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ExEcUTivE SUMMAry
As President Barack Obama has said, the 
danger that terrorists could get and use a 
nuclear bomb remains “the most immedi-
ate and extreme threat to global security.”  
Incidents around the world make clear 
that urgent action is needed to improve 
security for nuclear stockpiles around the 
world and to keep nuclear weapons and 
the materials needed to make them out 
of terrorist hands.  That is the purpose of 
both the global effort to secure all nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear 
material within four years that President 
Obama has initiated, and the nuclear se-
curity summit he is hosting in Washington 
on 12-13 April 2010.
Although the Obama administration has 
made progress toward this goal, much 
more needs to be done. Today, the world 
is not yet on track to succeed in achiev-
ing effective security for all stockpiles of 
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nu-
clear materials within four years.  To meet 
that objective, the nuclear security summit 
must be only the first step in a broader 
campaign to shift the global nuclear se-
curity effort onto a faster and broader 
trajectory.
thE thrEat of nuclEar tErroriSm
Several facts frame the danger:
Al Qaeda is seeking nuclear weap-• 
ons and has repeatedly attempted to 
acquire the materials and expertise 
needed to make them.
Numerous studies by the U.S. and • 
other governments have concluded 
that it is plausible that a sophisticated 
terrorist group could make a crude 
nuclear bomb if it got enough of the 
needed nuclear materials.
There have been over 18 documented • 
cases of theft or loss of plutonium or 
highly enriched uranium (HEU), the 
essential ingredients of nuclear weap-
ons.  Peace activists have broken into a 
Belgian base where U.S. nuclear weap-
ons are reportedly stored; two teams 
of armed men attacked a site in South 
Africa where hundreds of kilograms of 
HEU are stored; and Russian officials 
have confirmed that terrorist teams 
have carried out reconnaissance at Rus-
sian nuclear weapon storage facilities.
The immense length of national bor-• 
ders, the huge scale of legitimate traffic, 
the myriad potential pathways across 
these borders, and the small size and 
weak radiation signal of the materials 
needed to make a nuclear bomb make 
nuclear smuggling extraordinarily dif-
ficult to stop.
No one knows the real likelihood of 
nuclear terrorism.  But the consequences 
of a terrorist nuclear blast would be so 
catastrophic that even a small chance is 
enough to justify urgent action to reduce 
the risk. The heart of a major city could be 
reduced to a smoldering radioactive ruin, 
leaving tens to hundreds of thousands of 
people dead.  Devastating economic con-
sequences would reverberate worldwide.  
America and the world would be changed 
forever.
Making plutonium or HEU is well be-
yond the plausible capabilities of terrorist 
groups.  Hence, if all the world’s stock-
piles of these materials can be secured 
from falling into terrorist hands, nuclear 
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terrorism can be prevented.  Improved 
nuclear security is the single point on 
the terrorist pathway to the bomb where 
government policies can do the most to re-
duce the danger.  After a nuclear weapon 
or the material needed to make one has 
been stolen, every later step on the terror-
ist pathway is easier for terrorists to take 
and harder for governments to stop.
nuclEar SEcurity today
Today, nuclear weapons or the separated 
plutonium or HEU needed to make them 
exist in hundreds of buildings and bun-
kers in dozens of countries.  Each country 
where such stockpiles exist is respon-
sible for securing them, and the specific 
approaches, procedures, and rules for 
securing and accounting for nuclear stock-
piles vary widely. There are no binding 
global rules that specify how much secu-
rity these stockpiles should have.
In many countries, nuclear security today 
is substantially better than it was in the 
mid-1990s, as a result of national efforts 
and international cooperative programs.  
Security and accounting systems for 
all but a few dozen of the hundreds of 
buildings and bunkers in Russia and the 
Eurasian states have been substantially 
improved through cooperative efforts.  
Some 17 countries have eliminated all of 
the weapons-usable nuclear material on 
their soil.  These successes represent, in a 
real sense, bombs that will never go off—
and demonstrate the progress that can be 
achieved through cooperation.
But serious risks remain, as evidenced 
by recent incidents at nuclear sites and 
ongoing cases of theft or loss of weap-
ons-usable nuclear material.  Upgraded 
security systems will not last forever un-
less states provide the resources to sustain 
them and write and enforce rules that 
require sites and transporters to maintain 
effective security and accounting systems.  
Strong security cultures—in which all rel-
evant staff take security seriously, every 
day—are also an essential component of 
effective nuclear security.
Based on unclassified information on the 
quantity and quality of nuclear stockpiles 
around the world, the security levels in 
place, and the adversary threats these 
security systems must protect against, it 
appears that the highest risks of nuclear 
theft today are in:
Pakistan, where a small and heavily • 
guarded nuclear stockpile faces im-
mense threats, both from insiders who 
may be corrupt or sympathetic to ter-
rorists and from large-scale attacks by 
outsiders;
Russia, which has the world’s largest • 
nuclear stockpiles in the world’s larg-
est number of buildings and bunkers; 
security measures that have improved 
dramatically but still include im-
portant vulnerabilities (and need to 
be sustained for the long haul); and 
substantial threats, particularly from 
insiders, given the endemic corruption 
in Russia; and
HEU-fueled research reactors, which • 
usually (though not always) use only 
modest stocks of HEU, in forms that 
would require some chemical process-
ing before they could be used in a 
bomb, but which often have only the 
most minimal security measures in 
place—in some cases little more than a 
night watchman and a chain-link fence.
While these are the highest-risk catego-
ries, the risks elsewhere are very real as 
well.  Transport of nuclear weapons and 
materials is a particular concern, as it is 
the part of the nuclear material life-cycle 
most vulnerable to violent, forcible theft, 
since it is impossible to protect the mate-
ExECUTIVE SUMMARY vii
rial with thick walls and many minutes 
of delay when it is on the road.  Repro-
cessing plutonium from spent fuel and 
recycling it as new fuel requires intensive 
security measures and creates risks that 
are not present when the plutonium re-
mains in massive, intensely radioactive 
spent fuel assemblies that would be very 
difficult to steal.  Nuclear security issues 
exist not only in developing and transition 
countries but in wealthy countries as well, 
some of which have no armed guards at 
nuclear facilities, or only protect these 
facilities against very modest threats.  In 
the end, virtually every country where 
these materials exist—including the 
United States—has more to do to ensure 
that these stocks are effectively protected 
against the kinds of threats that terrorists 
and criminals have shown they can pose.   
Table ES-1 provides a summary of the 
state of nuclear security around the world 
today.
President Obama, building on programs 
launched by his predecessors, has taken 
a number of steps to accelerate nuclear 
security improvements, including launch-
ing the four-year nuclear security effort, 
hosting the nuclear security summit, cre-
ating new U.S. government positions to 
coordinate these programs, and request-
ing a significant increase in the budget for 
nuclear security improvement programs 
in fiscal year (FY) 2011 (though not, un-
fortunately, in FY 2010).  Recent progress 
includes:
During FY2009, security and account-• 
ing upgrades were completed at 29 
additional weapons-usable nuclear ma-
terial buildings in Russia, bringing the 
total for such buildings upgraded in 
Russia and the Eurasian states to 210, 
only 19 short of the target of 229 build-
ings to be completed through FY2012.
Since President Obama launched the • 
four-year nuclear security effort four 
countries have eliminated all the weap-
ons-usable nuclear material on their 
soil, with U.S. help.  To date, the United 
States has helped remove all the HEU 
from more than 47 facilities in coun-
tries around the world.
Discussions about eliminating all HEU • 
in several of the developing or transi-
tion non-nuclear-weapon states with 
the largest HEU stocks are well ad-
vanced.
Cooperation to improve nuclear secu-• 
rity is continuing in Pakistan, though 
the specifics are classified; the United 
States and Russia have greatly broad-
ened their exchanges of best practices, 
efforts to strengthen security culture, 
and cooperation to ensure effective nu-
clear security will be sustained for the 
long haul; and detailed dialogue with 
China on improving nuclear security 
and accounting is continuing.
The nuclear security summit has elevated 
the issue of nuclear security to a far higher 
political level.  If the summit succeeds, 
it will help build a new sense of urgency 
among the participants about taking 
action to prevent nuclear terrorism.  Prod-
ucts of the summit are expected to include 
a communiqué from the assembled lead-
ers, a more detailed expert-level work 
plan, and commitments to nuclear secu-
rity actions that individual participating 
countries are likely to make.  The suc-
cess of the summit will be measured by 
whether it leads to real change in the pace 
and scope of nuclear security improve-
ments on the ground in the months that 
follow.
Despite this progress, the world is not 
yet on track to succeed in achieving effec-
tive security for all stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear 
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Table ES-1: Global Nuclear Security Today
Category Assessment
Dramatic progress, though major issues remain.  Planned U.S.-sponsored security 
upgrades for both warhead sites and nuclear material buildings almost complete, 
though some warhead sites and material buildings not covered.  Inadequate Russian 
investment to ensure sustainability, though signs of improvement.  Questions on 
security culture.  Poorly paid and trained conscript guards for nuclear material.  
Substantial threats from widespread insider corruption and theft, while material 
accounting and control measures remain weak in some cases.  Substantial outsider 
threats as well, though suppressed by counterinsurgency in Chechnya.  Major need for 
consolidation, as Russia still has the world’s largest numbers of nuclear weapons sites 
and weapons-usable nuclear materials buildings, including the world’s largest eet of 
HEU-fueled research reactors.
Pakistan has a small, heavily guarded nuclear stockpile.  Substantial security improve-
ments have been made in recent years, in part with U.S. help, but the specics of this 
cooperation are classied.  Immense threats in Pakistan from nuclear insiders with 
extremist sympathies, al Qaeda or Taliban outsider attacks, and a weak state.  India also 
has a small nuclear stockpile, and reports that it requires its stocks to be protected 
against a range of outsider and insider threats, but has so far rejected nuclear security 
cooperation with the United States.  China has a somewhat larger nuclear stockpile, 
believed to be protected by substantial guard forces.  A broad U.S.-Chinese nuclear 
security dialogue is underway, and China appears to have modernized security and 
accounting measures at some sites, but little evidence that China has yet required such 
measures in its regulations. In North Korea, a very small nuclear stockpile and a 
garrison state probably limit the risks of nuclear theft.
Important progress in recent years, but some issues remain.  U.S.-funded security 
upgrades completed at nearly all facilities with weapons-usable material in the 
Eurasian states outside of Russia, and in Eastern Europe.  Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
and South Africa have particularly dangerous nuclear material: upgrades completed in 
Ukraine (though sustainability is an issue); upgrades nearing completion after a 
several-year delay in Belarus; South Africa (whose facility suered a penetration of the 
outer perimeter by armed men in November 2007) is discussing cooperation on 
nuclear security. Upgrades completed for nearly all HEU-fueled research reactors that 
previously did not meet IAEA recommendations, but some upgrades would not be 
enough to defend against demonstrated terrorist and criminal capabilities.
Signicant progress in recent years, as several countries have strengthened nuclear 
security rules since 9/11.  The United States has ongoing dialogues with key countries 
on nuclear security, but does not sponsor security upgrades in wealthy countries.  
Nuclear security requirements in some countries remain insucient to protect against 
demonstrated terrorist or criminal threats.  Additional eorts needed to consolidate 
both HEU and separated plutonium in fewer locations.
Substantial progress in recent years, though issues remain.  DOE has drastically 
strengthened its requirements for protecting both nuclear weapons and materials 
(especially from outsider attack) since 9/11.  NRC has also increased its security 
requirements, though they remain less stringent than DOE requirements, and NRC-
regulated research reactors fueled with HEU remain exempt from most NRC security 
requirements. Major progress in converting NRC-regulated reactors to low-enriched 
fuel, and in implementing voluntary security upgrades going beyond regulatory 
requirements at these sites.  Recent incidents suggest an ongoing issue with security 
culture.
Russia
Developing states 
with nuclear weapons
(Pakistan, India, 
China, North Korea)
Developing and 
transition non-nuclear-
weapon states
Developed Countries
United States
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materials within four years.  To meet that 
objective, the nuclear security summit and 
the efforts that follow will have to shift the 
nuclear security effort onto a faster and 
broader trajectory.
nExt StEPS to SEcurE nuclEar 
matErial in four yEarS
The goal of the four-year nuclear security 
effort that President Obama has called 
for and that the UN Security Council has 
endorsed in Resolution 1887 should be to 
ensure that all stocks of nuclear weapons, 
plutonium, and HEU worldwide are effec-
tively and lastingly protected.
All means that any nuclear material that 
could be used to make a nuclear bomb 
should be included, whether it is in a 
military or a civilian stockpile.  It means 
the effort must ensure security not just 
for materials in developing or transition 
countries such as Russia, Pakistan, or 
South Africa, but also in wealthy coun-
tries such as Belgium and Japan—and the 
United States. 
Effectively is a matter of risk—another way 
of stating the goal is that at the end of 
four years, all nuclear stocks should have 
a low risk of being stolen.  That means 
they have to be reliably protected against 
the most plausible kinds of adversary ca-
pabilities (both outsider and insider) that 
they might face.  In a world with terrorists 
with global reach, all nuclear weapons 
and weapons-usable nuclear materials 
should at least be protected against theft 
by a well-placed insider; a modest group 
of well-armed and well-trained outsid-
ers, capable of operating as more than 
one team; or both together, and against 
a range of tactics such adversaries might 
use, from frontal assault to deception to 
covert infiltration.  Countries facing more 
capable adversaries, such as Pakistan, 
should put even more stringent security 
measures in place.  
Lastingly means that countries have put 
in place the resources to sustain effective 
security and accounting measures for the 
long haul, and the regulations requiring 
operators to do so. 
As with any government program, it will 
be essential to develop measures and 
indicators that provide a realistic assess-
ment of the progress being made.  Such 
measures might include, for example, the 
fraction of the total world number of sites 
with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable 
nuclear materials where all of those stocks 
have been eliminated, and the fraction 
that have demonstrated that their security 
systems are performing effectively, and 
could protect against a broad range of 
outsider and insider threats.
It would certainly not be possible for U.S.-
funded upgrades to be negotiated and 
implemented for all relevant sites around 
the world in four years.  Instead, the ef-
fort must combine U.S.-funded upgrades 
and material removals (or those funded 
by other donor states) with security im-
provements and material removals key 
countries carry out themselves, once they 
become convinced of the urgency of ac-
tion.  The administration must develop a 
clear set of metrics to be used in assessing 
progress in the four-year nuclear security 
effort—metrics that assess not just where 
equipment has been installed but what 
fraction of the sites where nuclear weap-
ons and weapons-usable nuclear materials 
exist have effective nuclear security mea-
sures in place.
With the right leadership, sufficient re-
sources, a comprehensive, prioritized 
plan, and a partnership-based approach, 
it is quite plausible that at the end of the 
four-year effort, the number of countries 
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where weapons-usable nuclear material 
exists could be cut in half or more; the 
number of sites could have been cut by 
20-30 percent; and that all the countries 
where nuclear weapons or weapons-
usable nuclear material still exists could 
put in place effectively enforced rules 
requiring all of their dangerous nuclear 
stocks to be protected against a robust 
set of outsider and insider threats.  Such 
progress would dramatically reduce the 
danger that nuclear terrorism poses to 
global security.  Nevertheless, it is clear 
that continued work to improve nuclear 
security—particularly the important but 
difficult specifics of accurate control and 
accounting of nuclear materials being pro-
cessed in bulk—will still be needed after 
the end of the four-year nuclear security 
effort.
Achieving these objectives will require 
several steps beyond those already being 
taken.
Build the sense of urgency and 
commitment worldwide
The fundamental key to the success of 
the four-year nuclear security effort is to 
convince political leaders and nuclear 
managers around the world that nuclear 
terrorism is a real and urgent threat 
to their countries’ security, worthy of a 
substantial investment of their time and 
money.  If these programs succeed in 
building that sense of urgency, these of-
ficials and managers will take the needed 
actions to prevent nuclear terrorism; with-
out that sense of urgency, they will not.
The United States and other countries 
should take several steps to build the 
needed sense of urgency and commit-
ment, including: (a) joint threat briefings at 
upcoming summits and high-level meet-
ings with key countries, where experts 
from both the United States and the coun-
try concerned would outline the very real 
possibility that terrorists could get nuclear 
material and make a nuclear bomb; (b) 
intelligence agency discussions, in which 
U.S. intelligence agencies would seek to 
convince their foreign counterparts—
who are often their government’s main 
source for assessments of national secu-
rity threats—that the nuclear terrorism 
threat is a real one that must be addressed 
urgently; (c) an “Armageddon Test,” in 
which intelligence agents would attempt 
to penetrate nuclear smuggling networks 
and acquire sufficient nuclear material 
for a bomb, providing a realistic assess-
ment of how difficult it is to do so; (d) 
nuclear terrorism exercises with policymak-
ers from key states, which can sometimes 
reach officials emotionally in a way that 
briefings and policy memos cannot; (e) 
fast-paced nuclear security reviews, in which 
leaders of key states would pick teams of 
security experts they trust to conduct fast-
paced reviews of nuclear security in their 
countries (with U.S. advice and technical 
assistance if desired), assessing whether 
facilities are adequately protected against 
a set of clearly-defined threats (as the 
United States did after 9/11, revealing a 
wide range of vulnerabilities); (f) realistic 
testing of nuclear security performance, in 
which the United States could help coun-
tries conduct realistic tests of their nuclear 
security systems’ ability to defeat realistic 
insider or outsider threats; and (g) shared 
databases of threats and incidents, including 
unclassified information on actual secu-
rity incidents (both at nuclear sites and at 
non-nuclear guarded facilities) that offer 
lessons for policymakers and facility man-
agers to consider in deciding on nuclear 
security levels and particular threats to 
defend against.
Broaden consolidation and  
security upgrade efforts
Today, U.S.-funded cooperative nuclear 
security upgrade efforts are focusing pri-
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marily on the former Soviet Union, South 
Asia, and a few HEU-fueled research 
reactors elsewhere.  (Nuclear security 
cooperation with China has so far fo-
cused on dialogue and exchanges of best 
practices, not on U.S.-funded upgrades.)  
U.S.-funded consolidation programs focus 
primarily on converting HEU-fueled reac-
tors and removing Soviet-supplied HEU 
and a fraction of U.S.-supplied HEU.  
To secure all nuclear stockpiles in four 
years, both security upgrades and con-
solidation efforts must be broadened.  The 
United States and other donor countries 
should plan to carry out security up-
grades that are more extensive than those 
now planned, at more facilities, in more 
countries.  These should include not only 
installing equipment, but also increasing 
each country’s capacity and commitments 
to implement effective nuclear security on 
their own—through training, exchanges of 
best practices, improvements in regulation 
and enforcement, sustainability support 
programs, work on security culture, and 
more.  This effort should include the 
regional nuclear security “centers of excel-
lence” that President Obama and some 
European countries have proposed, which 
could provide central locations for train-
ing, demonstrating modern equipment, 
exchange of best practices, and the like.
Consolidation efforts should be expanded 
to include reducing the number of sites 
where nuclear weapons exist (particularly 
in Russia); limiting the accumulation of 
stockpiles of separated plutonium, and 
the number of places where plutonium is 
processed, stored, and used; and remov-
ing HEU from a far broader set of the sites 
where it now exists, with the goal of elimi-
nating the HEU from the most vulnerable 
sites during the four-year effort, and 
eliminating all civil HEU within roughly 
a decade.  The United States and other 
donor countries should offer additional 
incentives, structured to the needs of each 
facility, to convince facilities to agree to 
convert to fuels that cannot be used in a 
nuclear bomb, or to shut down, and to 
give up their HEU or separated pluto-
nium.  The United States and other donor 
states should offer something in the range 
of $10,000 per kilogram for modest stocks 
of excess HEU from any country willing 
to get rid of it and to agree not to make or 
buy more.
Get the rules and incentives right
Effectively enforced national rules for nu-
clear security and effective global nuclear 
security rules are both key elements of the 
effort to secure nuclear stockpiles around 
the world.  As most nuclear managers 
only invest in expensive security measures 
when the government tells them they 
have to, effective regulation is essential 
to effective and lasting security.  Hence, 
President Obama and other leaders seek-
ing to improve nuclear security should 
greatly increase the focus on ensuring that 
countries around the world put in place 
and enforce effective nuclear security and 
accounting regulations, giving all facilities 
strong incentives to ensure those stock-
piles are effectively secured.  Regulators 
in each country must have the authority, 
independence, expertise, and resources 
needed to do their jobs effectively—and 
countries must ensure that operators have 
the resources needed to follow the rules.  
These rules should include requirements 
for realistic testing of the performance 
of nuclear security systems against intel-
ligent and creative insider and outsider 
adversaries.
Nuclear security is only as strong as its 
weakest link.  Hence, it is also important 
to seek effective global nuclear security 
rules that will help ensure that each coun-
try where stockpiles of nuclear weapons 
and weapons-usable materials exist puts 
effective national rules and procedures 
in place.  Unfortunately, because of com-
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placency about the threat, concerns over 
national sovereignty, and differing na-
tional approaches, past efforts to negotiate 
global treaties specifying how secure 
nuclear weapons or weapons-usable ma-
terials should be have not succeeded, and 
such a treaty-negotiation approach is not 
likely to succeed in the future.  (There is a 
Convention on Physical Protection and a 
2005 amendment to it that provide useful 
guidelines, but set no specific require-
ments for how secure weapons-usable 
nuclear material should be.)
The most promising approach to forging 
international standards is to make use 
of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 
which already legally requires all coun-
tries to provide “appropriate effective” 
security and accounting for any nuclear 
stockpiles they may have. The United 
States should work with other states pur-
suing improved nuclear security to build 
a political-level consensus around what 
essential elements need to be in place for 
nuclear security systems to be considered 
“appropriate” and “effective,” and then 
work with other donor states to help (and 
to pressure) countries around the world to 
put those essential elements in place.  The 
approach should be based on ensuring 
that all states provide protection against 
a plausible set of outsider and insider 
threats, while leaving flexibility for each 
country to pursue its own approach to 
accomplishing that objective.  At the same 
time, the United States should certainly 
continue to work to get states to ratify the 
physical protection convention and its 
2005 amendment and to strengthen the 
IAEA’s nuclear security guides and recom-
mendations. 
Incentives are as important as rules. Given 
the strong incentives to save money and 
time by cutting corners on nuclear secu-
rity, states, agencies, facilities, managers, 
and staff must be given strong incentives 
to focus on achieving high nuclear se-
curity performance. If the effort to build 
a sense of urgency around the world 
about the threat of nuclear terrorism suc-
ceeds, the desire to address real threats 
will provide the most important incen-
tive.  President Obama should also make 
clear to countries around the world that 
cooperating to ensure effective security 
for nuclear stockpiles and take other steps 
to prevent nuclear terrorism is essential 
to good relations with the United States, 
just as compliance with arms control and 
nonproliferation agreements has been for 
many years. At the same time, the United 
States should seek to ensure that each 
country with dangerous nuclear stockpiles 
establishes financial and other rewards 
for strong nuclear security performance 
(comparable, for example, to the bonus 
payments contractors managing DOE 
facilities can earn for high performance), 
and for those who identify nuclear se-
curity problems and propose practical 
solutions. The U.S. government should 
take the position that only facilities that 
can demonstrate that they maintain highly 
effective security will be eligible for U.S. 
government-funded contracts for coopera-
tive R&D and related efforts, and should 
seek to convince other governments to do 
likewise. Ultimately, effective security and 
accounting for weapons-usable nuclear 
material should become part of the “price 
of admission” for doing business in the 
international nuclear market.
Take a partnership-based approach
To succeed, a global nuclear security im-
provement effort must be based not just 
on donor-recipient relationships but on 
real partnerships, which integrate ideas 
and resources from countries where up-
grades are taking place in ways that also 
serve their national interests.  For coun-
tries like India and Pakistan, for example, 
it is politically untenable to accept U.S. 
assistance that is portrayed as necessary 
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because they are unable to adequately 
control their nuclear stockpiles on their 
own.  But joining with the major nuclear 
states in jointly addressing a global 
problem may be politically appealing.  
U.S.-Russian relations are still rocky de-
spite President Obama’s efforts to “reset” 
them, making a real nuclear security part-
nership with Russia difficult to achieve, 
but no less essential; shared U.S.-Russian 
interests in keeping nuclear material out 
of terrorist hands remain.  Such partner-
ships will have to be based on creative 
approaches that make it possible to co-
operate in upgrading nuclear security 
without demanding that countries com-
promise their legitimate nuclear secrets.  
Specific approaches should be crafted to 
accommodate each national culture, se-
crecy system, and set of circumstances.  
As a central element of this partnership-
based approach, the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism should be 
reinvigorated, with a focus on building 
the international sense of urgency and 
commitment to action to reduce the risk 
of nuclear terrorism, and on meeting the 
four-year nuclear security objective.
Broaden best practices exchanges 
and security culture efforts
Opportunities for nuclear security op-
erators to hear about and learn from 
the best security practices used in other 
facilities around the world—as offered, 
for example, by the new World Institute 
for Nuclear Security—can be powerful 
motivators for improvement.  Targeted 
efforts to improve nuclear security cul-
ture, so that guards are no longer falling 
asleep on the job or turning off intrusion 
detectors, are also critical. As Gen. Eugene 
Habiger, former commander of U.S. stra-
tegic nuclear forces and former security 
“czar” at the U.S. Department of Energy 
once put it, “good security is 20 percent 
equipment and 80 percent culture.”  Presi-
dent Obama and other leaders seeking 
to improve nuclear security should work 
with all countries where nuclear weapons 
and weapons-usable nuclear materials 
exist—as well as countries with major 
nuclear facilities that might be subject to 
sabotage—to exchange best practices and 
strengthen nuclear security culture.  The 
ultimate goal should be to ensure that 
every facility and transporter handling 
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable 
nuclear material participates in programs 
to exchange best practices, and has a tar-
geted program in place to continually 
assess and strengthen its nuclear security 
culture.
Create mechanisms to follow up  
and to build confidence in progress
Mechanisms to follow up on commit-
ments made and to build confidence that 
they are being implemented—and that 
states are maintaining effective nuclear 
security systems—will be essential if the 
commitments of the nuclear security sum-
mit are to have a real and lasting impact.
First, each participating state should 
designate one or a small number of key 
officials to be responsible for implement-
ing their states’ efforts, and groups of 
these officials should meet regularly in 
the months and years after the summit to 
review progress and assess next steps.  If 
initial approaches are not working, or par-
ticular cooperating countries identify gaps 
that need to be filled or unexpected prob-
lems that need to be solved, these officials 
should have the authority to modify the 
cooperative nuclear security efforts.  
Second, it is important to build an inter-
national understanding of the work to 
be done.  Through intelligence programs 
such as the Nuclear Materials Information 
Program, the United States is developing 
a more comprehensive classified under-
standing of the state of nuclear security 
around world.  But a common under-
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standing of the state of nuclear security 
around the world is needed, to provide a 
baseline against which to judge progress 
of the four-year nuclear security effort.  
While many of the specifics of nuclear 
security arrangements in different coun-
tries will inevitably remain shrouded 
in secrecy, the United States and other 
countries working to achieve the four-year 
nuclear security objective should seek to 
convince countries of the importance of 
sharing as much information as they can 
about how many sites with nuclear stock-
piles exist in each country, what security 
measures are in place (at least in general 
descriptive terms), and the like.
Third, countries should work together 
to develop means, within the confines of 
necessary secrecy, to build international 
confidence that states are taking the 
steps they have committed to and put-
ting effective nuclear security measures in 
place.  International visits such as those 
that take place under U.S. nuclear supply 
agreements, IAEA-led peer reviews, and 
international cooperation on nuclear secu-
rity upgrades are all effective mechanisms 
for expanding transparency to build 
confidence that effective nuclear security 
measures are in place, or are being put 
in place.  But additional approaches will 
be needed for sites that are unlikely to 
welcome international visitors in the near 
future—from U.S. and Russian nuclear 
warhead assembly plants to nuclear sites 
in Pakistan and Israel.  For example, coun-
tries might have their adversary teams 
who test nuclear security systems train to-
gether (to increase their understanding of 
the kinds of tests each participating coun-
try conducts)—and then report to each 
other, at least in general terms, the results 
of nuclear security tests.  The United 
States, for example, already openly pub-
lishes data on what percentage of DOE 
facilities have received high ratings in 
DOE security inspections—and uses that 
percentage as a measure of the effective-
ness of ongoing steps to improve security.  
In the immediate term, until such mea-
sures can be agreed, states should do 
more to provide general descriptions of 
their nuclear security approaches, photo-
graphs of installed equipment, and related 
data that could be made public and help 
build confidence that effective nuclear se-
curity measures are being taken without 
providing data that could help terrorists 
and criminals plan their attacks.
Build a multi-layered defense
Nuclear security systems will never be 
perfect—and some nuclear material may 
already have been stolen and never re-
covered.  Hence, a multilayered effort to 
block the terrorist pathway to the bomb is 
needed, with nuclear security as the first 
and most important layer.  The United 
States and other countries seeking to re-
duce this risk should expand police and 
intelligence cooperation focused on iden-
tifying and countering terrorist groups 
with nuclear ambitions and seeking to 
interdict nuclear smuggling.  They should 
work to ensure that countries around the 
world have criminal laws in place impos-
ing heavy penalties for any participation 
in efforts to steal or smuggle nuclear 
material or any assistance to nuclear ter-
rorists—and that states have units of their 
national police trained and equipped to 
deal with such cases.   They should create 
new tip lines and reward programs to en-
courage participants in such conspiracies 
to blow the whistle.  While the likelihood 
that hostile states would consciously de-
cide to transfer nuclear weapons or the 
materials needed to make them to terror-
ists is already low, the United States and 
its international partners should seek to 
lower it further, in particular by putting 
together international packages of car-
rots and sticks large enough and credible 
enough to convince North Korea and Iran 
that it is in their national interests to veri-
fiably abandon their pursuit of nuclear 
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weapons—and by making crystal clear the 
consequences that any state found to have 
intentionally transferred such items to ter-
rorists would face.
Provide the needed leadership, 
planning, and resources
Achieving effective security for all the 
world’s stockpiles of nuclear weapons and 
weapons-usable nuclear materials poses 
an extraordinarily difficult challenge. 
Sustained high-level leadership will be 
needed to overcome a maze of obstacles 
posed by complacency about the threat, 
secrecy, political disputes, sovereignty 
concerns, and bureaucratic obstacles.  In-
ense engagement from presidents and 
prime ministers in the months and years 
following the nuclear security summit 
will be needed, not just occasional state-
ments of support.  Leaders will have to be 
willing to change outdated rules, overrule 
officials standing in the way of nuclear 
security cooperation, invest additional 
funds in nuclear security, and more.
First, President Obama, building on the 
structure he has put in place, should give 
the National Security Council clear di-
rection and authority to take the needed 
actions to move this agenda forward, and 
to keep this effort on the front burner at 
the White House every day.  The staff fo-
cused on this topic need to wake up every 
morning thinking “what can we do today 
to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack?”  
President Obama should also encourage 
Russia and other key countries to put sim-
ilar top-level structures in place, so that 
it is clear which officials other countries 
should talk to about nuclear security and 
nuclear terrorism.
Second, President Obama should direct 
the NSC staff to further develop a compre-
hensive, prioritized plan for preventing 
nuclear terrorism, integrating steps from 
implementing nuclear security upgrades 
to expanding intelligence cooperation 
focused on the nuclear terrorist threat to 
building the sense of urgency around the 
world.  This plan will have to be continu-
ously modified as circumstances change.
Third, President Obama and the Congress 
should work together to provide sufficient 
resources to ensure that steps that could 
significantly reduce nuclear terrorism 
risks are not slowed by lack of money.  
Achieving the four-year nuclear security 
objective will require doing more, faster, 
than in the past, which will inevitably re-
quire an increase in budgets.  Yet nuclear 
security is eminently affordable: the sums 
spent on cooperative threat reduction each 
year are a tiny fraction of the budgets of 
the Departments of Defense, Energy, and 
State.  As part of providing sufficient re-
sources, the leaders at the 2010 G8 summit 
should agree to extend the Global Partner-
ship Against the Spread of Weapons and 
Materials of Mass Destruction for another 
ten years, with a continuing flow of funds, 
and target it on helping states around the 
world provide effective nuclear security 
and meet their other obligations under 
UNSCR 1540.  In addition, the United 
States and other countries should expand 
their efforts to strengthen the IAEA’s 
nuclear security efforts, increasing their 
budgets and shifting them to the regular 
budget rather than relying almost exclu-
sively on voluntary contributions.
Fourth, President Obama should take ac-
tion to ensure that his administration has 
the information and analysis it needs to 
support effective policymaking, including 
(a) directing U.S. intelligence agencies to 
place high priority on all aspects of the 
nuclear terrorism problem, from assess-
ing and penetrating terrorist conspiracies 
and nuclear smuggling networks to as-
sessing nuclear security measures around 
the world; and (b) working with Congress 
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to fund non-government institutions to 
provide independent analysis and sug-
gestions that can help strengthen these 
programs.
Fifth, President Obama should work 
to put the United States’ own house in 
order, continuing the effort to convert 
U.S. HEU-fueled research reactors to use 
low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel that 
cannot be used in a nuclear bomb, going 
farther in consolidating U.S. stockpiles, 
and working to strengthen security at 
U.S. HEU-fueled research reactors (which 
are exempted from many of the most 
important U.S. nuclear security rules).  
Convincing foreign countries to reduce 
and consolidate nuclear stockpiles, to put 
stringent nuclear security measures in 
place, or to convert their research reac-
tors will be far more difficult if the United 
States is not doing the same at home.
The obstacles to accelerated and expanded 
progress are real and difficult.  But with 
sustained high-level leadership, a sensible 
strategy, partnership-based approaches, 
adequate resources, and good informa-
tion, they can be overcome.  The actions 
President Obama has already taken open 
new opportunities.  Now is the time to 
seize them.  President Obama still has an 
enormous opportunity and an obligation, 
to reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism 
to a fraction of its current level during his 
first term in office.
1 IntroductIon
The challenges of our time threaten the peace 
and prosperity of every single nation, and no 
one nation can meet these challenges alone…  
[T]he theft of loose nuclear materials could lead 
to the extermination of any city on Earth.
—President Barack Obama, 10 July 2009
In Prague in April 2009, U.S. President 
Barack Obama warned that the danger 
that terrorists could get and use a nuclear 
bomb remains “the most immediate and 
extreme threat to global security.”  From 
peace activists breaking into a base where 
U.S. nuclear weapons are reportedly 
stored in Belgium in early 2010 to armed 
men assaulting a site with hundreds of 
kilograms of highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) in South Africa in 2007 to repeated 
cases of theft or loss of plutonium or 
HEU, a drumbeat of events makes clear 
that urgent action is needed to improve 
security for nuclear stockpiles around the 
world and to keep nuclear weapons and 
the materials needed to make them out of 
terrorist hands.  (See “Incidents Highlight 
the Global Threat,” p. 4.)  To respond to 
this danger, President Obama announced 
“a new international effort to secure all 
vulnerable nuclear material around the 
world within four years.”1  Dating from 
President Obama’s speech, the four-year 
nuclear security effort would extend to 
April 2013.  In September 2009, the UN Se-
curity Council unanimously endorsed this 
four-year objective in Resolution 1887.2 
1 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Re-
marks by President Barack Obama,” Prague, Czech 
Republic, 5 April 2009 http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-
Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/ (accessed 19 
February 2010).
2 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 
1887,” S/Res/1887 (New York: United Nations, 
24 September 2009), http://daccess-ods.un.org/
As part of that effort, President Obama is 
hosting an unprecedented global summit 
focused entirely on security for nuclear 
stockpiles, scheduled for 12-13 April 2010, 
in Washington, D.C.
This report is intended to assess:
The magnitude of the continuing threat • 
of nuclear theft and terrorism;
The current global status of security for • 
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable 
nuclear materials;3 
access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1887%20
(2009)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC (accessed 8 Febru-
ary 2010).
3 In this report, “weapons-usable materials” refers 
primarily to HEU and plutonium separated from 
spent fuel; the phrase as used here is essentially the 
same as the set of materials the IAEA refers to as 
“unirradiated direct use nuclear material.”  Both 
“reactor-grade” plutonium and HEU enriched to 
levels well below the 90% usually referred to as 
“weapon-grade” are weapons-usable. For the most 
detailed official unclassified statement on the weap-
ons-usability of reactor-grade plutonium, see U.S. 
Department of Energy, Office of Arms Control and 
Nonproliferation, Nonproliferation and Arms Con-
trol Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material 
Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alterna-
tives, DOE/NN-0007 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 1997), 
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/425259-
CXr7Qn/webviewable/425259.pdf (accessed 5 March 
2010), pp. 37-39; for a useful discussion in the case 
of HEU, see Alexander Glaser, “On the Proliferation 
Potential of Uranium Fuel for Research Reactors at 
Various Enrichment Levels,” Science and Global Se-
curity, Vol. 14 (2006).  The phrase “weapons-usable 
nuclear material,” like the IAEA’s phrase, includes 
not only pure HEU or plutonium but also HEU or 
plutonium in fabricated reactor fuel that would 
require some modest chemical processing before 
it could be used in a nuclear explosive.  While it 
does not include plutonium in intensely radioactive 
power reactor spent fuel that would be extremely 
difficult for adversaries to steal and process to re-
cover plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, it does 
include HEU and plutonium in modestly radioactive 
materials that do not pose a similar barrier to theft, 
such as most irradiated research reactor fuel.  (For a 
1
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What the goals of this four-year effort • 
should be, and how progress toward 
them should be judged;
How much effort has been expended • 
and how much progress has already 
been made to achieve the goals Presi-
dent Obama and the Security Council 
outlined; and
What further steps are needed if the • 
four-year effort is to succeed.
When this report is published, a year of 
the four years after President Obama’s 
Prague speech will already have gone by, 
leaving just three years remaining if the 
original goal is to be met.  Identifying the 
highest-priority risk reduction steps that 
can be accomplished in that remaining 
time, and the means to overcome the ob-
stacles to taking those steps, is the central 
focus of this report.  Of course, like many 
other deadlines, the four-year goal is, in 
a sense, arbitrary.  What is essential is not 
that nuclear security improvements be 
accomplished within three years or four 
years, but that improvements sufficient to 
keep nuclear materials from being stolen 
get to the world’s stockpiles of nuclear 
discussion of the risks posed by irradiated research 
reactor fuel, see Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, 
Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (Washington, 
D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on 
Managing the Atom, Harvard University, May 2004), 
pp. 37-39. In addition to plutonium and HEU, the 
phrase would also include more obscure materials 
from which a bomb could be made, such as U-233, 
or certain isotopes of elements such as americium 
or neptunium. See, for example, David Albright 
and Lauren Barbour, “Troubles Tomorrow? Sepa-
rated Neptunium-237 and Americium,” in David 
Albright and Kevin O’Neill, eds., The Challenges of 
Fissile Material Control (Washington, D.C.: Institute 
for Science and International Security, 1999), pp. 
85-96, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/
fmct/ book/ New%20chapter%205.pdf  (accessed 5 
March 2010). These other materials exist in kilogram 
quantities in only a few facilities in the world, which 
are typically highly secure facilities, and therefore 
do not contribute a major part of the overall risk of 
nuclear theft and terrorism.  As far as is publicly 
known, actual nuclear weapons have only been fab-
ricated from plutonium, HEU, or both.  
weapons and the materials needed to 
make them before thieves and terrorists 
do.  The effort to secure the world’s nu-
clear stockpiles is, in that sense, a race—a 
“race between cooperation and catastro-
phe,” as former Senator Sam Nunn has 
said.4
It is not an accident that President Obama 
announced the four-year effort to secure 
nuclear materials worldwide as part of 
his broad speech on nonproliferation and 
disarmament, in which he recommitted 
the United States to seeking “the peace 
and security of a world without nuclear 
weapons.”  Security for nuclear weapons 
and weapons-usable nuclear materials 
is the essential foundation for what are 
often known as the “three pillars” of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—nonpro-
liferation, disarmament, and peaceful use 
of nuclear energy.5  None of those other 
objectives can realistically be achieved 
without effective nuclear security.  The 
possibility that states or terrorist groups 
could rapidly and secretly make a nuclear 
bomb using stolen nuclear materials poses 
a fundamental proliferation threat.  States 
with nuclear weapons will not disarm 
if they believe other states or terrorist 
groups might suddenly get nuclear weap-
ons by such means.  And nuclear power 
will be unable to gain the support it needs 
for large-scale growth unless nuclear fa-
cilities and nuclear stockpiles are seen to 
be safe and secure.
4 See, for example, Sam Nunn, “The Race Between 
Cooperation and Catastrophe: Reducing the Global 
Nuclear Threat,” speech, National Press Club, 9 
March 2005 http://www.nti.org/c_press/ 
speech_nunnpressclub_030905.pdf, (accessed 9 Feb-
ruary 2010).
5 Some governments have referred to nuclear secu-
rity as a “fourth pillar” of the NPT, but given how 
essential nuclear security is to the traditional three 
pillars, it seems more accurate to describe it as a 
foundation for these three than as a fourth pillar.  
See Prime Minister Gordon Brown, The Road to 2010: 
Addressing the Nuclear Question in the 21st Century 
(London: United Kingdom Cabinet Office, July 
2009), p. 8.
INTROdUCTION 3
Nevertheless, this report does not ad-
dress the full spectrum of steps needed to 
reduce the dangers of nuclear weapons 
or limit their spread to additional states.6  
Instead, it is focused only on steps to 
prevent terrorist acquisition and use of 
an actual nuclear explosive.  It does not 
cover the broad range of non-nuclear 
means by which terrorists might be able 
to cause catastrophic harm.7 The use of a 
nuclear bomb would be among the most 
difficult types of attack for terrorists to 
accomplish—but the massive, assured, 
instantaneous, and comprehensive de-
struction of life and property that would 
result may make nuclear weapons a prior-
ity for terrorists despite the difficulties.
It is important to understand the full 
history-changing scope of the catastrophe 
that even a single terrorist nuclear bomb 
could cause.  The heart of a major city 
could be reduced to a smoldering radio-
active ruin, leaving tens or hundreds of 
6 For compilations of recommended steps for the 
broader problem of nuclear nonproliferation, see, for 
example, George Perkovich et al., Universal Compli-
ance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2005), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/
UC2.FINAL3.pdf (accessed 10 December 2009); 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Hans 
Blix, chairman, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World 
of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms (Stockholm: 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006), 
http://wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.
pdf (accessed 9 February 2009); and International 
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Dis-
armament, Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, 
co-chairs, Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical 
Agenda for Global Policymakers (Canberra/Tokyo: 
International Commission on Nuclear Non-Prolif-
eration and Disarmament, November 2009), http://
www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/pdf/ICNND_
Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf.
7 For an official listing of major terrorist and natu-
ral scenarios that could cause catastrophic harm, 
see U.S. Homeland Security Council, National 
Planning Scenarios: Version 20.1 Draft (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2005), 
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/
nationalsecurity/earlywarning/NationalPlanningSce-
nariosApril2005.pdf (accessed 9 February 2010).
thousands of people dead.8 Terrorists—
either those who committed the attack or 
others—would probably claim they had 
more bombs already hidden in other cities 
(whether they did nor not), and the fear 
that this might be true could lead to pan-
icked evacuations, creating widespread 
havoc and economic disruption.
Some countries may feel that nuclear ter-
rorism is really only a concern for the 
countries most likely to be the targets, 
such as the United States.  In reality, 
however, such an event would cause dev-
astating economic aftershocks worldwide.  
8 There have been many assessments of the impact 
of such an attack, though they usually focus nar-
rowly on the death and destruction the explosion 
itself would cause, rather than the reverberating 
aftershocks.  An earlier report in this series, esti-
mated that if terrorists detonated a 10-kiloton bomb 
(that is, one with the explosive power of 10,000 
tons of TNT, somewhat smaller than the bomb that 
obliterated Hiroshima) at Grand Central Station in 
Manhattan on a typical workday, the attack could 
kill half a million people and cause roughly $1 tril-
lion in direct economic damage.  See Matthew Bunn, 
Anthony Wier, and John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear 
Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan 
(Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project 
on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2003; available at http://
www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/cnwm.pdf as of 28 
March 2008), pp. 15-19.  This was a rough estimate 
based on a relatively crude analysis.  A number of 
more detailed analyses of the effects of a terrorist 
nuclear weapon in a U.S. city are available, though 
a surprising number of them either envision a bomb 
going off in an area with much lower population 
density than mid-town Manhattan, or envision the 
bomb being detonated at night (when the popula-
tions at the center of most cities are far lower, but 
easier to get information about from the U.S. cen-
sus).  For a recent official government analysis of 
such an event in Washington D.C., see, for example, 
U.S. Homeland Security Council, National Planning 
Scenarios: Version 20.1 Draft. Recent detailed non-gov-
ernment analyses include Charles Meade and Roger 
C. Molander, Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic 
Terrorist Attack (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2006; 
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_re-
ports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf as of 28 March 2008) 
and Ira Helfand, Lachlan Forrow, and Jaya Tiwari, 
“Nuclear Terrorism,” British Medical Journal 324 (9 
February 2002; available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/
reprint/324/7333/356.pdf as of 28 March 2008).
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IncIdents HIgHlIgHt tHe global tHreat
In early February 2010, a group of peace activists climbed over the perimeter fence at Kleine-Borgel 
airbase in Belgium, where U.S. nuclear weapons are reportedly stored.  The fence was a simple chain-
link fence with no intrusion detectors, and the group was not detected.  The group walked out onto 
the runway, where they spent 40 minutes to an hour, expecting to be arrested.  They then walked 
through a gate that had been left open in a double fence surrounding an area of bunkers, placing pro-
test stickers on the wall of one bunker (not, apparently, a nuclear weapon storage bunker).  They then 
proceeded across a large open area, where they were finally stopped by a single guard, whose weapon 
appeared to be unloaded—some 90 minutes after they entered the base.1
Though the area the activists penetrated was not the nuclear weapons storage area, this was a major 
security breach, revealing substantial weaknesses in the site’s ability to detect, assess, and respond to 
adversary intrusions in a timely way.  Remarkably, security at the site was still weak despite a series of 
warnings of security problems and threats, including: (a) a November 2009 penetration of the site by 
the same peace group (which only reached the airstrip, not the area with the hardened bunkers); (b) 
a 2008 report from an Air Force blue-ribbon panel that warned that there were significant security 
problems at European bases for U.S. nuclear weapons, and that “most sites require significant ad-
ditional resources to meet [Department of Defense] security requirements”;2 and (c) the 2001 arrest 
of an al Qaeda operative for planning to bomb the same base (and who testified that an insider at the 
base had sold photos of the facility to al Qaeda).3
In November 2007, just over two years earlier, two teams of armed men attacked the Pelindaba nu-
clear facility in South Africa, where hundreds of kilograms of weapon-grade HEU are located.  One 
of the teams got through a 10,000-volt security fence, disabled intrusion detectors without detection, 
and proceeded to the emergency control center (where they shot one of the workers on duty in a 
struggle).  They had set off no alarm until the worker at the emergency control center called for help. 
They left via the same point at the fence by which they arrived, reportedly spending 45 minutes inside 
the guarded perimeter without ever being engaged by site security forces.  The other team engaged the 
site security forces, but never entered the site perimeter.  The attackers’ familiarity with how to disable 
the intrusion detectors and with equipment at the emergency control center strongly suggests they had 
help from someone with insider knowledge.  The attackers have never been identified or captured. The 
security manager, two guards, and a shift supervisor on duty at the time resigned or were fired. While 
they never penetrated the inner security for the HEU area, this also represents a major security breach,
1 For useful discussions of this incident, with links to the peace activists’ video taken by the peace activists and to a variety of 
other relevant sources, see Jeffrey Lewis, “Activists Breach Security at Kleine Brogel,” ArmsControlWonk.com, 4 February 2010, 
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2614/activists-breach-security-at-kleine-brogel (accessed 5 February 2010), and Hans 
Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Site in Europe Breached,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 
4 February 2010, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/02/kleinebrogel.php (accessed 5 February 2010).  For confirmation that 
they did not enter the double-fenced area they entered was not the nuclear weapon storage area, see Jeffrey Lewis, “Yes, It’s the 
Other Area,” ArmsControlWonk.com, 6 February 2010, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2619/yes-its-the-other-area (ac-
cessed 6 February 2010).
2 Major General Polly A. Meyer, chair, Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Air Force, 8 February 2008), p. 52.  This report was first revealed by Hans Kristensen, “USAF Report: ‘Most’ Nu-
clear Weapon Sites in Europe Do Not Meet U.S. Security Requirements,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American 
Scientists, 19 June 2008, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/usaf-report-%E2%80%9Cmost%E2%80%9D-nuclear-
weapon-sites-in-europe-do-not-meet-us-security-requirements.php (accessed 5 February 2010).
3 See, for example, “Al-Qaeda Suspect Tells of Bomb Plot,” BBC News, 27 May 2003 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/eu-
rope/2941702.stm (accessed 5 February 2010).  The al Qaeda operative in the case was Nizar Trabelsi, who had met repeatedly 
with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.  For a summary of Nizar Trabelsi’s terrorist activities, see “Nizar Trabelsi,” GlobalJihad.
net, 8 April 2007, http://globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=356 (accessed 5 February 2010).
INTROdUCTION 5
IncIdents HIgHlIgHt tHe global tHreat (cont)
highlighting substantial weaknesses in the site’s detection, assessment, and response arrangements.4
A year and a half before that, in February 2006, Russian citizen Oleg Khinsagov was arrested in Geor-
gia (along with three Georgian accomplices) with 79.5 grams of 89% enriched HEU, claiming that 
he had kilograms more available for sale.5  There is at least suggestive evidence that this material—and 
additional HEU seized in Georgia in 2003—was stolen from the large Russian nuclear fuel fabrication 
plant at Novosibirsk.6  This 2006 case was only the most recent in a series of incidents: the IAEA has 
documented 18 cases of actual theft or loss of plutonium or HEU (the materials from which a nuclear 
bomb could be made), confirmed by the states concerned.7  Additional thefts are known to have 
occurred which the relevant states have so far not confirmed to the IAEA.8 What is not known, of 
course, is how many thefts may have occurred that were never detected; it is a sobering fact that nearly 
all of the stolen HEU and plutonium that has been seized over the years had never been missed before 
it was seized.  U.S. intelligence agencies have assessed that “it is likely that undetected smuggling has 
occurred,” and they are “concerned about the total amount of material that could have been diverted 
over the last 15 years.”9
All of these events point to a single conclusion: in a variety of countries around the world, security for 
nuclear weapons and for the materials that would be needed to make them is not adequate to protect 
against the kinds of threats that terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose.
4 For a description of this event, see Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008, pp. 3-4 (with sources cited therein), and “60 Minutes: As-
sault on Pelindaba,” CBS News, 23 November 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/20/60minutes/main4621623.
shtml (accessed 6 February 2010).
5 For an especially useful account of this case, see Michael Bronner, “100 Grams (And Counting): Notes From the Nuclear 
Underworld” (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, June 2008), http://belfercenter.ksg.
harvard.edu/files/100-Grams-Final-Color.pdf (accessed 6 February 2010). (The case involved roughly 100 grams of uranium 
oxide, of which 79.5 grams were uranium.) See also Laurence Scott Sheets, “A Smuggler’s Story,” Atlantic Monthly, April 2008, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200804/uranium-smuggling (accessed 6 February 2010), and  Elena Sokova, William C. 
Potter, and Cristina Chuen, “Recent Weapons Grade Uranium Smuggling Case: Nuclear Materials Are Still on the Loose” 
(Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 26 January 2007), http://
cns.miis.edu/stories/070126.htm (accessed 6 February 2010).  Khinsagov offers a stark jailhouse confession in the film Count-
down to Zero (Participant Media, January 2010, director Lucy Walker).
6 The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) investigation concluded that Khinsagov had traveled to towns near the Novosi-
birsk facility some years before he was arrested.  See Bronner, “100 Grams (And Counting).”
7 For the International Atomic Energy Agency’s list of incidents confirmed by the states concerned, see IAEA Illicit Trafficking 
Database: Fact Sheet (Vienna: IAEA, 2008) http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/PDF/fact_figures2007.pdf 
(accessed 6 February 2010). Perhaps the best available summary of what is known and what is not known about nuclear and 
radiological smuggling is “Illicit Trafficking in Radioactive Materials,” in Mark Fitzpatrick, ed., Nuclear Black Markets: Paki-
stan, A.Q. Khan, and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net Assessment (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2007), pp. 119-138.  (Lyudmila Zaitseva, principal author.)
8 See Zaitseva, “Illicit Trafficking in Radioactive Materials.”
9  U.S. National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and 
Military Forces (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006), http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/russia0406.html (accessed 
4 March 2010). Former CIA Director Porter Goss testified to Congress that sufficient material was unaccounted for that he 
could not provide assurances that enough material for a bomb had not already been stolen. See testimony in Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 16 February 
2005, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/shrg109-61.pdf (accessed 31 March 2010).  Goss was not saying that the CIA 
had definite information that enough material for a bomb was missing, only that the accounting uncertainties are large enough 
that he could not confirm that was not the case.  The same is true in the United States; some two tons of U.S. plutonium, for 
example, enough for hundreds of nuclear bombs, is officially considered “material unaccounted for.”  See U.S. Department of 
Energy, Plutonium: The First 50 Years: United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization from 1944 through 1994 
(Washington, D.C.: DOE, 1996), http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/pu50y.html (accessed 4 March 2010).
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In 2005 then-UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan warned that these global effects 
would push “tens of millions of people 
into dire poverty,” creating “a second 
death toll throughout the developing 
world.”9 
It is also important to emphasize that the 
nuclear industry itself has a huge interest 
in preventing nuclear terrorism.  A terror-
ist nuclear bomb, or a major sabotage of a 
nuclear facility—a “security Chernobyl”—
would doom any prospect for gaining the 
public, government, and utility support 
needed for large-scale growth of nuclear 
power, putting tens or hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars in future revenue at risk.  
In some countries, it might even lead to 
pressures to close major operating facili-
ties.
Unfortunately, as described in the next 
chapter, al Qaeda has been actively seek-
ing a nuclear bomb for years.  Moreover, 
as already noted, there have been repeated 
cases of real theft of the materials needed 
to make a nuclear bomb, and government 
studies have warned that if a sophisti-
cated terrorist group got enough of these 
materials, they might well be able to 
fabricate at least a crude nuclear bomb.  
The likelihood of terrorists detonating a 
nuclear bomb may not be high, but the 
consequences would be so catastrophic—
not only for the targeted country but for 
the entire world—that urgent action is 
justified to reduce the danger.10  No one in 
9 Kofi Annan, “A Global Strategy for Fighting Terror-
ism: Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary,” in The 
International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Se-
curity (Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005), http://english.
safe-democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-
fighting-terrorism.html (accessed 9 February 2010).
10 A substantial literature now exists on the danger 
of nuclear terrorism.  See in particular the reports in 
the Securing the Bomb series, most recently Matthew 
Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, 
and Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2008).  
These reports are all available (with extensive ad-
ditional information) at the “Securing the Bomb” 
section of the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s website, 
their right mind would operate a nuclear 
power plant upwind of a major city if 
it had a 1% chance each year of a Cher-
nobyl-scale release—the danger would 
be understood by all to be too great.  Yet 
the international community may well be 
accepting an even greater risk of nuclear 
devastation of a major city by terrorists as 
a result of the way nuclear weapons and 
materials are managed around the world 
today.
Terrorists cannot make a nuclear bomb 
unless they get hold of enough highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. 
No material, no bomb.  These materi-
als do not occur in nature, and are quite 
difficult to produce—well beyond the 
plausible capabilities of terrorist groups.  
Indeed, making the needed nuclear mate-
rial has always been the most challenging 
and costly element of national nuclear 
weapons programs, having consumed 
some 90% of the resources devoted to the 
Manhattan Project.  Hence, as President 
Obama and the UN Security Council 
recognized, securing nuclear material to 
prevent it from being stolen is the single 
most important step that can be taken to 
reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism.  If 
all the nuclear weapons and all the plu-
tonium and HEU produced by states can 
be reliably secured and kept out of ter-
rorist hands, terrorists can be prevented 
from getting nuclear weapons.  Nuclear 
weapons, plutonium, or HEU exist in hun-
dreds of buildings and bunkers in dozens 
of countries around the world—but not 
in thousands of buildings in hundreds of 
countries.  Providing effective security 
for these stockpiles is a big job, and a dif-
ficult job, but with the right leadership, 
http://www.nti.org/securingthebomb.  For a seminal, 
alarming look at the danger, see Graham T. Allison, 
Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe 
(New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2004).  For a 
less alarming analysis, see Michael Levi, On Nuclear 
Terrorism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2007).  
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resources, international cooperation, and 
planning, it can be done.
Of course, other steps beyond nuclear 
security should also be taken to block the 
terrorist pathway to the bomb, providing 
a multilayered defense in case nuclear 
security measures do not succeed. (See 
Figure 1.1.)  Cooperative threat reduction 
programs can help stop the first steps on 
the terrorist pathway, homeland secu-
rity measures can help interdict the final 
steps on the pathway, and intelligence 
and counter-terrorism measures operate 
throughout the path.  In particular, key 
steps include identifying and countering 
terrorist groups with nuclear ambitions, 
seeking to interdict nuclear smuggling, 
and further reducing the already low 
likelihood that states would consciously 
transfer nuclear weapons or materials to 
terrorists, and more.  But the step on the 
terrorist pathway that government policies 
can do the most to stop is the initial theft 
of a nuclear weapon or nuclear material.  
The nuclear material needed for a bomb 
would fit in a suitcase and is difficult to 
detect; once that material has left the gate 
of the facility where it was supposed to 
be, it could be anywhere, and all the later 
lines of defense are variations on looking 
for needles in haystacks.  The further ter-
rorists get along the pathway to the bomb, 
the harder they would be to stop; home-
land security measures, in this case, are 
desperate, last-ditch defenses.  Hence, this 
report, like the Security Council resolution 
and the planned nuclear security summit, 
will focus primarily on nuclear security 
measures designed to prevent nuclear 
weapons or the materials needed to make 
them from being stolen.11  This report does 
11 For discussions covering other elements of an 
overall defense against nuclear terrorism see, for 
example, Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism; Bunn, Securing 
the Bomb 2008, pp. 160-174; and Matthew Bunn, “A 
Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terror-
ism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol. 607, No. 1 (September 2006), pp. 
103-120.  
not address other important nuclear non-
proliferation programs such as efforts to 
strengthen export controls or to reemploy 
former weapons scientists in civilian pur-
suits.
otHer types of nuclear and 
radIologIcal terrorIsm
It is important to distinguish terrorist 
use of an actual nuclear bomb from other 
terrorist attacks involving nuclear or ra-
diological materials or facilities. Terrorists 
could use conventional explosives or other 
means to disperse radioactive material in 
a so-called “dirty bomb,” using, for ex-
ample, radiological sources in wide use in 
medicine, industry, and agriculture.  Such 
an attack would be far easier for terrorists 
to accomplish than would use of an actual 
nuclear bomb: a far wider range of radio-
active materials could be used, available 
in hospitals, industry, and agriculture, and 
it is much easier to simply disperse such 
materials than to set off an explosive nu-
clear chain reaction.  Such a “dirty bomb” 
attack could potentially cause large-scale 
panic and disruption, along with tens of 
billions of dollars in the costs of cleanup 
and disrupted economic activity—but it 
would not incinerate the heart of a major 
city in a flash, as a nuclear bomb could, 
and in most scenarios, it is likely that 
few people would die from the radiation.  
Dirty bombs are sometimes described as 
“weapons of mass disruption” rather than 
“weapons of mass destruction.”12  If risk is 
defined as probability multiplied by con-
sequences, a strong case can be made that 
terrorist use of an actual nuclear bomb, 
with its overwhelmingly catastrophic 
consequences, poses a greater risk, even 
if it would be much harder for terrorists 
to accomplish. 13  Successful radiation-
12 Michael A. Levi and Henry C. Kelly, “Weapons of 
Mass Disruption,” Scientific American, November 
2002, pp. 77-81.
13 Easier attacks are not always more likely.  Probabil-
ity depends also on how terrorists see the potential 
8 SECURING THE BOMB 2010
OR
FIgure 1.1:
INTROdUCTION 9
dispersing sabotage of a major nuclear 
facility, such as a nuclear power plant or 
spent fuel pool, is intermediate between 
a nuclear bomb and a dirty bomb in both 
the difficulties it poses for terrorists and 
the consequences it might have.  There, 
too, the evidence suggests the risk is sub-
stantial, but less severe than the dangers 
posed by actual terrorist use of a nuclear 
bomb. 
Though often lumped together under the 
rubric of “nuclear terrorism,” these are 
very different types of attack, calling for 
quite different policies to reduce the risks 
they pose. Because radiological sources 
exist in thousands of locations all over the 
world, and because much of the impact 
of such an attack would arise from the 
public fear it might provoke, the response 
to the “dirty bomb” danger should fo-
cus not only on improved security for 
radiological materials, but also on public 
education and strengthened prepared-
ness that could help reduce the fear and 
disruption such an attack would cause, 
reducing terrorists’ perception of its likely 
value.  In the case of sabotage, each coun-
consequences of an attack serving their purposes. 
If the value to them of a potential attack was high, 
terrorists might be willing to devote substantial 
resources to overcoming the obstacles to accomplish-
ing it. While some al-Qaeda-linked terrorists, such as 
Dhiren Barot, have pursued “dirty bomb” concepts, 
there is significant evidence that the central leader-
ship of al Qaeda has focused on acquiring an actual 
nuclear explosive, rather than on dirty bombs.  Rolf 
Mowatt-Larssen, who led the CIA’s effort to track 
al Qaeda’s nuclear, chemical, and biological efforts 
after 9/11, remains convinced that despite the greater 
ease of a radiological attack, a terrorist attack us-
ing an actual nuclear bomb may be just as likely, 
because this is what he observed Osama bin Laden 
and Ayman al-Zawahiri were focused on achieving.  
See Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda WMD Threat: 
Hype or Reality?” (Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Ken-
nedy School, January 2010), http://belfercenter.ksg.
harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf (accessed 
6 February 2010).  In this paper, Mowatt-Larssen 
provides a detailed chronology of al Qaeda’s efforts 
to acquire nuclear and biological weapons for large-
scale strategic attacks.
try operating facilities whose sabotage 
could pose a major catastrophe—whether 
nuclear or non-nuclear—should ensure 
that they have security measures capable 
of protecting against the most plausible 
threats, and that appropriate evacuation 
plans and other procedures to strengthen 
resilience in the face of attack are in place.  
Where cost-effective measures are avail-
able to change processes and materials so 
as to lessen the consequences of sabotage 
(such as switching to less toxic or dispers-
ible chemicals at a chemical plant), they 
should be implemented.  A key difference 
between sabotage and a nuclear bomb is 
that sabotage’s consequences are concen-
trated in the immediate area of the facility 
attacked, while stolen nuclear material 
could be made into a bomb that might be 
used anywhere in the world.  These other 
types of nuclear terrorism are addressed 
elsewhere, and are not discussed further 
in this report.14
Hoaxes and threats are other forms of 
nuclear-related terrorism that could po-
tentially also have important impacts.  If 
there were a specific and credible threat 
14 See, for example, Charles D. Ferguson and William 
C. Potter, with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and 
Fred L. Wehling, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, 
ed. Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. We-
hling (Monterey, Cal.: Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 
2004), http://www.nti.org/c_press/analysis_4faces.
pdf (accessed 9 February 2010). One conceivable type 
of nuclear terrorism, not addressed in this report, 
is the possibility of terrorists somehow figuring out 
a way to cause an existing nuclear weapon to be 
launched, or to provoke existing nuclear weapon 
states to launch a nuclear attack (for example by 
introducing false alarms into nuclear warning sys-
tems).  Possibly the earliest public discussion of 
such possibilities was in Bruce G. Blair and Gary D. 
Brewer, “The Terrorist Threat to the World’s Nuclear 
Weapons Programs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
Vol. 31, No. 3, September 1977, pp. 379-403, http://
www.cdi.org/blair/terrorist-threat.cfm (accessed 9 
February 2010).  More recently, see, for example, 
Gary Ackerman and William C. Potter, “Catastrophic 
Nuclear Terrorism: A Preventable Peril,” in Nick 
Bostrom and Milan M. Cirkovic, Global Catastrophic 
Risks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 
402-449.
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that  a nuclear bomb was hidden in Wash-
ington, D.C.—perhaps backed up by a 
genuine sample of HEU or plutonium and 
a credible bomb design included in the 
threat—the federal and local governments 
would be faced with extraordinarily dif-
ficult choices.  The terrorists might well 
provide the threat to the national media 
as well, potentially provoking widespread 
fear that it might be real.  Better prepara-
tions for such events are surely needed.  
But hoaxes and threats, by their nature, 
would not have the catastrophic, history-
changing impact of a mushroom cloud 
rising over the ruins of the heart of a ma-
jor city, and they, too, are not addressed 
further in this report.
cooperatIon, not confrontatIon,  
Is tHe answer
Combining fears of nuclear bombs and 
terrorists in a single terrifying idea, the 
concept of nuclear terrorism reaches many 
people’s deepest fears, and provokes in 
some the desire to lash out militarily if 
necessary to protect against this danger.  
Indeed, the fear that Saddam Hussein 
might pass nuclear, chemical, or biologi-
cal weapons to terrorists was a prominent 
part of the debate over the U.S.-led inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003. 
But the reality is that nuclear terrorism 
cannot be prevented by force of arms.  The 
world’s stockpiles of HEU and plutonium, 
located in dozens of countries, can only 
be secured through broad international 
cooperation, with many countries work-
ing together to confront a threat to their 
common security.  Terrorist networks that 
might be working on nuclear weapons 
are international, and can only be found 
and countered with international intel-
ligence and police cooperation.  Nuclear 
smuggling can only be stopped through 
similar intelligence and police coopera-
tion, combined with customs and border 
control cooperation and other efforts to 
track down the material and those who 
are moving it.  There will surely be cases 
where a Predator strike or some other use 
of force is an important part of the strug-
gle—but the fundamental elements of the 
effort to prevent nuclear terrorism involve 
politically sensitive cooperation across the 
globe.
a note on sources— 
and tHe need for accountabIlIty
No one wants nuclear thieves or sabo-
teurs to know the details of the security 
measures they will have to defeat.  Hence, 
every country that possesses nuclear 
weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materi-
als, or major nuclear facilities considers 
the specifics of its nuclear security ar-
rangements a closely guarded secret.
As a result, no government or inter-
national organization has a complete 
understanding of where all the nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear 
materials in the world are and the secu-
rity measures in place at each of those 
locations.  (In recent years, the U.S. gov-
ernment has sought to compile and to 
analyze as much of this information as it 
can, and to identify what is still unknown, 
in an effort known as the Nuclear Materi-
als Information Program, or NMIP.)  There 
is no internationally agreed baseline from 
which to judge how much progress is be-
ing made in improving nuclear security 
and reducing the risks of nuclear theft.  
Nor are there any agreed measures of 
progress from whatever the starting point 
might be. Safeguards inspectors from 
the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) inspect to make sure non-nuclear-
weapon states have not diverted nuclear 
material to military programs, but they 
are not charged with either guarding 
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these stockpiles from theft or assessing 
how well countries are guarding them: 
ironically, “safeguards” have little to do 
with either safety or guarding.15  The lack 
of either an agreed baseline or agreed 
measures of progress from that starting 
point makes it extraordinarily difficult to 
set priorities focusing on the highest-risk 
locations, to gain specific nuclear security 
commitments, or to hold countries ac-
countable for fulfilling the commitments 
they make—a fundamental challenge for 
the four-year effort to achieve effective 
security for nuclear stockpiles worldwide.  
One major recommendation of this report, 
discussed in the final chapter, is that the 
United States and other countries work-
ing to improve nuclear security should do 
as much as is possible within the confines 
of necessary secrecy to reach a common 
understanding of where nuclear security 
stands around the world, and should de-
velop measures countries can use to build 
international confidence that they are 
providing effective security and meeting 
whatever nuclear security commitments 
they have entered into. 
Developing an assessment of the state of 
nuclear security and the risks of nuclear 
theft from outside any government, rely-
ing only on unclassified information, is 
more difficult still. This report provides 
a best estimate based on a wide range of 
unclassified sources, including published 
national regulations, reports, and state-
ments of policy; conference papers; visits 
to nuclear facilities; and interviews with 
nuclear security officials and experts in 
several countries. In order to allow these 
officials to be candid, they remain anony-
mous.  Although the picture provided 
15 As discussed later in this report, however, some 
states have voluntarily requested IAEA-led reviews 
of their security arrangements—an effort quite 
separate from IAEA safeguards—and some are ob-
ligated by agreements with suppliers, particularly 
the United States, to accept supplier review of their 
security arrangements.
here is global, alert readers will note that 
the information provided about nuclear 
security in the United States and Russia is 
more detailed; that is because, after nearly 
two decades of nuclear security coopera-
tion, more detailed information is publicly 
available about nuclear security in these 
two countries than in others.  This report 
is the latest in a series, building on nearly 
two decades of research and government 
service focused on the management of 
nuclear materials.16
plan of tHIs report
This report begins with assessments of the 
current risk of nuclear terrorism and the 
current global status of nuclear security.  
This provides, in effect, the beginning 
point for the four-year effort to secure 
nuclear stockpiles called for by President 
Obama and Security Council Resolution 
1887.  Next, the report lays out a set of ob-
jectives for providing effective security for 
all nuclear materials worldwide, and out-
line indicators that can be used to judge 
the level of effort devoted to reducing 
these dangers, and the degree of progress 
being made.  The next section describes 
the efforts to upgrade nuclear security 
and to prevent nuclear terrorism made 
by the Obama administration and other 
governments during 2009, and uses some 
of the indicators developed in the previ-
ous chapter to assess those efforts.  The 
final chapter outlines what steps need to 
be taken if the international community is 
to succeed in securing all nuclear material 
worldwide in four years.
16 In particular, this report draws heavily on the con-
clusions and analysis in Matthew Bunn, Securing the 
Bomb 2008 (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing 
the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, November 2008).  That report, previous re-
ports in the “Securing the Bomb” series, and a wide 
range of other information, including an on-line 
interactive budget database for all threat U.S.-spon-
sored threat reduction programs, can be found at 
http://www.nti.org/securingthebomb. 

2 The ConTinuing Danger of  nuClear ThefT anD Terrorism
Complacency about the threat is perhaps 
the biggest obstacle to forging the urgent, 
in-depth international cooperation needed 
to secure nuclear stockpiles and reduce 
the danger of nuclear terrorism.  Many 
policymakers around the world continue 
to believe that it would take a Manhattan 
Project to make a nuclear bomb, that it 
would be almost impossible for terrorists 
to get the necessary nuclear material, and 
that the risk of terrorists getting and using 
a nuclear bomb is therefore vanishingly 
small.  The experience of finding that Iraq 
did not have nuclear, chemical, or bio-
logical weapons in 2003 has made many 
justifiably skeptical of other assertions 
about serious threats from such weap-
ons.  Unfortunately, while no one can say 
precisely what the probability of nuclear 
terrorism is, the danger is very real.  Sev-
eral unfortunate facts shape the risk the 
world faces.
Some TerroriSTS are Seeking  
nuclear WeaponS
Most terrorist groups are focused on 
small-scale violence to attain local ob-
jectives.  For them, the old adage that 
“terrorists want a lot of people watching, 
not a lot of people dead” holds true, and 
nuclear weapons are likely to be irrelevant 
or counterproductive for their goals.
But a small set of terrorists with global 
ambitions and nihilistic visions clearly 
are eager to get and use a nuclear bomb.  
Osama bin Laden has called the acquisi-
tion of nuclear weapons or other weapons 
of mass destruction a “religious duty.”1 
1 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Interview with Bin Laden: 
World’s Most Wanted Terrorist” (ABC News On-
line, 2 January 1999), http://cryptome.org/jya/
bin-laden-abc.htm (accessed 6 February 2010).  For 
For years, al Qaeda operatives have re-
peatedly expressed the desire to inflict 
a “Hiroshima” on the United States.2  Al 
Qaeda operatives have made repeated 
attempts to buy nuclear material for a nu-
clear bomb, or to recruit nuclear expertise.
Shortly before the 9/11 attacks, for ex-
ample, bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri 
met with two senior Pakistani nuclear 
scientists to discuss nuclear weapons.3 
Former CIA Director George Tenet reports 
that the two provided al Qaeda with a 
rough sketch of a nuclear bomb design, 
and that U.S. officials were so concerned 
further details on U.S. intelligence on al Qaeda’s 
nuclear efforts, see Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda 
WMD Threat: Hype or Reality?” (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and International 
Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2010), 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-
wmd-threat.pdf (accessed 6 February 2010); George 
Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the 
CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), pp. 259-280;  
and Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 
of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Report to the President (Washington, 
D.C.: WMD Commission, 2005), http://www.gpoac-
cess.gov/wmd/pdf/full_wmd_report.pdf (acessed 
6 February 2010), pp. 267-278.  While Tenet’s cred-
ibility has been undermined by the discovery that 
Iraq had no chemical or biological weapons and no 
substantial nuclear program remaining in 2003, his 
descriptions of al Qaeda’s efforts to get a nuclear 
bomb have not been subject to substantial public 
challenge.
2 Steve Coll, “What Bin Laden Sees in Hiroshima,” 
Washington Post, 6 February 2005.
3 David Albright and Holly Higgins, “A Bomb for 
the Ummah,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 
2 (March/April 2003), http://thebulletin.metapress.
com/content/ru1k226j4ln4585l/ (accessed 9 February 
2010)), pp. 49-55.  For a somewhat more detailed 
version, see David Albright and Holly Higgins, 
“Pakistani Nuclear Scientists: How Much Nuclear 
Assistance to Al Qaeda?” (Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for Science and International Security, 
2002), http://www.exportcontrols.org/pakscientists.
html#back29 (accessed 9 February 2010).
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about the activities of the “charity” they 
had established (whose board of directors 
also included a range of senior retired mil-
itary officers, and which reportedly also 
offered nuclear weapons help to Libya) 
that President Bush directed him to fly to 
Pakistan and discuss the matter directly 
with Pakistani President Pervez Mushar-
raf.4  Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmoud, the 
more senior of the two, had long argued 
that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons rightfully 
belonged to the whole worldwide “um-
mah,” or Muslim community, and had 
advocated sharing nuclear weapons tech-
nology.5
After the 9/11 attacks, intelligence agen-
cies from the United States and other 
countries learned that in the years leading 
up to the attacks, al Qaeda had a focused 
nuclear weapons program managed by 
Abdel Aziz al-Masri (aka Ali Sayyid al-
Bakri), an Egyptian explosives expert. The 
program reported directly to Zawahiri, 
as did al Qaeda’s anthrax efforts, its other 
major strategic-scale weapons of mass 
destruction program.  This program re-
portedly got to the point of carrying out 
tests of conventional explosives for use in 
a nuclear bomb.6  
Al Qaeda’s nuclear efforts apparently 
continued after the disruptions the group 
faced following the overthrow of the Tali-
ban government and the removal of al 
Qaeda’s Afghan sanctuary.  In 2002-2003, 
U.S. intelligence received a “stream of reli-
able reporting” that the leadership of al 
Qaeda’s cell in Saudi Arabia was negotiat-
ing to purchase three objects they believed 
to be Russian “nuclear devices,” and that 
al Qaeda’s central leadership had ap-
proved the purchase if a Pakistani expert 
4 Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 266-268.
5 Albright and Higgins, “Pakistani Nuclear Scien-
tists: How Much Nuclear Assistance to Al Qaeda?”
6 Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda WMD Threat: Hype or 
Reality?” See also Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, 
p. 275. 
using his equipment confirmed that they 
were genuine.  (The actual nature of these 
“devices,” if they existed, the name of the 
Pakistani expert, and the type of equip-
ment he was to use to examine the devices 
have never been learned.)7  At the same 
time these discussions were taking place, 
bin Laden arranged for a radical Saudi 
cleric to issue a fatwa or religious ruling 
authorizing the use of nuclear weapons 
against American civilians.8  The cleric 
who issued the fatwa was the “steady 
companion” of the al Qaeda operative 
leading the negotiations over the nuclear 
devices. 9
Before al Qaeda, the Japanese terror cult 
Aum Shinrikyo also made a concerted 
effort to get nuclear weapons.10  Chechen 
terrorists have certainly pursued the pos-
sibility of a radioactive “dirty bomb,” and 
there are at least suggestive indications 
that they also have pursued nuclear weap-
ons—including two incidents of terrorists 
conducting reconnaissance at secret nu-
clear weapon storage sites, confirmed by 
Russian officials.  There are at least some 
indications that Pakistani groups such as 
Lashkar-e-Taiba may also be interested—a 
particularly troubling possibility given the 
deep past connections these groups have 
7 Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda WMD Threat: Hype or 
Reality?”  See also Tenet, At the Center for the Storm, 
pp. 272-276. 
8 For an English translation of this fatwa, see Nasir 
Bin Hamd al-Fahd, “A Treatise on the Legal Status 
of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Against In-
fidels,” May 2003, http://www.carnegieendowment.
org/static/npp/fatwa.pdf (accessed 19 January 2010). 
Al-Fahd was subsequently arrested, served some 
years in prison, and released; during that time, he 
publicly renounced some of his previous rulings.
9 Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda WMD Threat: Hype or 
Reality?”
10 For earlier discussions of the al Qaeda and Aum 
Shinrikyo efforts, see Matthew Bunn and Anthony 
Wier, with Joshua Friedman, “The Demand for 
Black Market Fissile Material,” in Nuclear Threat 
Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, 
Harvard University, and Nuc
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inTernaTional STaTemenTS on The ThreaT of nuclear TerroriSm
Nuclear terrorism is one of the most serious threats of our time.  Even one such attack could inflict mass 
casualties and create immense suffering and unwanted change in the world forever.  This prospect should 
compel all of us to act to prevent such a catastrophe.
—U.N. Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, 13 June 2007, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sgsm11040.doc.
htm (accessed 5 March 2010)
Experts estimate that terrorists with 50 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), an amount that 
would fit into six one-litre milk cartons, need only smuggle it across borders in order to create an impro-
vised nuclear device that could level a medium-sized city.
—High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York: 
United Nations, 2004), p. 16
Nuclear terrorism is still often treated as science fiction. I wish it were. But unfortunately we live in a 
world of excess hazardous materials and abundant technological know-how, in which some terrorists clear-
ly state their intention to inflict catastrophic casualties. Were such an attack to occur, it would not only 
cause widespread death and destruction, but would stagger the world economy… [creating] a second death 
toll throughout the developing world.
—then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism,” 10 March 2005, http://english.
safe-democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html (accessed 5 March 2010)
The gravest threat faced by the world is of an extremist group getting hold of nuclear weapons or materials.
—then-Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohammed ElBaradei, address to the United Na-
tions General Assembly, 14 September 2009, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2009/ebsp2009n011.html  
(accessed 5 March 2010)
We have firm knowledge, which is based on evidence and facts, of steady interest and tasks assigned to ter-
rorists to acquire in any form what is called nuclear weapons, nuclear components. 
—Anatoly Safonov, Special Representative of the Russian President for International Cooperation in the Fight Against 
Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime, Interfax, 27 September 2007 (translation by Simon Saradzhyan)
There is a risk that security weaknesses could allow terrorists to steal enough material, or even an actual 
device.  The most crucial step in preventing nuclear terrorism is, therefore, to keep terrorists from acquir-
ing access to such materials or devices… Given these risks, both highly enriched uranium and plutonium 
merit access controls as strict as those prescribed for nuclear weapons.
—Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 
Arms (Stockholm: WMD Commission, 2006), pp. 83-84.
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had with Pakistani security services, their 
ongoing cooperation with al Qaeda, and 
the example of in-depth cooperation on 
unconventional weapons provided by al 
Qaeda’s work with Jemaah Islamiyah on 
anthrax.11
With at least two groups going down this 
path in the last 15 years, and possibly 
more, there is no reason to expect that oth-
ers will not do so in the future.
Some TerroriST groupS mighT be 
able To make crude  
nuclear bombS
Repeated assessments by the U.S. gov-
ernment and other governments have 
concluded that it is plausible that a so-
phisticated terrorist group could make 
a crude nuclear explosive—capable of 
destroying the heart of a major city—if 
they got enough plutonium or HEU.  A 
“gun-type” bomb made from HEU, in 
particular, is basically a matter of slam-
ming two pieces of HEU together at high 
speed.  An “implosion-type” bomb—in 
which precisely arranged explosives crush 
nuclear material to a much higher density, 
setting off the chain reaction—would be 
substantially more difficult for terrorists 
to accomplish, but is still plausible, par-
ticularly if they got knowledgeable help 
(as they have been actively attempting to 
do).12  
lear Threat Initiative, 2005), http://www.nti.org/e_re-
search/cnwm/threat/demand.asp (accessed 6 
February 2010), and Sara Daly, John Parachini, and 
William Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the 
Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies 
for Combating Nuclear Terrorism (Santa Monica, Cal.: 
RAND, 2005), http://www.rand.org/pubs/docu-
mented_briefings/2005/ 
RAND_DB458.sum.pdf (accessed 6 February 2010). 
11 Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda WMD Threat: Hype 
or Reality?”
12 For a more detailed unclassified discussion, with 
relevant references, see Matthew Bunn and An-
thony Wier, “Terrorist Nuclear Bomb Construction: 
One study by the now-defunct congres-
sional Office of Technology Assessment 
summarized the technical reality: “A small 
group of people, none of whom have 
ever had access to the classified literature, 
could possibly design and build a crude 
nuclear explosive device...  Only mod-
est machine-shop facilities that could be 
contracted for without arousing suspicion 
would be required.”13  Indeed, even before 
the revelations from Afghanistan, U.S. in-
telligence concluded that “fabrication of at 
least a ‘crude’ nuclear device was within 
al-Qa’ida’s capabilities, if it could obtain 
fissile material.”14 
It is important to understand that making 
a crude, unsafe, unreliable bomb of un-
certain yield that might be carried in the 
back of a large van is a dramatically sim-
pler task than designing and building a 
safe, secure, reliable, and efficient weapon 
deliverable by a ballistic missile, which 
a state might want to incorporate into its 
arsenal.  Terrorists are highly unlikely to 
ever be able to make a sophisticated and 
efficient weapon, a task that requires a 
substantial nuclear weapons enterprise—
but they may well be able to make a crude 
one.  Their task would be easier if they 
managed to recruit experts with experi-
ence in key aspects of a national nuclear 
weapons program.
Nuclear weapons themselves generally 
have substantial security measures and 
How Difficult?” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, Vol. 607, pp. 133-149.
13 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (Washington, 
D.C.: OTA, 1977) http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/
disk3/1977/7705/7705.PDF (accessed 30 October 
2009), p. 140.  OTA reached this conclusion long 
before the internet made a great deal of relevant 
information much more widely available.
14 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of 
the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass De-
struction, Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: 
WMD Commission, 2005), http://www.gpoaccess.
gov/wmd/index.html (accessed 30 October 2009), 
p. 276.
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would be more difficult to steal than nu-
clear materials.  If terrorists nevertheless 
managed to steal an assembled nuclear 
weapon from a state, there is a significant 
risk that they might figure out how to set 
it off—though this, too, would in most 
cases be a difficult challenge for a terrorist 
group.15  Many modern U.S. and Russian 
nuclear weapons are equipped with so-
phisticated electronic locks, known in the 
United States as “permissive action links” 
or PALs, intended to make it difficult to 
detonate the weapon without inserting an 
authorized code, which terrorists might 
find very difficult to bypass.  Some weap-
ons, however, are either not equipped 
with PALs or are equipped with older 
versions that lack some of the highest-
security features (such as “limited try” 
features that would permanently disable 
the weapon if the wrong code is inserted 
too many times or attempts are made to 
bypass the lock).16  Many nuclear weapons 
15 See Bunn and Wier, “Terrorist Nuclear Bomb Con-
struction: How Difficult?”
16 Bruce Blair, a former U.S. ballistic missile launch 
officer who has written extensively about U.S. and 
Russian nuclear command and control, reported 
that Russian tactical nuclear weapons “built before 
the early 1980s lack the safety locks known as per-
missive action links.”  See testimony in U.S. House 
of Representatives, National Security Committee, 
Military Research & Development Subcommittee, 
Hearing on Russian Missile Detargeting and Nuclear 
Doctrine and its Relation to National Missile Defense, 
105th Cong., 1st sess. March 13, 1997.  Similarly, by 
one account, U.S. intelligence has concluded that 
Russian tactical weapons “often” have external 
locks “that can be removed, and many have none 
at all.”  Bruce W. Nelan, “Present Danger: Russia’s 
Nuclear Forces are Sliding Into Disrepair and Even 
Moscowis Worried About What Might Happen,” 
Time Europe, 7 April 1997.  In both the United States 
and Russia, thousands of nuclear weapons, particu-
larly older varieties, have been dismantled in recent 
years, and it is likely that most of the dangerous 
weapons lacking modern safeguards have been 
destroyed.  Less is known about such electronic 
locks in other nuclear powers, though Pakistan has 
asserted that it has similar systems in place, and it 
seems likely that advanced nuclear weapon states 
such as Britain and France have made use of such 
also have safety features designed to pre-
vent the weapon from detonating unless it 
had gone through its expected flight to its 
target—such as intense acceleration fol-
lowed by unpowered flight for a ballistic 
missile warhead—and these would also 
have to be bypassed, if they were present, 
for terrorists to be able to make use of an 
assembled nuclear weapon they acquired.
If they could not figure out how to deto-
nate a stolen weapon, terrorists might 
choose to remove its nuclear material 
and fashion a new bomb. Some modern, 
highly efficient designs might not contain 
enough material for a crude, inefficient 
terrorist bomb; but multistage thermo-
nuclear weapons, with nuclear material in 
both the “primary” (the fission bomb that 
sets off the fusion reaction) and the “sec-
ondary” (where the fusion takes place) 
probably would provide sufficient mate-
rial. In any case, terrorists in possession 
of a stolen nuclear weapon would be in a 
position to make fearsome threats, for no 
one would know for sure whether they 
could set it off.
TerroriSTS mighT be able To  
geT heu or pluTonium
Unfortunately, there is also a real risk that 
terrorists could get the plutonium or HEU 
needed to make a nuclear bomb.  As de-
scribed in more detail in the next chapter, 
important weaknesses in nuclear security 
arrangements still exist in many coun-
tries, creating weaknesses that outsider or 
insider thieves might exploit.  And as dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, theft of the 
essential ingredients of nuclear weapons 
is not a hypothetical worry but an ongo-
ing reality—the IAEA has documented 
18 cases of theft or loss or plutonium or 
HEU, confirmed by the states concerned.
technology as well.  India, Pakistan, and China are 
believed to store many or their weapons in partly 
disassembled form.
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HEU-fueled research reactors, for ex-
ample, sometimes located on university 
campuses, often have only the most mini-
mal security measures in place.  Many 
have few or no armed guards; very loose 
arrangements (if any) to screen personnel 
before granting them access to the reac-
tor and its nuclear material; few means to 
detect intruders until they are entering the 
nuclear material areas; and little revenue 
to pay for more substantial security ar-
rangements.  In some cases, the security in 
place amounts to little more than a night 
watchman and a chain-link fence.
In countries such as Pakistan, even sub-
stantial nuclear security systems are 
challenged by immense adversary threats, 
both from nuclear insiders—some with 
a demonstrated sympathy for Islamic 
extremists—and from outside attacks 
that might include scores or hundreds of 
armed attackers.  In Russia, there have 
been dramatic improvements in security 
and accounting for nuclear materials 
since the early 1990s, and the most egre-
gious security weaknesses—gaping holes 
in fences, lack of any detector to set off 
an alarm if plutonium or HEU is being 
removed—have been corrected, with U.S. 
and other assistance and Russia’s own ef-
forts.  But significant risks remain, from 
insider corruption to weak nuclear secu-
rity regulation.  In the end, all countries 
where these materials exist—including 
the United States—have more to do, and 
need to continually reassess their efforts, 
to ensure that the security and accounting 
measures they have in place are sufficient 
to meet the evolving threat.  A nuclear 
security system not focused on continual 
improvement is likely to see its effective-
ness decline over time as complacency 
sets in.
nuclear Smuggling iS  
exTremely difficulT To inTerdicT
The nuclear material needed for a bomb 
is small and difficult to detect.  Once such 
material has left the facility where it is 
supposed to be, it could be anywhere, 
and finding and recovering it poses an 
immense challenge.  The plutonium re-
SuiTcaSe nukeS probably noT on The looSe
In late 1997, General Alexander Lebed (retired), who had recently been Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin’s national security advisor, provoked an international furor by asserting in interviews that 
scores of nuclear weapons similar to suitcases were missing. 
It is clear that small nuclear weapons existed—both the United States and the Soviet Union produced 
nuclear weapons intended to be carried and emplaced by individuals, as well as nuclear artillery 
shells.  But the Russian military vigorously denied that any such weapons were missing.  Despite the 
chaos following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no convincing evidence that Lebed’s claims 
were correct, and substantial reason to doubt them: meticulous records were kept of each Russian 
nuclear weapon, and each weapon was accompanied by a “passport” showing its serial number, where 
and when it had been made, where it had been sent for deployment and for maintenance, and so on.  
It is extraordinarily unlikely that nuclear weapons went missing without detection. Lebed himself—
well known for his erratic actions and statements—later backed off from the claim that suitcase nukes 
were missing, and the official Lebed appointed to look into the matter eventually came forward to 
confirm that his group had accounted for all of the small nuclear weapons in question. 
In short, stolen “suitcase nukes” are not likely to be an important part of the overall risk of nuclear 
terrorism.  Still less are terrorist-made nuclear bombs likely to fit in a suitcase: rather, a terrorist nu-
clear bomb might well weigh over a ton, and be more suitable for delivery in a truck. 
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quired for an implosion-type nuclear 
bomb would fit in a soda can.  The HEU 
required for the simplest type of nuclear 
bomb for terrorists to make, a less efficient 
“gun-type” bomb that slams two pieces 
of HEU together at high speed, is smaller 
than two two-liter bottles.17  The radia-
tion from plutonium, and particularly 
from HEU, is weak and difficult to detect, 
particularly if the adversaries attempting 
to smuggle it use any significant amount 
of shielding.  The detectors that are being 
widely deployed throughout the world—
or even the more expensive Advanced 
Spectroscopic Portals (ASPs) that are be-
ing considered to replace them—would 
17 For a more detailed discussion, see Bunn and 
Wier, “Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: 
How Difficult?”
have little chance of detecting HEU metal 
if it had significant shielding.18  (Pluto-
nium’s radiation is more penetrating and 
easier to detect.)  To date, only one of the 
successes in seizing stolen nuclear mate-
rial reportedly included the material being 
detected by one of these detectors; the 
others were the result of police and intelli-
gence efforts, often including participants 
in the conspiracy or people they were 
trying to convince to help them or to buy 
their stolen nuclear material informing the 
police.19
18 See, for example, discussion in Thomas B. Co-
chran and Matthew G. McKinzie, “Detecting 
Nuclear Smuggling,” Scientific American, April, 
2008.
19 For a detailed account of the 2006 nuclear smug-
gling incident, see Bronner, “110 Grams (and 
nuclear TerroriSm and The nuclear energy revival
Growing energy demand and concerns over climate change and energy security are driving a num-
ber of countries to increase their emphasis on nuclear power.  Fortunately, the expected growth and 
spread of nuclear energy need not increase the chance that terrorists could get their hands on the ma-
terial for a nuclear bomb.
Today, most nuclear power reactors run on low-enriched uranium fuel that cannot be used in a 
nuclear bomb without further enrichment, which is beyond plausible terrorist capabilities. These 
reactors produce plutonium in their spent fuel, but that plutonium is one percent by weight in mas-
sive, intensely radioactive spent-fuel assemblies that would be extraordinarily difficult for terrorists to 
steal and to process into material for a bomb. In some countries, the plutonium is removed from the 
spent fuel (an approach known as “reprocessing”) for recycling into new fuel; that process requires 
extraordinary security measures to ensure against terrorist access to the separated plutonium. Fortu-
nately, economics and counterterrorism point in the same direction in this case: because reprocessing 
is much more expensive than simply storing spent fuel pending disposal, few countries that do not 
already reprocess their fuel are interested in starting, and some of the existing plants are running far 
below capacity or will soon be shut down.
Many more nuclear power reactors in many more countries would mean more potential targets for 
terrorist sabotage—and more chances that some reactor’s security would be weak enough that a ter-
rorist attack would succeed. Sabotage would not cause the kind of massive, instantaneous destruction 
a nuclear bomb would cause, but in the worst case, successful sabotage might cause a massive radia-
tion release—a “security Chernobyl.” Such an event would be a catastrophe for the country where it 
occurred, and for its downwind neighbors; but unlike readily transported nuclear weapons or materi-
als, it would not pose a threat to countries thousands of kilometers away. It would, however, pose a 
threat to the global nuclear power industry, for the public reaction to such an event would almost 
surely doom any prospect for nuclear growth on the scale needed to play a significant role in mitigat-
ing the threat of climate change.
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norTh korea, iran, and The riSk of nuclear TerroriSm
Discussions about the dangers of nuclear terrorism often turn quickly to two states that provoke 
particular fear in the United States:  North Korea and Iran.  But the available evidence suggests that 
these states contribute only a small part of the overall risk of nuclear terrorism.
The current situation in these two countries is very different.  North Korea already has enough plu-
tonium for several nuclear weapons, has conducted two nuclear tests, has pulled out of the NPT, and 
has ejected international inspectors.  By contrast, as far as the international community knows, Iran 
has not yet produced any of its own HEU (though it has a few kilograms of irradiated HEU research 
reactor fuel supplied by the United States in the Shah’s time and less than a kilogram of Chinese-or-
igin HEU in the core of a small research reactor supplied in the early 1990s).  While Iran is defying 
UN Security Council resolutions requiring it to suspend enrichment and continuing to try to shield 
some activities from IAEA inspectors, it remains a party to the NPT, with international inspectors at 
its major nuclear sites.
Several scenarios in which these states might contribute to the risk of nuclear terrorism should each 
be considered separately.
Conscious state decisions to provide nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists.  It is very un-
likely that either of these states—or other states, for that matter—would consciously decide to 
transfer nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists. Hostile dictators focused on preserving their 
regimes are highly unlikely to hand over the greatest power they have ever acquired to groups they 
cannot control, in ways that might provoke retaliation that would destroy their regimes forever.  
Only if the survival of the regime seemed to depend on the revenue that might be generated from 
such a transfer—highly unlikely, given the relatively modest resources of even the wealthiest terrorist 
groups—or as a last act of vengeance as a regime was collapsing—might the risk of such a transfer 
increase.1  
Today, Iran simply does not have enough HEU for a bomb available to transfer.  Moreover, while 
Iran has supported both Hezbollah and Hamas—both of which are terrorist groups as well as so-
cial and political movements—there is no evidence it has ever provided chemical weapons to these 
groups (despite acknowledging that it has possessed such arms). 
North Korea has exported ballistic missiles to many countries for cash, and apparently transferred a 
plutonium production reactor to Syria.2  But transferring technology to build nuclear weapons to
1 Similarly, despite various warnings, from the Bush administration, the U.S. intelligence community concluded that the 
probability that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq would take the “extreme step” of transferring weapons of mass destruction to terror-
ist groups was low, unless Hussein concluded that the United States was going to overthrow his regime in any case and that 
such a transfer represented “his last chance to exact vengeance.”  (See George Tenet, letter to Senator Bob Graham, 7 October 
2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2002/iraq-021007-cia01.htm (accessed 27 March 2010).  Along 
the same lines, a comprehensive Defense Department assessment of proliferation threats just before the 9/11 attacks con-
cluded that “the likelihood of a state sponsor providing such a weapon to a terrorist group is believed to be low.”  See U.S. 
Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: DOD, January 2001), p. 61.  For an attempt 
to estimate the fraction of the overall risk of nuclear terrorism contributed by different pathways to the bomb, see Matthew 
Bunn, “A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence, Vol. 607, No. 1 (September 2006), pp. 103-120.
2 North Korea may also be the state that transferred uranium hexafluoride to Libya, though there are still some controversies 
about that judgment.  For a brief summary, see, for example, Jeffrey Lewis, “A Financial Link in that AQ Khan-North Korea-
Libya Daisy Chain?” ArmsControlWonk.com, 1 April 2005, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/index.php?id=509 (accessed 31 
March 2010).
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norTh korea, iran, and The riSk of nuclear TerroriSm (conT)
states that will almost certainly never use them is a profoundly different act than transferring themto 
terrorists who are very likely to detonate them.  The United States and other governments should 
be taking steps to reduce this small risk still further—by reiterating that the consequences of such 
a transfer would be disastrous for the North Korean government, by making the benefits of a path 
away from hostility and nuclear weapons equally clear, and by working internationally to strengthen 
controls over materials coming out of North Korea, increasing the risk that such a transfer would be 
intercepted.3 
Theft of nuclear weapons or material.  Currently, theft of nuclear weapons or material in either 
North Korea or Iran is also unlikely, so they need not be central priorities for the four-year nuclear 
security effort.  North Korea is a tightly controlled garrison state, and there is currently virtually no 
risk of a group of terrorists storming its facilities and seizing plutonium.  Because North Korea has 
only enough plutonium for a few nuclear bombs, and this material is considered crucial to the state, 
it is presumably under controls that would make it very difficult for insiders to steal nuclear material 
or a nuclear weapon covertly. Virtually nothing is publicly known, however, about the specifics of 
North Korea’s nuclear security arrangements.  In Iran, there is no weapons-usable nuclear material to 
steal except for the few kilograms of irradiated research reactor fuel.  (Arrangements should be made 
to ship that fuel elsewhere—either back to the United States as is being done with other U.S.-origin 
HEU, or if that is politically impossible, to Russia or France, as is being done with a variety of other 
HEU research reactor fuel.)
Future scenarios.  Two future scenarios merit concern—state collapse, and growing nuclear stock-
piles.  Collapse of the state—which is far more likely in North Korea than in Iran —could destroy 
whatever controls are in place and create a serious problem of “loose nukes.”4  At the same time, if 
North Korea’s stockpile grows in the future, the possibility that key military officers might come to 
believe that they could sell off some of the plutonium without the top North Korean leadership find-
ing out might grow—one of many reasons why it is important to again seek to halt North Korean 
production of fissile material, and ultimately to roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  
Similarly, if Iran does ultimately produce HEU and nuclear weapons, that will create a new potential 
source for nuclear theft—and regional fears and tensions that could increase the chance that other 
countries in the region might follow the same path.  This is yet another reason why pulling together 
an international package of carrots and sticks large enough and credible enough to convince the 
Iranian government that it is in its interests to verifiably end its quest for nuclear weapons should 
remain a high priority. 
3 As with stopping other nuclear smuggling, reducing the risk of such North Korean transfers poses an enormous challenge; 
unless circumstances arise that make it possible to stop and search all ships, aircraft, and ground transports leaving North 
Korea, it will never be possible to have confidence that North Korea would have not have substantial chances to complete such 
a shipment.  Hence, primary reliance must be placed on further strengthening the already strong disincentives to the North 
Korean regime considering such a transfer.  But North Korea’s extreme isolation from the rest of the world makes the prospects 
of monitoring such shipments at least somewhat better than they would be from most other countries.
4 Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John M. Shalikashvili, “A Scary Thought: Loose Nukes in North Korea,” Wall Street 
Journal, 6 February 2003, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1243/ (accessed 9 February 2010).
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A crude terrorist nuclear bomb would be 
considerably larger than the plutonium 
or HEU at its core, perhaps weighing a 
ton or so.  Nevertheless, just as interdict-
ing smuggling of nuclear materials poses 
immense challenges, it would also be 
extremely difficult to stop terrorists from 
smuggling a crude nuclear weapon to its 
target. A nuclear bomb might be deliv-
ered, intact or in ready-to-assemble pieces, 
by boat or aircraft or truck.  The length of 
national borders, the diversity of means 
of transport, the vast scale of legitimate 
traffic across borders, and the ease of 
shielding the radiation from plutonium or 
especially from HEU all operate in favor 
of the terrorists. Building the overall sys-
tem of legal infrastructure, intelligence, 
law enforcement, border and customs 
forces, and radiation detectors needed to 
find and recover stolen nuclear weapons 
or materials, or to interdict these as they 
cross national borders, is an extraordi-
narily difficult challenge.20
nuclear ThieveS could STrike  
in any counTry
International terrorists have demonstrated 
that they have global reach.  Everyone 
recalls the attacks in the United States, in 
Moscow and Beslan, in London, and in 
Madrid.  But it is important to recall that 
al Qaeda-linked conspiracies have been 
uncovered even in countries that have 
never been the victims of large-scale ter-
rorist attacks, from Canada to Belgium to 
the Netherlands.  Japan has experienced 
homegrown terrorism with weapons of 
mass destruction from Aum Shinrikyo—
Counting).”
20 For a useful discussion emphasizing the ease with 
which terrorists might follow different pathways to 
deliver their weapon, see Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: 
The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, pp. 104-120.  
For a more optimistic view of the potential of these 
parts of a defensive system, see Levi, On Nuclear 
Terrorism, pp. 49-61, 87-96, 115-121.
and in the years to come, such groups 
could arise in other countries.
Al Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania not because they had 
any special quarrel with Kenya or Tan-
zania but because they were particularly 
vulnerable targets that would hurt the 
United States.  Similarly, terrorists will 
seek nuclear material for a bomb wher-
ever they think the combination of their 
strength and the security systems’ weak-
ness makes it easiest to get.  Given the 
immense difficulty of stopping nuclear 
smuggling, the terrorists do not have to 
steal it in the country that is the ultimate 
target; it could be from a country on the 
opposite side of the world.  No country 
should believe that because it has never 
been threatened by extremists it need not 
provide stringent security for its nuclear 
material.  In a very real sense, vulnerable 
weapons-usable nuclear material any-
where is a threat to everyone, everywhere.
nuclear TerroriSm: The good neWS
The good news is that there is no convinc-
ing evidence that any terrorist group has 
yet gotten a nuclear weapon or the mate-
rials and expertise needed to make one.  
Moreover, making and delivering even a 
crude nuclear bomb would be among the 
most technically challenging and com-
plex operations any terrorist group has 
ever carried out.  There would be many 
chances for the effort to fail.  But given a 
history of terrorist efforts to get a nuclear 
bomb, and the dire consequences should 
they ever succeed, there can be no room 
for complacency.  All countries must take 
action to reduce the risks of nuclear theft 
and terrorism to the lowest practicable 
level.  This report is intended to offer a 
roadmap for the needed actions.
3 Global Nuclear Security today
Today, nuclear weapons or the separated 
plutonium or HEU needed to make them 
exist in dozens of countries.  Worldwide, 
these stockpiles can be found in hundreds 
of buildings and bunkers, and scores or 
hundreds of transports of these stocks 
from one place to another occur every 
year.
Each country where such stockpiles exist 
is responsible for securing them, and the 
specific approaches, procedures, and rules 
for securing and accounting for nuclear 
stockpiles vary widely. There are no bind-
ing global rules that specify how much 
security these stockpiles should have.
Most nuclear stockpiles around the 
world have generally effective security 
measures in place.  Moreover, national 
programs and international cooperative 
efforts—many of them funded by the 
United States—have led to major security 
improvements for some of the world’s 
most vulnerable stockpiles over the last 18 
years.  Other stocks have been eliminated 
entirely—representing, in a real sense, 
bombs that will never go off. The world 
owes the hundreds of men and women 
who have labored to make these improve-
ments a substantial debt of gratitude.
But other stockpiles of nuclear material 
still have security measures that would 
demonstrably not be enough to stop a 
theft attempt using some of the capabili-
ties and tactics that terrorists or thieves 
have already demonstrated in non-nuclear 
incidents.  Some countries require that 
stocks of nuclear weapons or weapons-
usable nuclear material be guarded by 
scores of heavily armed troops, multiple 
layers of barriers, security cameras, detec-
tors, and alarms; other countries require 
no armed guards at all (relying on police 
some distance away) and in some cases 
few other security measures are in place.
In general, military stockpiles have more 
stringent security measures than civilian 
stocks, and wealthy developed countries 
often devote more resources to security 
than developing countries transitioning 
from communism do.  But there are im-
portant exceptions to both of these rules of 
thumb—as the Belgian incident described 
at the outset of this report makes clear, 
along with incidents such as the U.S. Air 
Force’s inadvertent flight of six nuclear 
weapons to an air base that did not know 
it had received them in 2007, which, along 
with other incidents, led to the firing of 
both the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force.1
Nuclear security should not be thought of 
as some sites being “secured” and others 
“unsecured,” or one site “vulnerable” and 
another “not vulnerable.” Rather, nuclear 
security is a spectrum of degrees of risk—
additional security measures could always 
be added to any facility, if the threat 
justified the additional cost and inconve-
nience.  Indeed, even assessing whether 
one site has more effective security than 
another can be difficult, as one site may 
have especially good protection against 
one type of threat (such as insiders at the 
facility removing material and smuggling 
it out the door), while another may have 
1 A detailed account of the inadvertent movement of 
the six nuclear weapons, along with a review of or-
ganizational issues that contributed to this incident, 
can be found in Defense Science Board, Permanent 
Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, Report 
on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 
February 2008), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/
usa/doctrine/usaf/Minot_DSB-0208.pdf (accessed 5 
March 2010).
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superior protection against other types 
of threats (such as outsiders storming 
the facility with automatic weapons and 
explosives).  President Obama’s reference 
to securing all “vulnerable” nuclear mate-
rial around the world was an unfortunate 
choice of words, both because there is no 
clear line that delineates which material 
is vulnerable and because the reaction 
of many countries was to deny that their 
nuclear stockpiles are “vulnerable.”
There is probably nowhere in the world 
where substantial stocks of HEU or sepa-
rated plutonium are entirely “unsecured” 
in the sense of having no security mea-
sures at all (though there was an incident 
in the United States where government 
experts visiting a civilian site found a 
metal plate containing a kilogram of HEU 
hanging on the inside of the door of a jani-
tor’s closet).2  Indeed, managers of nuclear 
facilities around the world, in most cases 
never having had a nuclear theft attempt 
at their site, are almost all convinced that 
the security measures they already have 
in place are fully adequate—even though 
in some cases they amount to little more 
than a night watchman and a chain-link 
fence.
The difficult question of how much nu-
clear security, of what kinds, is “enough” 
must be based on an assessment of risk—
given the quality and quantity of nuclear 
material (or nuclear weapons) at a site, 
the security measures in place there, and 
the kinds of capabilities adversaries in 
that country may be able to bring to bear 
to try to steal a nuclear weapon or the 
nuclear material needed to make one, how 
does the risk of nuclear theft at one site 
compare to the risk at others?  Additional 
steps should be taken to improve security 
wherever the risk of nuclear theft appears 
to be substantial—and particularly if that 
risk appears to be higher than the com-
2 Interview with National Nuclear Security Admin-
istration (NNSA) officials, October 2008.
parable risk at other sites with nuclear 
weapons or weapons-usable nuclear ma-
terial.
This risk assessment approach depends 
crucially on the kinds of capabilities ad-
versaries who might attempt a nuclear 
theft could plausibly put together in the 
place where a particular nuclear facility or 
transport link is located.  The reason to be 
concerned about nuclear theft in Pakistan, 
for example, is not that they have weak 
security for their nuclear stockpile—they 
do not—but rather that their security sys-
tems must protect that stockpile against 
extraordinary threats, from both nuclear 
insiders with a demonstrated willingness 
to sell nuclear weapons technologies and 
outsiders that might include dozens or 
even hundreds of armed extremists (as 
occurred in an assault on a Frontier Corps 
base in January 2009).3  A nuclear security 
system that was sufficient to reduce the 
risk of nuclear theft to a low level for a 
nuclear facility in Canada might still leave 
a high risk of nuclear theft if the facility 
was in Pakistan.
It is also important to understand that 
nuclear security is a complex system that 
depends not only on having effective 
equipment in place, but even more on the 
actions of people, having guards and staff 
who take security seriously every day, and 
who do not prop open security doors for 
convenience or turn off intrusion detectors 
out of annoyance over their false alarms.  
As Gen. Eugene Habiger, former com-
mander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces 
and former security “czar” at the U.S. 
Department of Energy once put it, “good 
security is 20 percent equipment and 80 
3 See, for example, Richard A. Oppel, Jr. and Pir 
Zubair Shah, “46 Die in Taliban Attack on Pakistan 
Troops,” New York Times, 11 January 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/world/asia/12pstan.
html (accessed 5 March 2010).  The authors quote 
Frontier Corps officials as estimating that there 
were some 600 attackers, armed with machine guns 
and rocket-propelled grenades.
GlOBal NUClEaR SECURITy TOday 25
percent culture.”4  In this sense, nuclear 
security is an ever-evolving process, one 
that depends on how security is imple-
mented day-to-day, for years at a time, 
including when no inspectors or observers 
are present.  As with safety, each facility 
should set excellence in nuclear security 
as its goal, and strive to create a culture 
of continual improvement—for an orga-
nization that is not always on the lookout 
for ways to improve, and problems to be 
fixed, is an organization whose security 
performance is likely to decline over time 
as complacency sets in and unidentified 
problems mount.5
Global Distribution of  
nuclear stockpiles
Today, some 38 states either possess nu-
clear weapons or have HEU or plutonium 
separated from spent fuel on their soil.6  
Of these, nine possess nuclear weapons.7  
Beyond those nine, roughly 18 states 
have enough plutonium or HEU on their 
soil to require the highest international 
standards of security, while eleven have 
4 Interview by author, April 2003.
5 For a very useful guide to best practices in im-
proving nuclear security culture—with a tool for 
organizations to assess their own performance in 
this area—see World Institute for Nuclear Security, 
Nuclear Security Culture: A WINS Best Practice Guide 
for Your Organization, Rev. 1.4 (Vienna: WINS, Sep-
tember 2009).
6 See sources for the tables.
7 In order of the estimated number of nuclear weap-
ons in each country, these are Russia, the United 
States, France, China, the United Kingdom, Israel, 
Pakistan, India, and North Korea.  In addition, U.S. 
nuclear weapons are reportedly located at one base 
each in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Turkey, and two bases in Italy.  See Robert S. Nor-
ris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: 
Worldwide Deployments of Nuclear Weapons, 
2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/
December 2009, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/
content/xm38g50653435657/fulltext.pdf (accessed 27 
March 2010).
only one to a few kilograms.8  See Table 
3.1-Table 3.3.  The tables also include in-
formation on some key commitments and 
transparency measures related to nuclear 
security, including which countries:
Are recipients of U.S.-origin nuclear • 
material (which means they are obli-
gated to accept U.S. visits to review 
their physical protection arrangements 
for that material);
Have asked for and received an IAEA-• 
led International Physical Protection 
Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission to 
review their physical protection ar-
rangements;
Have cooperated with the United • 
States on upgrading nuclear security 
(providing another window of trans-
parency into how physical protection is 
being implemented);
Have ratified the Convention on Physi-• 
cal Protection;
Have ratified the 2005 amendment to • 
the physical protection convention.
As can be seen, most of these countries 
have ratified the Convention on Physi-
cal Protection and participate in at least 
one of the different types of international 
physical protection transparency.  Most, 
however, have not ratified the 2005 
amendment. 
Many of these countries have only a single 
facility, such as a research reactor, where 
HEU or separated plutonium are located.  
Others may have dozens, or, in the Rus-
sian case, hundreds of locations where 
nuclear weapons or weapons-usable fissile 
materials are stored or processed.
8 It is worth nothing that NNSA’s programs to re-
move nuclear material are now moving rapidly 
enough that several countries had to either be 
moved to a lower category or removed from these 
tables entirely because of removal of material in 
between the first and the final drafts of this report.  
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Fissile materials are used for both military 
and civilian purposes.  The military stock-
piles are larger, but are generally heavily 
guarded, while the smaller civilian stock-
piles often have more modest security 
measures in place.9
Over 95% of the world’s HEU was pro-
duced for military use, either for nuclear 
weapons or for naval fuel, though the 
civilian HEU, largely in the fuel cycle 
for nuclear research reactors, also poses 
substantial risks, discussed in more de-
tail below.  Russia and the United States 
possess well over 90% of the global HEU 
stock, though most of the other countries 
in the tables also have civil HEU on their 
soil.  The world HEU stockpile is declin-
ing as Russia and to a lesser extent the 
9 For a recent overview of world fissile material 
stockpiles, see International Panel on Fissile Ma-
terials, Global Fissile Materials Report 2009: A Path 
to Nuclear Disarmament (Princeton, N.J.: IPFM, Oc-
tober 2009), http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/
site_down/gfmr09.pdf (accessed 31 January 2010), 
pp. 8-23.
United States blend down excess HEU no 
longer needed for military purposes to 
LEU, at a rate far greater than the small 
continuing production of HEU in Pakistan 
and possibly in India.
World stockpiles contain some 500 tons of 
plutonium outside of spent fuel, roughly 
half in military stockpiles (including 
stocks declared excess to military needs) 
and half in civilian stockpiles (which are 
increasing steadily, as more plutonium is 
reprocessed from spent fuel than is fab-
ricated into new fuel every year).10  The 
world stockpiles of military plutonium 
are growing only very slowly, as only 
Pakistan, India, North Korea, and possibly 
Israel are continuing to produce pluto-
nium for weapons. 
Where, among these dozens of coun-
tries and hundreds of sites, is the risk of 
nuclear theft the highest?  What places 
10 Throughout this report, “tons” refers to metric 
tons.  A metric ton is 1000 kilograms, or approxi-
mately 2200 pounds.
Country
Russia
United States
U.K.
France
China
Germany
Japan
Belgium
India
Kazakhstan
Table 3.1:  Countries With ≥2 Tons of Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material: 
Stocks Physically Located in Each Country as of the end of 2003, in Metric Tons
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
b
b
a
c
U.S. Supplied
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Party to CPPNM 
Amendment
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Party to CPPNM
b
a
c
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
U.S. Funded 
Security Cooperation
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
IPPAS
Sources for tables: International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Materials Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament (Princeton, N.J.: IPFM, October 2009); David Albright and 
Kimberly Kramer, Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, July 2005); data on countries where all or most HEU 
has been removed provided by NNSA, January and March 2010; data on countries that have hosted International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions provided by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), February 2010; IAEA, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna, IAEA, 24 September 2009), 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_status.pdf (accessed 10 February 2010); IAEA, Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material (Vienna, IAEA, updated 8 February 2010), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_amend_status.pdf   (accessed 10 February 2010).
   Kazakhstan has some 10 tons of irradiated fuel from the now-closed BN-350 fast reactor, which was primarily in the range of 22-27% enrichment before irradiation; a publicly 
unknown quantity of this material is still HEU, though its enrichment has been reduced by ssion of U-235 during irradiation.  The BN-350 spent fuel also contains some 3 tons of 
high-grade plutonium, though this is less than 1 percent by weight of the spent fuel. 
   The United Kingdom and France have substantial stocks of material they produced themselves, but also some U.S.-origin material.
   China and the United States have been engaged in a broad dialogue on best practices for security and accounting for nuclear materials, but this has involved U.S.-funded upgrades 
at only one site in China; for the rest, China is expected to undertake improvements with its own resources.  U.S. ocials have not visited the sensitive facilities where most of China’s 
HEU and plutonium, and all of China’s nuclear weapons, are stored.
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should be the top priorities for the four-
year effort to secure nuclear weapons and 
materials around the world?  That cen-
tral question is very difficult to answer, 
particularly as most countries keep the 
specifics of their nuclear security practices 
secret.  Overall, the risk of nuclear theft 
from any particular facility or transport 
operation depends on the quantity and 
quality of the material available to be sto-
len (that is, how difficult would it be to 
make the available material into a nuclear 
bomb), the security measures in place 
(that is, what kind of insider and outsider 
thieves could the security measures pro-
tect against, with what probability), and 
the threats those security measures face 
(that is, the probability of different levels 
of insider or outsider capabilities being 
brought to bear in a theft attempt).  Based 
on the limited unclassified information 
available, it appears that the highest risks 
of nuclear theft today are in:
Pakistan, where a small and heavily • 
guarded nuclear stockpile faces im-
mense threats from Islamic extremists;
Russia, which has the world’s largest • 
nuclear stockpiles in the world’s largest 
number of buildings and bunkers, and 
security measures that have improved 
dramatically but still include important 
vulnerabilities; and
HEU at research reactors, which usu-• 
ally (though not always) use only 
modest stocks of HEU, in forms that 
the would require some chemical pro-
cessing before they could be used in a 
bomb, but which often have only the 
most minimal security measures in 
place.
While these are the highest-risk catego-
ries, the risks elsewhere are very real as 
well.  Transport of nuclear weapons and 
materials is a particular concern, as it is 
the part of the nuclear material life-cycle 
most vulnerable to violent, forcible theft, 
since it is impossible to protect the mate-
Country
Belarus
Canada
Czech Republic
Hungary
Israel
Italy
Mexico
Netherlands
North Korea
Pakistan
Poland
Serbia
South Africa
Switzerland
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Table 3.2:  Other Countries With Cat. I Quantities of Weapons-Usable Material
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
U.S. Supplied
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Party to CPPNM 
Amendment
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Party to CPPNM
b
a
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
U.S. Funded 
Security Cooperation
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
IPPAS
   “Category I” quantity is 5 kilograms of U-235 in HEU, or 2 kilograms of plutonium or U-233.
   Italy and the Netherlands possess substantial stocks of separated civilian plutonium, but much of it is physically located in other countries.  The Netherlands also has                    
   signicant civil HEU.   
   Switzerland has no civil HEU, and has consumed most of its former stock of civilian plutonium, but still (as of early 2010) has a modest stock of civilian plutonium.
b
b
c
a
c
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rial with thick walls and many minutes 
of delay when it is on the road, and since 
transports of both weapons and materials 
are remarkably frequent. In the end, virtu-
ally every country where these materials 
exist—including the United States—has 
more to do to ensure that these stocks are 
effectively protected against the kinds of 
threats that terrorists and criminals have 
shown they can pose.
pakistan
Pakistan’s modest nuclear stockpile 
arouses global concern because Pakistan is 
also the world headquarters of al Qaeda; 
its stockpile faces a greater threat from Is-
lamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons 
than any other nuclear stockpile on earth.  
Despite extensive security measures, there 
is a very real possibility that sympathetic 
insiders might carry out or assist in a 
nuclear theft, or that a sophisticated out-
sider attack (possibly with insider help) 
could overwhelm the defenses.  Over the 
longer term, there is at least a possibility 
of Islamic extremists seizing power, or 
of a collapse of the Pakistani state mak-
ing nuclear weapons vulnerable—though 
present evidence suggests both of these 
scenarios remain unlikely.
Pakistan is believed to have an arsenal of 
some 70-90 nuclear weapons, stored at 
several sites.11  It also has HEU and pluto-
nium production and processing facilities 
(including weapons-component fabrica-
tion facilities) and a small research reactor 
where a small amount of U.S.-origin HEU 
is located, all of which must be protected 
against nuclear theft.  Pakistan’s nuclear 
stockpile is growing, as it continues to 
produce HEU, it announced the start-
up of a plutonium production reactor at 
Khushab in 1998, and it has two more 
plutonium production reactors under con-
struction.12
Extensive Security Measures
In the last decade, Pakistan has taken 
major steps to improve security and 
command and control for its nuclear 
11 See Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear 
Notebook: Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2009,” Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 63, No. 3 (September/
October 2009http://thebulletin.metapress.com/
content/f828323447768858/fulltext.pdf (accessed 3 
February 2010), ), pp. 82-89.
12 Norris and Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Paki-
stani Nuclear Forces, 2009.”  
Country
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Chile
Ghana
Indonesia
Iran
Jamaica
Nigeria
Norway
Syria
Table 3.3: Other Countries With Kilogram-Range Quantities of Weapons-Usable Material 
as of early 2010
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
a
U.S. Supplied
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Party to CPPNM 
Amendment
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Party to CPPNM
a
b
b
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
U.S. Funded 
Security Cooperation
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
IPPAS
   Indonesia no longer uses HEU for either research reactor fuel or isotope production targets, but used HEU for medical isotope production for roughly a decade, and still has HEU     
remaining from that program.
   Iran has several kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU, but because the United States and Iran do not have diplomatic relations, the United States does not conduct visits to conrm that 
this material has adequate physical protection, as it does in other countries with U.S.-origin nuclear material. 
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stockpiles.13  While Islamabad maintains a 
veil of secrecy over the specifics of its nu-
clear security arrangements, its stockpiles 
are thought to be under heavy guard, 
protected by a 1,000-man armed secu-
rity force overseen by a two-star general, 
which is part of the larger 8-10,000-person 
Strategic Plans Division that manages 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.14  Person-
nel participating in the nuclear program 
are subject to extensive screening, in a 
program reported to be comparable to 
the U.S. Personnel Reliability Program.15  
Pakistani nuclear weapons are believed 
to be stored in disassembled form, with 
the components stored in separate build-
ings, so that thefts from more than one 
building would be required to get the 
complete set of components for a nuclear 
weapon.16  Pakistani officials also report 
13 For an unclassified overview of Pakistan’s nuclear 
security arrangements, see International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, 
A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net 
Assessment (London: IISS, 2007), pp. 112-118.  For a 
recent Pakistani view, see Feroz Khan, “Nuclear Se-
curity in Pakistan: Separating Myths and Reality,” 
Arms Control Today, http://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2009_07-08/khan#41 (accessed 28 January 2010).  
(Khan is a retired Pakistani brigadier general, who 
served as director for arms control and disarma-
ment affairs in Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division.)  
Along similar lines, see Kenneth N. Luongo and 
Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Naeem Salik, “Building Confi-
dence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” Arms Control 
Today, December 2007, http://www.armscontrol.
org/act/2007_12/Luongo.asp (accessed 28 January 
2010); for a more alarming view, see Rolf Mowatt-
Larssen, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing 
the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism,” Arms Control Today, 
July/August 2009, http://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2009_07-08/Mowatt-Larssen (accessed 28 Janu-
ary 2010).  See also Shaun Gregory, The Security of 
Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan, Pakistan Security Re-
search Unit (PSRU) Brief Number 22, 18 November 
18 2007, http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/
attachments/748/Brief_22finalised.pdf (accessed 28 
January 2010).
14 IISS, Nuclear Black Markets, p. 112.
15 See, for example, Khan, “Nuclear Security in Paki-
stan.”
16 See, for example, David Albright, “Securing 
Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” in Lee Feinstein 
et al., A New Equation: U.S. Policy toward India and 
that locks to prevent unauthorized use 
are incorporated into Pakistani weapons, 
though it is not known how these would 
be incorporated in weapons that are 
stored in disassembled form, or how dif-
ficult the Pakistani lock designs would be 
to bypass.17  In a crisis in which Pakistan 
sought to disperse its nuclear weapons to 
ensure their survival and prepare for their 
possible use, the controls that help pre-
vent unauthorized use in peacetime might 
be seriously weakened.18  The United 
States has cooperated with Pakistan to 
further strengthen nuclear security, as 
Pakistan has acknowledged, and Obama 
administration officials have sought to 
broaden and deepen this effort, but spe-
cifics concerning what steps have been 
implemented, are still underway, or are 
still being discussed remain classified.19
While Pakistani generals share the U.S. 
concern over extremist threats to their 
nuclear stockpiles, their first concern 
is protecting these stocks from Indian 
strikes—or American seizure.  The lat-
ter fear is stoked by repeated U.S. press 
speculation about planning for such 
possibilities.20  Hence, Pakistan has not 
Pakistan after September 11 (Washington, D.C.: Car-
negie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp27.pdf 
(accessed 31 January 2010).
17 See, for example, Hamid Mir, interview with 
former Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission 
Chairman Samar Mubarakmand, Geo-TV, 5 March 
2004, http://www.pakdef.info/forum/showthread.
php?t=9214 (accessed 31 January 2010). 
18 For a useful discussion making the case that this 
is an inherent feature of Pakistan’s nuclear posture, 
see Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s 
Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” Inter-
national Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/2010), 
pp. 65-73. 
19 For one unclassified account of these top-
ics, see David Sanger, “Obama’s Worst Pakistan 
Nightmare,” New York Times Magazine, 8 Janu-
ary 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/
magazine/11pakistan-t.html (accessed 13 February 
2010).
20 See, for example, Seymour Hersh, “Watch-
ing the Warheads,” The New Yorker, 5 
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permitted U.S. experts to visit its nuclear 
sites, or even disclosed where they are.  
Though the U.S. and Pakistani govern-
ments describe themselves as allies, 
anti-American feeling and suspicion of 
U.S. motives is widespread in Pakistan, 
particularly on nuclear issues (as the 
United States long opposed Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons program, and is still sus-
pected of trying to undermine it).  These 
suspicions can sometimes undermine 
cooperation in sensitive nuclear areas, 
and are only inflamed by detailed public 
discussions in the United States of pos-
sible actions to improve Pakistani nuclear 
security.
Extraordinary Insider and  
Outsider Threats
While Pakistani security measures are 
extensive, they must provide protection 
against extraordinary threats, from both 
insider infiltration and outsider attack.  
In the global black-market network led 
by Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, insiders within 
Pakistan’s program demonstrated both a 
willingness to sell nuclear weapons tech-
nology around the globe and an ability 
to remove major items from Pakistan’s 
nuclear material production facilities 
and ship them abroad.  As discussed 
earlier, other senior Pakistani nuclear 
scientists led a “charity” that reportedly 
offered to help al Qaeda (and Libya) with 
November 2001, http://www.newyorker.com/
archive/2001/11/05/011105fa_FACT (accessed 13 
February 2010), or Christina Lamb, “Elite U.S. 
Ready to Combat Pakistani Nuclear Hijacks,” The 
Times (London), 17 January 2010 http://www.time-
sonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6991056.
ece (accessed 13 February 2010).  Note that while 
the latter article also provoked Pakistani concern, 
the specific scenario described was U.S. special 
forces responding to extremist theft of a nuclear 
weapon, presumably with the knowledge and 
cooperation of the Pakistani military, rather than 
U.S. seizure of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons against 
Pakistan’s will.
nuclear weapons.21  Pakistan also suffers 
pervasive and deeply ingrained corrup-
tion, which can create opportunities for 
insider recruitment.22  Insiders among 
the elite group guarding then-Pakistani 
President Pervez Musharraf cooperated 
with al Qaeda in two assassination at-
tempts that came within a hair’s breadth 
of succeeding.  If the military personnel 
guarding the President cannot be trusted, 
how much confidence can the world have 
in the military personnel guarding the 
nuclear weapons?  
Sophisticated outsider attacks involving 
scores or even hundreds of armed ex-
tremists are also a serious possibility.  A 
January 2009 attack on a base for the para-
military Frontier Corps in the Mohmand 
district near the Afghan border, for ex-
ample, reportedly involved hundreds of 
attackers armed with machine guns and 
rocket-propelled grenades.23
There have been terrorist attacks targeting 
nuclear facilities in Pakistan, including 
attacks on or near the Sargodha air base 
and the Wah cantonment, both sites where 
nuclear weapons are believed to be stored 
or handled.24  These attacks, however, 
were typically simple car bombings that 
21 Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 262-68;  Mo-
watt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda WMD Threat: Hype or 
Reality?,” and Albright, “A Bomb for the Ummah.”
22 Russia, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Belarus are the 
only countries with substantial amounts of weap-
ons-usable nuclear materials in the worst 50 of 
180 countries ranked for perceptions of corruption 
by Transparency International.  See Transparency 
International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2009 (Ber-
lin: Transparency International, 17 November 2009), 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/sur-
veys_indices/cpi/2009 (accessed 13 March 2010).
23 Richard A. Oppel, Jr., and Pir Zubair Shah, “46 
Die in Taliban Attack on Pakistani Troops,” New 
York Times, 11 January 2009, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/01/12/world/asia/12pstan.html?_r=1&hp 
(accessed 29 January 2010).
24 Shaun Gregory, “The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s 
Nuclear Weapons,” CTC Sentinel, Vol 2, No. 7 (July 
2009), http:// www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSenti-
nel-Vol2Iss7.pdf (accessed 29 January 2010).
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never breached the perimeter security of 
the facilities, having little to do with the 
tactics that would be needed to steal a 
nuclear weapon or nuclear material.  In-
deed, these attacks may have the effect of 
reducing the risk of nuclear theft, as mass 
murder of military and nuclear personnel 
(or their children, in the case of one attack) 
presumably will make it more difficult 
for the extremists to recruit military and 
nuclear personnel to their cause.
The 2009 attack on Pakistani Army head-
quarters was more worrisome (though it 
also may have had the effect of making 
military personnel less likely to support 
the extremists).  The attackers, wearing 
Pakistani army uniforms, penetrated the 
site and seized dozens of hostages, ap-
parently with detailed knowledge of the 
layout of the site.  A Pakistani elite unit 
defeated the attackers and rescued most 
of the hostages, after several hours.25  With 
the right tactics and enough firepower, 
a similar attack—a terrorist assault on a 
heavily guarded facility, involving so-
phisticated planning, the use of deception 
(including, by some accounts, not just the 
uniforms but forged identifications), at-
tackers willing and eager to sacrifice their 
lives, and probably insider knowledge of 
the security arrangements—would pose 
a serious threat to a nuclear weapons or 
nuclear materials site.
Ultimately, no nuclear security system 
can protect against an unlimited threat. 
Hence, reducing the risk of nuclear theft 
in Pakistan must include both steps to fur-
ther improve nuclear security measures 
and steps to reduce extremists’ ability to 
challenge the Pakistani state, to recruit 
nuclear insiders, and to mount large 
outsider attacks.  Fortunately, the Paki-
stani government, with support from the 
United States and other countries, is mov-
25 Jane Perlez, “Pakistani Police Had Warned 
Army About a Raid,” New York Times, 11 October 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/world/
asia/12pstan.html (accessed 29 January 2010).
ing on both fronts, seeking to wage both a 
military/intelligence battle and a “hearts 
and minds” campaign against violent 
extremists in Pakistan (though as of early 
2010, the Pakistani military was declining 
to take on those elements of the Taliban 
located in North Waziristan).  The extrem-
ists’ ability to mount attacks throughout 
the country, and to acquire inside infor-
mation on security arrangements at sites 
they are considering attacking, remain 
troubling, however.
Finally, it is important to understand the 
limits of the policy tool of improving 
nuclear security.  The more extreme sce-
narios in Pakistan would not be addressed 
by any plausible nuclear security system.  
If the Pakistani state collapsed, or Taliban-
linked jihadists seized power, or hundreds 
of well-armed and well-trained jihadists 
attacked a nuclear site all at once, or se-
nior generals decided to provide nuclear 
assistance to jihadis, better nuclear secu-
rity systems would not solve the problem.  
However large or small these risks may 
be, other policy tools will be needed to 
address them.
russia
Russia has the world’s largest stockpiles 
of nuclear weapons, plutonium, and HEU, 
located in the world’s largest number of 
buildings and bunkers.  Having recovered 
from the chaos following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Russia now has substan-
tial security and accounting measures in 
place for its nuclear weapons and materi-
als, but significant weaknesses remain in 
some areas, and its security measures face 
substantial threats from both insiders and 
outsiders.
Dramatically Improved  
Nuclear Security
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, 
many important elements of nuclear secu-
rity—which had been based on a closed 
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society, closed borders, close surveillance 
of all nuclear-related personnel by the 
KGB, and nuclear workers who got the 
best of everything Soviet society had to 
offer—collapsed along with it.  Since then, 
through Russia’s own efforts and coop-
eration with the United States and other 
countries, nuclear security in Russia has 
improved dramatically.  The nuclear secu-
rity initiative launched by U.S. President 
George W. Bush and Russian President 
Vladimir Putin at Bratislava in 2005 was 
completed at the end of 2008, with exten-
sive security upgrades in place for all but 
a modest number of nuclear weapon sites 
and buildings with weapons-usable nu-
clear material.  Cooperative upgrades are 
continuing at buildings where coopera-
tion was agreed after the initial Bratislava 
list was prepared, and other cooperation 
to strengthen sustainability, regulations, 
inspections, training, material accounting 
and control procedures, security culture, 
and more is ongoing.  (See “Progress in 
Nuclear Security Upgrades in Russia and 
the Eurasian States,” p. 35.)
 Throughout the Russian nuclear complex, 
the most egregious weaknesses of the 
past—gaping holes in security fences, lack 
of any detector at all to set off an alarm if 
someone were carrying out bomb mate-
rial in a briefcase—appear to have been 
fixed, making nuclear thefts far more dif-
ficult to accomplish.  At the same time, the 
Russian economy improved dramatically 
over the past decade (though it has taken 
a substantial hit from the current world 
economic crisis), and that, combined 
with an overall revival of both the civil-
ian and military sides of Russia’s nuclear 
establishment, has largely eliminated the 
1990s-era desperation that created unique 
incentives and opportunities for nuclear 
theft.  No longer are there guards leav-
ing their posts to forage in the forest for 
food, as occurred in the late 1990s. And 
strengthened central control and the re-
newed strength of the FSB, the successor 
to the KGB, undoubtedly also contribute 
to deterring attempts at nuclear theft.  
Overall, the risk of nuclear theft in Russia 
has been reduced to a fraction of what it 
was a decade ago.26  Nevertheless, there 
remain strong grounds for concern, dis-
cussed below.
Insider Threats
All of the known cases of theft of weap-
ons-usable nuclear material where the 
circumstances of theft are known were 
perpetrated by insiders, or with the as-
sistance of insiders.  Thefts by employees 
are widespread at non-nuclear facilities in 
Russia; in 2006, authorities stopped an on-
going insider conspiracy that had stolen 
hundreds of items from the Hermitage, 
one of Russia’s leading (and most secure) 
museums. 27 In the case of nuclear weap-
ons and materials, the temptations for 
such insider theft may be high: in one case 
revealed in 2003, a Russian businessman 
was offering $750,000 for stolen weapon-
grade plutonium for sale to a foreign 
client.28
26 For more in-depth information and references, 
see Matthew Bunn, “The Threat in Russia and the 
Newly Independent States,” in Nuclear Threat Initia-
tive Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cambridge, 
Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing 
the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, 2006), http://www.nti.org/e_research/
cnwm/threat/russia.asp (accessed 9 February 2010).
27 Alex Rodriguez, “The Inside Job at Russia’s Her-
mitage,” Chicago Tribune, 20 August 2006; Geraldine 
Norman, “Mystery of Missing Treasures,” The Daily 
Telegraph (London) 5 December 2006; and Galina 
Stolyarova, “State Has No Plan to Guard Works of 
Art,” Moscow Times, 15 August 2006.
28 For a summary of multiple Russian sources on 
this case, see “Plutonium Con Artists Sentenced in 
Russian Closed City of Sarov,” NIS Export Control 
Observer, (November 2003), http://cns.miis.edu/
pubs/nisexcon/pdfs/ob_0311e.pdf (accessed 9 Feb-
ruary 2010).  See also “Russia: Criminals Indicted 
for Selling Mercury as Weapons-Grade Plutonium,” 
trans. U.S. Department of Commerce, Izvestiya, 
11 October 2003; “Russian Court Sentences Men 
for Weapons-Grade Plutonium Scam,” trans. BBC 
Monitoring Service, RIA Novosti, 14 October 2003.
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proGress in nuclear security upGraDes in russia anD the eurasian states
FiGure 3.1: FSu buildiNGS with Security upGradeS 
Since the 1990s, U.S., Russian, and Eurasian experts have worked closely together to upgrade nuclear 
material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) systems throughout Russia and the Eurasian 
countries.  The Bratislava nuclear security initiative, launched by Presidents Bush and Putin in 2005 
and completed at the end of 2008, accelerated and expanded this cooperative effort.  As shown in 
Figure 3.1, by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2009, MPC&A upgrades had been completed for 210 of the 
roughly 250 buildings in the former Soviet Union where plutonium or HEU exist.  Similarly, U.S. and 
Russian experts have completed security upgrades at all of the warhead sites where the United States 
and Russia agreed to cooperation, including all but a very few of the warhead storage sites in Russia 
and most of the temporary warhead handling areas, a total of  97 of the estimated 110-130 nuclear 
warhead sites in Russia.
The United States and Russia have cooperated on a broad range of other elements of a comprehensive 
nuclear security system as well, establishing facilities for training personnel and maintaining equip-
ment; drafting new regulations and procedures; training and equipping guard forces; consolidating 
nuclear material at fewer locations; creating programs to strengthen security culture; instituting com-
puterized national and site-level accounting systems for nuclear weapons and materials; and exchanging 
“best practices” in areas ranging from countering insider threats to budget planning for nuclear security.
These efforts have dramatically reduced the risk of nuclear theft in Russia, with major benefits for the 
security of the United States, Russia, and the world.  They have also established patterns of coopera-
tion and transparency that have offered both sides much greater insight into how the other manages its 
nuclear stockpiles—an intangible but substantial security benefit in itself.
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Corruption and insider theft are endemic 
in Russia, and have included military per-
sonnel selling off conventional weapons; 
one Russian official estimated in 2008 
that a third of Russia’s military spending 
is lost to corruption.29 Russian President 
Dmitri Medvedev has identified cor-
ruption as one of the biggest threats to 
Russia’s national security.30  In the nuclear 
sector, former Minister of Atomic Energy 
Evgeniy Adamov’s conviction for stealing 
millions of dollars from the HEU Purchase 
Agreement is only the tip of the iceberg.  
In 2003, the chief of security for one of 
Russia’s largest HEU and plutonium facil-
ities warned that guards there were often 
corrupt, becoming “the most dangerous 
internal adversaries.”31 In May 2008, an 
29 Steven Eke, “Russian Military ‘Deeply Corrupt’,” 
BBC News, 3 July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/7488133.stm (accessed 29 January 2010).  The 
estimate was from Aleksander Kvashin, leader of 
the military affairs commission of Russia’s Public 
Chamber.  Estimates from Russian ministries are 
much lower, but still substantial.  Russia’s chief 
military prosecutor estimated in early 2010 that 
losses to the government from military corruption 
and theft had doubled in 2009 compared to 2008 
(when Kvashin made his estimate), putting the 
losses identified in confirmed cases in the range of 
$100 million.  See “Russia Army Corruption ‘Cost 
$100M in 2009’,” BBC News, 26 January 2010.
30 See Janet McBride and Michael Stott, “Poverty 
and Corruption Threaten Russia: Medvedev,” 
Reuters, 25 June 2008.  In 2009, Transparency In-
ternational’s index of corruption perceptions rated 
Russia as one of the most corrupt countries on 
earth (tied with Ukraine and Zimbabwe, among 
others for 146th place out of 180 countries ranked, 
with first place being least corrupt).  Transparency 
International, Transparency International Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index 2009 (Berlin: Transparency 
International, 17 November 2009) http://www.
transparency.org/content/download/47852/763508/
CPI+2009_Presskit_complete_en.pdf (accessed 29 
January 2009). For an overview of security issues 
posed by corruption in Russia and other states of 
the former Soviet Union, see Robert Legvold, “Cor-
ruption, the Criminalized State, and Post-Soviet 
Transitions,” in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Corruption, 
Global Security, and World Order (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 2009), pp. 194-238.
31 Igor Goloskokov, “Refomirovanie Voisk MVD 
Po Okhrane Yadernikh Obektov Rossii (Reforming 
MVD colonel was reportedly arrested for 
soliciting thousands of dollars in bribes to 
overlook violations of security rules in the 
closed nuclear city of Snezhinsk.32
Protective measures to prevent insider 
theft at nuclear facilities have improved 
dramatically in recent years, but sig-
nificant weaknesses remain.  In general, 
material control and accounting measures 
have not progressed as rapidly as physi-
cal protection improvements have.  Many 
facilities continue to use easily-faked wax 
or lead seals. Facilities with hundreds or 
thousands of containers of nuclear ma-
terial have paper records of how much 
material is in those containers, but in 
some cases have still not actually mea-
sured each container to see if any of that 
material is missing.  Rules for material ac-
counting do not yet require the statistical 
analyses necessary to detect a slow, bit-
by-bit theft.  The most important insider 
issues relate to bulk processing facilities 
(which have been the source of almost 
all of the known thefts of HEU or pluto-
nium), where insiders might be able to 
steal small amounts of material at a time 
without detection.
Outsider Threats
Nuclear facilities in Russia also face seri-
ous outsider threats, though as a result 
MVD Troops to Guard Russian Nuclear Facili-
ties),” trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 
Yaderny Kontrol 9, no. 4 (Winter 2003), http://www.
pircenter.org/data/publications/yk4-2003.pdf (ac-
cessed 31 January 2010).
32 “An Employee of the Department of Classified 
Facilities of the MVD Was Arrested in Snezhinsk: 
What Incriminates the ‘Silovic’,” www.ura.ru, 29 
May 2008 [translated by Jane Vayman].  Person-
nel who have recently retired and have limited 
incomes, or are about to lose their jobs but still have 
access to nuclear material or knowledge of nuclear 
security systems, may pose particularly important 
insider risks—including retired 12th GUMO or Stra-
tegic Rocket Forces personnel, or the thousands of 
employees in the process of losing their jobs as Rus-
sia’s last plutonium production reactors and their 
associated reprocessing plants shut down.
GlOBal NUClEaR SECURITy TOday 35
of Russia’s suppression of the Chechen 
insurgency, it may now be unlikely that 
a nuclear site could be assaulted by a 
force as substantial as the 32-person team, 
armed with rocket-propelled grenades, 
machine guns, and explosives, that seized 
the school in Beslan in 2004.33  Russia is 
the only country in the world where se-
nior officials have confirmed that terrorist 
teams have carried out reconnaissance 
at nuclear weapon storage sites (whose 
locations are secret).34  Similarly, in late 
2005, Russian Interior Minister Rashid 
Nurgaliev, in charge of the MVD troops 
guarding nuclear facilities, confirmed that 
in recent years “international terrorists 
have planned attacks against nuclear and 
33 It is worth noting that the Beslan attackers ac-
quired some of their weapons stockpile in an even 
larger and more sophisticated June 2004 raid on 
Russian Interior Ministry buildings and arms de-
pots in the neighboring province of Ingushetia.  
That raid reportedly involved at least 200 attackers 
and left some 80 people dead.  In that incident, the 
attackers, dressed in uniforms of the Russian Fed-
eral Security Service, Army intelligence, and other 
special police squads, overwhelmed local forces, 
who did not receive reinforcements from federal 
security service troops for several hours.  Were a 
nuclear site to be attacked by a similar force, with 
reinforcements similarly late to arrive, the attack 
might well succeed.  Mark Deich, “The Ingushetia 
Knot,” Moskovskii Komsomolets, 6 August 2004; Boris 
Yamshanov, “Bribes Reeking of Explosives,” Rossiis-
kaya Gazeta, 16 September 2004.
34 These incidents apparently occurred in the 
months prior to the 9/11 attacks, when al Qaeda 
was also eagerly pursuing connections with senior 
Pakistani nuclear scientists in the Pakistani Um-
mah Tamir-e-Nau (UTN) network.  Two incidents 
during 2001 were confirmed by Major-General 
Igor Valynkin, then serving as the commander 
of the force that guards Russia’s nuclear war-
heads.  The Russian state newspaper reported two 
more such incidents focused on nuclear warhead 
transport trains.  See, for example, “Russia: Ter-
ror Groups Scoped Nuke Site,” Associated Press, 
25 October 2001; Pavel Koryashkin, “Russian 
Nuclear Ammunition Depots Well Protected—
Official,” ITAR-TASS, 25 October 2001.  For the 
train incidents, see Vladimir Bogdanov, “Propusk 
K Beogolovkam Nashli U Terrorista (a Pass to War-
heads Found on a Terrorist),” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 1 
November 2002.
power industry installations” intended 
to “seize nuclear materials and use them 
to build weapons of mass destruction 
for their own political ends.”35  In 2007, 
Anatoly Safonov, then-President Putin’s 
special representative for the fight against 
terrorism and deputy foreign minister, 
said: “We know for sure, with evidence 
and facts in hand, about this steady inter-
est and a goal pursued by terrorists to 
obtain what is called nuclear weapons and 
nuclear components in any form.”36
Transports of nuclear weapons and mate-
rials are the point in the nuclear material 
life-cycle that is most vulnerable to violent 
outsider attack, since it is impossible to 
provide a transport with the layers of bar-
riers and detectors that are available at a 
fixed site.  In Russia, dozens of nuclear 
weapon transports and scores of weapons-
usable nuclear material transports take 
place every year, often over remote routes 
including the Trans-Siberian rail line. 
U.S. programs have helped Russia pur-
chase secure railcars and trucks, acquire 
armored “supercontainers” for shipping 
nuclear warheads, strengthen regulations, 
improve tactical approaches for defending 
warhead transports, and take other mea-
sures to improve transport security, but 
questions remain about the potential risk 
of armed theft from a transport. 
It appears, however, that Russia’s war 
in Chechnya has significantly reduced 
Chechen rebels’ ability to organize and 
mount large, sophisticated attacks, reduc-
ing the outsider threat to Russia’s nuclear 
facilities.37
35 “Internal Troops to Make Russian State Facilities 
Less Vulnerable to Terrorists.”
36 Quoted in “Russian Foreign Ministry Aware of 
Terrorists Attempts to Obtain Nuclear Weapons—
Diplomat,” Interfax, 27 September 2007.
37 See, for example, Brian D. Taylor, “Putin’s ‘His-
toric Mission’: State-Building and the Power 
Ministries in the North Caucasus,” Problems of Post-
Communism, Vol. 54, No. 6, November/December 
2007, pp. 3-16. 
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Sustainability
A central question is how well Russia will 
sustain and upgrade over time the im-
proved nuclear security and accounting 
measures that have been put in place.  In 
contrast to the 1990s, the Russian govern-
ment now has the resources to pay for 
effective nuclear security itself, but Russia 
has not made nuclear security spending a 
priority.  At present, nuclear facilities are 
generally responsible for paying for their 
own security measures.  Large facilities 
generating substantial amounts of rev-
enue (either from the commercial market 
or from Russian defense programs) can 
afford to sustain effective security, but 
smaller research facilities have been facing 
considerable difficulties finding the funds 
to maintain expensive equipment, test-
ing, and training programs.38 Three out of 
four civilian nuclear facilities visited by 
investigators from the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office in 2006 (all of which 
were research facilities with little commer-
cial revenue) expressed concern that they 
might not be able to afford to maintain the 
upgraded security systems at their sites 
when U.S. assistance phased out.39  U.S. 
and Russian experts are developing and 
implementing sustainability plans for 
each major site, but whether the Russian 
government and managers of these sites 
will devote the attention and resources 
required to maintain effective security for 
the long haul remains an open question. 
The U.S. Congress has directed that the 
U.S. government’s goal should be a nu-
clear security system entirely sustained by 
Russia’s own resources by the beginning 
38 Interviews with experts from Russian nuclear 
research centers, July 2008 and March 2009.
39 U.S. Congress, Government Accountability Office, 
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving 
Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-Term 
Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is 
Uncertain, GAO-07-404 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 
2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07404.pdf 
(accessed 9 February 2010), p. 27.
of 2013.40  This deadline has been useful 
in convincing Russian officials and site 
managers that U.S. assistance will not con-
tinue forever, and that they have to plan 
seriously for sustaining effective security 
themselves.  As the deadline nears, how-
ever, Congress should consider offering 
some flexibility, to help convince Russian 
site managers that U.S. experts will not 
be departing entirely so soon that it is no 
longer worth the effort to push potentially 
controversial cooperative projects through 
the Russian bureaucratic system.  In any 
case, even after the 2013 deadline, it will 
certainly make sense to continue a mod-
est level of funding to support exchanges 
of nuclear security and accounting best 
practices, joint research and development 
of improved security and accounting tech-
nologies, and other steps that will allow 
Russia and the United States continued 
confidence-building insight into how each 
country is managing nuclear security.
Consolidation
States can achieve more effective nuclear 
security at lower cost if they have fewer 
places with nuclear weapons or weapons-
usable nuclear material to protect. Russia 
reduced the number of nuclear weapon 
sites substantially in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, as nuclear weapons were 
removed from Eastern Europe, the non-
Russian states of the former Soviet Union, 
and some parts of Russia (such as the 
Caucasus).  But Russia is still believed 
to have 110-130 nuclear weapon sites.41  
40 See, for example, discussion in U.S. Congress, 
General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion: Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian 
Nuclear Sites, but the Long-Term Sustainability of U.S.-
Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain, GAO-07-404 
(Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2007), http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d07404.pdf (accessed 9 February 
2010); U.S. Department of Energy, 2006 Strategic 
Plan: Office of International Material Protection and 
Cooperation, National Nuclear Security Administration 
(Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2006).
41 See discussion in Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008, 
pp. 93-94.  This figure includes both permanent 
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Similarly, despite some consolidation of 
weapons-usable nuclear materials, Russia 
is still thought to have some 250 buildings 
where such materials exist, a far larger 
infrastructure of such buildings than ex-
ists in any other country.42  Russia should 
make consolidating these stockpiles to a 
much smaller and easier-to-protect num-
ber of sites a high priority, as it has not 
been so far.43
In particular, Russia has over 60 operating 
HEU-fueled research reactors and critical 
assemblies, far more than any other coun-
try.44  (The nuclear theft dangers posed 
storage sites and temporary locations such as rail 
transfer points or loading areas at military bases 
where nuclear weapons may be located for hours at 
a time.
42 NNSA plans to complete upgrades on 229 build-
ings with HEU or separated plutonium, of which 15 
are in other Eurasian states.  See U.S. Department of 
Energy, Department of Energy FY 2011 Congressional 
Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administra-
tion, Volume 1, DOE/CF-0047 (Washington, D.C.: 
February 2010), http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/about/
documents/FY_2011_CONG_NNSA_Merged.pdf 
(accessed 19 February 2010), p. 372.
43 For discussions of the importance of consolidation 
of nuclear weapon sites, see Gunnar Arbman and 
Charles Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: 
Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations, 
vol. FOI-R-1588-SE (Stockholm: Swedish Defense 
Research Agency, 2005), http://www.foi.se/upload/
pdf/FOI-RussiasTacticalNuclearWeapons.pdf (ac-
cessed 30 January 2010), and Harold P. Smith, Jr., 
“Consolidating Threat Reduction,” Arms Control 
Today 33, no. 9 (November 2003) http://www.
armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/Smith.asp (accessed 
30 January 2010).  For a discussion of consolidat-
ing weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia, 
see Pavel Podvig, Consolidating Fissile Materials 
in Russia’s Nuclear Complex, Research Report No. 
7 (Princeton, N.J.: International Panel on Fissile 
Materials, May 2009), http://www.fissilematerials.
org/ipfm/site_down/rr07.pdf (accessed 30 January 
2010).
44 Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit, “HEU Fuel 
Cycle Inventories and Progress on Global Mini-
mization,” Nonproliferation Review 15, no. 2 (July 
2008), and the on-line supplement, Ole Reistad 
and Styrkaar Hustveit, “Appendix II: Operational, 
Shut Down, and Converted HEU-Fueled Research 
Reactors,” http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol15/152_
reistad_appendix2.pdf  (accessed 30 January 2010).
by HEU-fueled research reactors are dis-
cussed in more detail below.)  Many of 
these facilities are little-used, yet Russia 
has shown little inclination to convert 
them to low-enriched uranium (LEU) that 
cannot be used in a nuclear weapon, or to 
shut them down.  In the Bratislava nuclear 
security initiative of 2005, Russian officials 
insisted that the reference to converting 
such reactors refer only to reactors in 
“third countries,” eliminating any com-
mitment to move toward conversion in 
Russia or the United States.  Despite more 
than a decade of effort and the blending 
down of some 12 tons of HEU, the U.S.-
sponsored Material Consolidation and 
Conversion (MCC) program has led to 
complete removal of the HEU from only 
one site, the Krylov Shipbuilding Research 
Institute. Negotiation of an agreement 
on consolidating nuclear materials has 
been stalled for years.  Russia has agreed 
to permit six of its facilities to accept U.S. 
funding to perform feasibility studies 
concerning whether they could convert to 
LEU, but there is as yet no commitment 
that these or other facilities will actually 
be converted.45
Regulation
Russia’s nuclear security and account-
ing rules and their enforcement have 
improved substantially since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.46 This is a crucial 
45 Interviews with NNSA officials, December 2009 
and January 2010.
46 In particular, in July 2007, after years of delay, 
the Russian government finally issued an updated 
overall physical protection regulation (though 
that rule is very general, and depends for its ef-
fectiveness on specifics laid down in agency-level 
rules, some of which are still being updated). See 
“Procedures for the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material, Nuclear Facilities, and Nuclear Material 
Storage Points,” Decree No. 456 (Moscow: Gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation, 19 July 2007).  
Similarly, a modified version of the basic rules 
of material control and accounting, known by its 
Russian acronym as OPUK, was issued in 2005; a 
substantially modified version of that set of basic 
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element of sustainability, as nuclear 
managers typically will not invest scarce 
resources in security unless the govern-
ment tells them they have to do so.
But Russia’s nuclear security rules still 
have important weaknesses, its regula-
tory agencies have limited resources for 
inspection and enforcement, and the regu-
lators in many cases have less power than 
Rosatom, the state corporation that man-
ages much of Russia’s nuclear complex, 
or the other agencies handling nuclear 
materials that they are supposed to regu-
late, making it difficult in some cases for 
them to enforce fines and shutdowns 
when facilities violate nuclear security 
and accounting rules.  Russia’s nuclear 
regulatory agency, once an independent 
body reporting directly to the Russian 
President, was folded in years ago to be 
one small part of a much broader agency 
regulating virtually all aspects of safety 
in Russia—and in 2008, that broader 
agency was turned into one small part of 
the Ministry of Natural Resources, cre-
ating multiple levels of administration 
that nuclear regulators must go through 
before a dangerous issue can be raised to 
the highest levels of the Russian govern-
ment.47  (Virtually every other country 
operating major nuclear facilities has an 
independent, stand-alone nuclear regula-
tory agency, as Russia had in the past.)  
Key nuclear security requirements are 
spread between several layers of national, 
agency-level, and site-level rules, and are 
sometimes vague or confusing, making 
it difficult in some cases for working-
rules is in development.  Interview with Russian 
regulatory official, March 2009.
47 This sub-agency is known as the Federal Service 
for Ecological, Technological, and Nuclear Super-
vision (known in Russia as Rostekhnadzor).  A 
separate unit within the Ministry of Defense (MoD), 
substantially smaller than Rostekhnadzor, regulates 
safety and security for MoD nuclear weapons and 
materials and those facilities at Rosatom manu-
facturing nuclear weapons components and other 
secret items.
level personnel to know how to follow 
the rules.  It remains unclear whether the 
nuclear regulators have the expertise and 
resources to provide in-depth evaluation 
of the capability of each site to provide 
effective protection against designated 
insider and outsider threats. The nuclear 
regulators have no authority to regu-
late the MVD forces that provide most 
of the guards for nuclear sites; instead, 
the MVD regulates itself.  Regulation of 
nuclear material control and accounting 
is also evolving; among other issues, sta-
tistical analyses of accounting results to 
determine if material is being removed 
in small amounts over time are not yet 
required.  Given the modest salaries of 
inspectors and the high costs a site might 
face to fix a violation inspectors uncov-
ered, the possibility of corruption is also 
a potential problem—as in the case of the 
MVD officer arrested for soliciting bribes 
to overlook violations of nuclear security 
rules, mentioned earlier. 
NNSA experts, working with Russian 
experts, have laid out a structure of hun-
dreds of key elements they believe an 
appropriate nuclear security and account-
ing system should have, and are working 
to put those elements in place.48  NNSA 
has also helped Russia develop a regula-
tory library to help staff understand and 
implement multiple layers of regulatory 
requirements. But Russian agreement to 
implement and enforce such a structure 
of rules remains far from certain.  There is 
still a long way to go to build a structure 
of effective rules, effectively enforced—
without which sustainable nuclear 
security is unlikely to be achieved.
48 See, for example, Greg E. Davis et al., “Creating a 
Comprehensive, Efficient and Sustainable Nuclear 
Regulatory Structure: A Process Report from the 
U.S. Department of Energy’s Material Protection, 
Control and Accounting Program,” in Proceedings 
of the 47th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear 
Materials Management, Nashville, Tenn., 16-20 July 
2006 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2006)..  Also inter-
views with NNSA officials, July 2006 and June 2007.
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Security Culture
As noted in the first chapter, building 
strong security cultures—strengthening 
the habit, among all security-relevant per-
sonnel, of taking security seriously and 
taking the actions needed to ensure high 
security—is critical to achieving effective 
nuclear security.  In Russia, both Russian 
and American experts have reported a 
systemic problem of inadequate security 
culture—intrusion detectors turned off 
when the guards get annoyed by their 
false alarms, security doors left open, se-
nior managers allowed to bypass security 
systems, effective procedures for oper-
ating the new security and accounting 
systems either not written or not followed, 
and the like.49  In 2003 the security chief at 
Seversk, one of Russia’s largest  plutonium 
and HEU processing facilities, reported 
that guards at his site routinely patrolled 
with no ammunition in their guns and 
had little understanding of the importance 
of what they were guarding.50
NNSA has launched an impressive effort 
to work with Russia to strengthen security 
culture—expanded after the presidential 
endorsement of the effort in the Bratislava 
49 Indeed, on one visit to a facility whose security 
had been upgraded with U.S. assistance, the U.S. 
General Accounting Office found that the gate to 
the central storage facility for the site’s nuclear 
material was left wide open and unattended.  At 
another site, guards did not respond when visitors 
entering the site set off the metal detectors, and the 
portal monitors to detect removal of nuclear mate-
rial were not working.  See U.S. Congress, General 
Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security 
of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further En-
hancements Needed, GAO-01-312 (Washington, D.C.: 
GAO, 2001), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01312.
pdf  (accessed 31 January 2010), pp. 12-13.  For a 
useful discussion of the security culture problem 
generally, see Igor Khripunov and James Holmes, 
eds., Nuclear Security Culture: The Case of Russia 
(Athens, Georgia: Center for International Trade 
and Security, The University of Georgia, 2004), 
http://www.nti.org/c_press/analysis_cits_111804.
pdf (accessed 31 January 2010). 
50 Goloskokov, “Reforming MVD Troops to Guard 
Russian Nuclear Facilities.”
nuclear security initiative in 2005.  More-
over, the transformation in culture that 
inevitably arises from dealing with mate-
rial that is now stored in a vault with a 
huge steel door which no one can access 
alone, arrived at through layers of fences, 
bars, and detectors, should not be under-
estimated.  But whether ongoing efforts to 
strengthen security culture will succeed 
on the scale required remains an open 
question.  Unfortunately, changing any 
deeply ingrained aspect of organizational 
culture, including security culture, is 
very difficult.51  It will not happen unless 
key Russian officials and site managers 
become convinced of the urgency of the 
threat and the need to make nuclear secu-
rity a top priority of their organizations.
Guard Forces
Nuclear weapon sites in Russia are 
guarded by a well-trained, professional 
military force, the 12th Main Directorate of 
the Ministry of Defense (known as the 12th 
GUMO, its Russian acronym).  At most 
weapons-usable nuclear material sites, 
by contrast, the main response forces are 
from the MVD, some of whom are poorly 
paid and poorly trained conscripts.  A 
transition is underway toward increased 
use of professional, better paid guards, 
such as Rosatom’s “Atomguard” force, but 
that transition is proceeding slowly, and 
at most sites, the main armed response to 
an outsider attack would come from the 
MVD.52  In 2003, the chief of security at 
Seversk reported that the Ministry of Inte-
51 A classic text on organizational culture (though 
one much critiqued in some circles as too focused 
on managers’ role in culture) is Edgar H. Schein, 
Organizational Culture and Leadership, Third ed. (San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004).  See also John 
P. Kotter, Leading Change, First ed. (Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press, 1996).  
52 A transition is underway toward greater use of the 
volunteer “Atomgard” force controlled by Rosatom, 
but so far Atomgard largely handles tasks internal 
to the sites, such as access control, and not the job 
of fighting off external adversaries.  As one resident 
of Sarov put it to the author, “they are mostly old 
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proGress in consoliDatinG nuclear stockpiles
In recent years, national programs and international cooperation have led to major progress in con-
solidating nuclear weapons and materials to fewer locations—though much remains to be done.
In the United States in particular, a substantial consolidation program is under way in the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) complex, focused on eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material entirely 
from as many sites and buildings as possible, driven in part by the immense costs of meeting post-
9/11 security requirements for such materials.  Moreover, international cooperative efforts have 
contributed to consolidation in many countries.  By NNSA’s accounting, by the end of 2009, the 
GTRI program and its predecessors had:
Contributed to converting or verified the shutdown of 67 HEU-fueled research reactors •	
worldwide;1
Helped remove all HEU from 47 facilities, so that these locations no longer have any weapons-•	
usable nuclear material to steal (see Figure 3.2);2
Shipped some 2,508 kilograms of HEU from potentially vulnerable facilities back to the United •	
States or Russia for secure storage and disposition.3
Most remarkably, perhaps, by the end of January 2010, 19 countries had eliminated all the weapons-
usable nuclear material on their soil.4  (See Table 3.4.)  As long as they do not reintroduce such 
material, none of these countries will ever again have to worry about having potential ingredients of 
nuclear weapons on their soil.
1 A more accurate figure would be 64, since three of these 67 were only partly converted and therefore still use HEU in parts 
of their reactor cores.  A much larger number of HEU-fueled reactors has shut down over the years than NNSA tracks; NNSA 
counts only those that were on their list to attempt to convert which then shut down.  For a more complete list, see Reistad 
and Hustveit, “Appendix 2: Operational, Shut Down, and Converted HEU-fueled Reactors.”
2 Data provided by NNSA, January 2010.  Note that the renewal of the U.S. take-back offer in 1996 started the effort on a 
steep upward trajectory, which was renewed, after a period of slow progress, by the establishment of the GTRI program in 
2004, which broadened the nuclear material removal effort and brought increased focus and resources to it. Here, too, the true 
number of sites with all weapons-usable nuclear material removed is larger, since NNSA’s figure does not include the many 
facilities within the United States from which all HEU has been removed; the Krylov Shipbuilding Institute in Russia, which 
eliminated all its HEU with help from the Material Consolidation and Conversion effort that is part of INMPC; the many 
buildings in Russia where all nuclear material has been eliminated, in part with help from INMPC; the two HEU-fueled re-
search reactors in Iraq from which the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) removed all the HEU after the 1991 
Gulf War; the Ulba fuel fabrication facility at Ust-Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan, from which Project Sapphire removed all HEU 
in 1994; the HEU-fueled research reactor in Georgia from which Operation Auburn Endeavor (otherwise known as Project 
Olympus) removed all HEU in 1998; or other facilities that eliminated their weapons-usable nuclear material without U.S. 
involvement, such as by converting to use LEU materials as their fuel and shipping their HEU to La Hague for reprocessing.
3 Data provided by NNSA, January 2010.  NNSA’s figures do not include the tens of kilograms of research reactor HEU fuel 
removed from Iraq by United Nations teams after the 1991 war; the nearly 600 kilograms of HEU removed in Project Sap-
phire in 1994; or the few kilograms removed from Georgia in Operation Auburn Endeavor in 1998.  Nor do they include the 
12 tons of HEU in Russia that the INMPC program has paid to have converted to low-enriched uranium, or the large stocks 
of HEU that have been removed from research reactors or other sites in the United States.
4 Data provided by NNSA, January 2010.  Taiwan is counted here as a country, since it currently has its own government sepa-
rate from that of the rest of China.  Iraq and Georgia, where nuclear material was removed by other programs, are added here 
to have a more complete accounting.  Spain, which is included here, possesses significant stocks of plutonium separated from 
spent fuel, but as far as is publicly known these are located in foreign countries, not in Spain itself.
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proGress in consoliDatinG nuclear stockpiles (cont)
Since it was established, the GTRI program has succeeded in sharply accelerating the consolidation 
efforts it is focusing on, speeding up reactor conversions and HEU removals several-fold compared to 
the years just before GTRI was created.  And in 2009, GTRI announced it was adding an addition 
71 more research reactors to the list of facilities it hopes to help countries convert to less dangerous 
fuels or shut down.  While there are still some operating HEU-fueled research reactors that GTRI 
does not believe it will be able to reach, this nonetheless represented a major step to close a gap in 
U.S. efforts, which previously had no plans for a substantial fraction of the world’s operating HEU-
fueled research reactors.5
There is still a need, however, for a broader approach to consolidating nuclear weapons and weapons-
usable nuclear materials in fewer locations.  First, there are tons of civilian HEU that GTRI does not 
plan to address—representing primarily U.S.-supplied HEU in developed countries.  While these 
stocks may in many cases pose lower risks than those in some other countries, that is not the same as 
saying they pose no risks—and as noted earlier, recent incidents make clear that the assumption that 
developed countries always maintain effective security for nuclear stockpiles is not universally correct. 
5 For a critique of GTRI’s focus on addressing only a fraction of the world’s research reactor HEU, see Bunn, Securing the Bomb 
2008, pp. 44-57, 105-108.
Figure 3.2: Sites With All HEU Removed Over Time
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proGress in consoliDatinG nuclear stockpiles (cont)
Over the long term, consideration should even be given to the costs and benefits of converting naval 
reactors to LEU as well.  Second, except for some small unwanted stocks that GTRI plans to address, 
there is no plan to consolidate civilian plutonium.  Despite the long-standing debates between differ-
ent countries over whether reprocessing and recycling plutonium from spent fuel or direct disposal 
of spent fuel is the best approach to the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, it should be possible over 
time to reach agreement on limiting the number of sites where plutonium separated from fission 
products is processed, stored, and used; maintaining stringent standards of security at those sites; and 
restraining the huge buildup of stockpiles of civilian separated plutonium (which are now as large 
or larger than all the world’s stockpiles of weapons plutonium combined), separating plutonium 
even in countries choosing a reprocessing fuel cycle only when the plutonium is needed for produc-
tion of fuel.  Finally, there should also be renewed efforts focused on consolidating nuclear weapons 
themselves to fewer locations—particularly in Russia (which has by far the world’s largest number of 
nuclear weapon sites) and the United States (which is the only country that deploys nuclear weapons 
in other countries).
Country
Iraq
Colombia
Spain
Denmark
Georgia
Philippines
Thailand
Slovenia 
Brazil
Sweden
Greece
South Korea
Latvia
Bulgaria
Portugal
Romania
Libya
Taiwan
Turkey
Table 3.4: Countries That Have Eliminated All Their Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material
1992
1996
1997
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
2002
2005
2007
2008
2008
2008
2009
2009
2009
2010
Year
rior troops guarding the facility routinely 
failed to protect the facility from outside 
attack in tests; routinely failed to prevent 
insiders from removing material in tests; 
often patrolled with no ammunition in 
their guns; and were frequently corrupt.53  
ladies, and they are not frightening.”  Personal 
communication, June 2006.
53 Goloskokov, “Reforming MVD Troops to Guard 
Russian Nuclear Facilities.”
The combination of low pay, boring 
work, and posting at remote nuclear sites 
contributes to low morale among these 
troops: brutal hazing and suicides are 
distressingly common.54 NNSA has been 
providing equipment and training to 
nuclear guard forces, helping to finance 
54 “Analysis: Hazing in Russian Guard Units Threat-
ens Nuclear Cities Security,” Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, 9 June 2005.
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dedicated training facilities for nuclear 
guards, and has been discussing assis-
tance with a personnel reliability program 
to screen new recruits and conscripts.55  
But over time, to achieve highly effective 
protection for these nuclear material sites 
Russia will need to move to a well-trained 
professional guard force, as it has long 
had for nuclear weapon sites. 
In short, as a CIA report summed it up in 
2006: “Russia’s nuclear security has been 
slowly improving over the last several 
years, but we remain concerned about 
vulnerabilities to an insider who attempts 
unauthorized actions as well as to poten-
tial terrorist attacks.”56
heu-fueleD research reactors
HEU-fueled research reactors typically 
have comparatively modest stockpiles 
of material, often in forms that would 
require some chemical processing to be 
used in a bomb.  But they have some of 
the world’s weakest security measures for 
those stocks.  (Ironically, the security mea-
sures at Pelindaba, which were challenged 
by the November 2007 intrusion described 
in the first chapter, are much more sub-
stantial than the security measures at 
many other HEU-fueled research reactors 
around the world.)  And it is important 
to remember that much of the irradiated 
fuel from research reactors is still HEU, 
and is not radioactive enough to pose any 
significant deterrent to theft by suicidal 
terrorists.57
55 Information provided by NNSA, October 2008.
56 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Annual Report 
to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nu-
clear Facilities and Military Forces (Washington, D.C.: 
NIC, April 2006), http://www.fas.org/irp/ 
nic/russia0406.pdf (accessed 1 February 2010).  Al-
though this is intended to be an annual report, no 
subsequent report has yet been released.
57 For a discussion of the proliferation threat posed 
by irradiated HEU fuel, see Matthew Bunn and 
Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for 
Action (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: 
Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, 
Over 130 research reactors around the 
world still use HEU as their fuel, or as 
targets for producing medical isotopes.58  
In addition, several plutonium or tritium 
production reactors, one nuclear power 
reactor, 15 reactors for nuclear-powered 
and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004), http://www.
nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.
pdf (accessed 9 February 2010), pp. 36-37.  For stud-
ies of the fact that a radiation level from irradiated 
fuel of 100 rad/hr at one meter is grossly insufficient 
to prevent theft by determined terrorists, see J.J. 
Koelling and E.W. Barts, Special Nuclear Material 
Self-Protection Criteria Investigation: Phases I and II, 
vol. LA-9213-MS, NUREG/CR-2492 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982), 
http://www.sciencemadness.org/lanl1_a/lib-www/
la-pubs/00307470.pdf (accessed 9 February 2010); 
C.W. Coates et al., “Radiation Effects on Personnel 
Performance Capability and a Summary of Dose 
Levels for Spent Research Reactor Fuels,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 47th Annual Meeting of the Institute for 
Nuclear Materials Management, Nashville, Tenn., 16-20 
July (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2006).
58 For data on world HEU-fueled research reactors, 
see See Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit, “Ap-
pendix II: Operational, Shut Down, and Converted 
HEU-Fueled Research Reactors,” http://cns.miis.
edu/pubs/npr/vol15/152_reistad_appendix2.pdf  
(accessed 13 February 2010), online supplement 
to Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit, “HEU Fuel 
Cycle Inventories and Progress on Global Mini-
mization,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 
(July 2008). Reistad and Hustveit list 133 research 
reactors operating with HEU as of the end of 2007.  
Since that time, 12 of these reactors have either shut 
down or converted to LEU.  NNSA, however, has 
also identified 14 research reactors operating with 
HEU that were not on previous lists, bringing the 
total to 135.  (These are on the listing of additional 
reactors added to GTRI’s scope presented at the 
“31st Annual Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for 
Research and Test Reactors,” Beijing, 1-5 November 
2009.)  Similarly, NNSA previously tracked a total 
of 207 HEU-fueled reactors, of which 15 were ice-
breaker reactors rather than research reactors, and 
65 have been converted or shut down, leaving 127, 
but the new list includes 14 more research reactors, 
bringing the total to 141.  The variations in num-
bers arise from differences in counting rules (e.g., 
whether reactors that have not operated in years 
but might be operated in the future are counted 
as operational or shut-down, whether only HEU-
fueled reactors are counted or whether the small 
number of plutonium-fueled research reactors are 
included as well, and the like) and by identification 
of additional reactors not included in earlier lists.
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icebreakers, and scores of reactors for 
naval ships and submarines also use 
HEU fuel. The world’s research reactors 
use some 800 kilograms of HEU fuel or 
target material every year.  Many tons 
of HEU exist at these research reactors, 
or in the research reactor fuel cycle.59  
Often—though not always—this mate-
rial is in forms that would require some 
chemical processing to use in a bomb.  
But any group that could pull off the dif-
ficult job of making a nuclear bomb from 
HEU metal would have a good chance of 
mastering the simpler job of getting HEU 
metal out of research reactor fuel.
Many of these reactors do not have 
enough nuclear material to make a bomb 
on-site—in many cases, it would require 
thefts from two or three facilities to get 
enough material for a bomb.  But some 
reactors have large stocks of high-quality 
material.  Critical assemblies and pulse 
reactors are types of particular concern, 
as they frequently have tens or hundreds 
of kilograms of high-quality HEU, which 
is so lightly irradiated that it is effectively 
little different from fresh, unused HEU.  
The hundreds of kilograms of HEU for 
critical assemblies that used to be located 
at Technical Area 18 (TA-18) at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, at a difficult-
to-defend site in a valley, provoked such 
security concern that the site was closed 
and the material shipped to the Device 
Assembly Facility (DAF) in Nevada, one 
of the most secure facilities in the DOE 
complex.60
Most of the world’s HEU-fueled research 
reactors are in Russia (which has by far 
the world’s largest fleet of them) and the 
United States.  But such reactors exist in 
many other countries as well—indeed, 
59 IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report 2009, pp.14-15.
60 National Nuclear Security Administration, “Sen-
sitive Nuclear Material Out of Los Alamos TA-18 
Facility” (Washington, D.C.: NNSA, 2 November 
2005), http://nnsa.energy.gov/news/1177.htm (ac-
cessed 31 March 2010).
nearly all of the countries with weapons-
usable nuclear material on their soil listed 
in Tables 3.1-3.3 has at least one research 
reactor using HEU.  Indeed, many coun-
tries are on the list only because of one or 
a few HEU-fueled research reactors.
The most significant stocks of HEU at 
research reactor sites in developing or 
transition countries outside of Russia are 
located in Belarus, Kazakhstan, South 
Africa, and Ukraine.  Research reactors in 
developed countries including Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United 
States, among others, also have substan-
tial stocks.
Many research reactors have remarkably 
modest security arrangements. One recent 
review of research reactors that had re-
ceived U.S.-sponsored security upgrades 
identified research reactors that were 
wholly dependent on off-site response 
forces to respond to a theft attempt, but 
had never exercised the capabilities of 
those forces; a reactor that conducted 
no search of vehicles leaving the site for 
potential nuclear contraband; a reactor 
for which the national regulatory agency 
had not established any nuclear security 
requirements; and a reactor where no 
background checks were performed be-
fore allowing access to nuclear material.61  
(Since only five reactors were reviewed, 
without any attempt to choose reactors 
likely to have weak security, this list of 
issues is particularly worrisome.)  Many 
research reactors have no armed guards 
on site, and rely on local police who are 
some minutes away, though in tests in 
several countries, adversary actions some-
times unfold so rapidly that such off-site 
61 U.S. Congress, Government Accountability Office, 
Nuclear Nonproliferation: National Nuclear Security 
Administration Has Improved the Security of Reactors 
in its Global Research Reactor Program, but Action is 
Needed to Address Remaining Concerns, GAO-09-949 
(Washington, D.C.: GAO, September 2009), http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d09949.pdf (accessed 30 
October 2009).
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forces might not be able to respond in 
time.  In the United States, research reac-
tors are exempted from almost all Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission physical protec-
tion regulations, and are not required to 
have armed guards, perimeter fences with 
intrusion detectors, or extensive barriers 
to slow adversaries’ ability to get to the 
nuclear material; more fundamentally, 
they are not required to be able to defend 
against any specified level of threat.62
Nevertheless, security for many HEU-
fueled research reactors is much better 
today than it was two decades ago.  Re-
search reactors in Russia and other former 
Eurasian states have had security up-
grades financed by the United States and 
other donor countries.  The United States 
has also financed security upgrades for 
over a dozen other HEU-fueled research 
reactors, in many cases following IAEA-
led peer reviews that recommended 
major security improvements.63  Within 
the United States, the GTRI program is 
helping reactor operators to voluntarily 
upgrade security to a level well beyond 
that required for research reactors by 
NRC regulations; GTRI had completed 
upgrades at seven U.S. reactors by the 
end of 2009 (though several of those were 
LEU-fueled facilities, upgraded primar-
ily to protect against sabotage).  These 
upgrades in the United States and around 
the world represent very important im-
provements, but in many cases the fact 
remains that the sites would not be effec-
tively protected either against attack by 
well-trained, well-armed outsiders or theft 
through a well-thought-out conspiracy of 
62 See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Part 
73-Physical Protection of Plants and Materials,” 
in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/
part073/full-text.html (accessed 13 March 2010).
63 For a list, see Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008, pp. 
97-98.  Some of these facilities have since converted 
to LEU, and some of those have had all their HEU 
removed.
well-placed insiders—and these facilities 
have few resources to be able to sustain 
more substantial improvements, includ-
ing the cost of paying round-the-clock 
armed guards.64  Ultimately, the only way 
to reduce the risk of nuclear theft at these 
facilities to zero is to ensure that there 
is no weapons-usable material left there 
to steal—and the GTRI effort has been 
focusing on doing precisely that, convert-
ing research reactors to use LEU fuel and 
targets, and removing HEU from sites 
around the world.
nuclear stockpiles in  
other contexts
While Pakistan, Russia, and HEU-fueled 
research reactors appear to pose the 
world’s highest risks of nuclear theft, 
the risks are significant in many other 
contexts as well.  Ultimately, essentially 
every country where weapons-usable 
nuclear material exists—including the 
United States—has more to do to ensure 
that these stocks are effectively protected 
against ever-evolving adversary threats.  
A brief review of nuclear security in a 
number of other countries and contexts is 
provided below.
China has a relatively modest stockpile 
of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable 
nuclear materials, which is thought to be 
under reasonably heavy guard.  NNSA 
64 For a discussion of the major difference between 
upgrading sites to ensure that they roughly follow 
the very general IAEA physical protection recom-
mendations and upgrading them to the point where 
they are effectively protected against plausible 
threats of nuclear theft, see Bunn, Securing the Bomb 
2008, pp. 96-102. Under U.S. law, the United States 
carries out visits in countries that have received 
U.S. nuclear materials and technologies to ensure 
that the U.S.-origin materials have adequate physi-
cal protection, but these visits are only designed to 
confirm that these facilities follow IAEA physical 
protection recommendations, not to confirm that 
they have security measures effective enough to 
defeat the outsider and insider threats that adver-
saries might be able to bring to bear in the country 
where the reactor operates.
46 SECURING THE BOMB 2010
has been conducting a broad nuclear 
security dialogue with China for years, 
though it is not paying for installation of 
nuclear security and accounting upgrades, 
expecting China to implement such up-
grades itself.  There are indications that 
China has installed modern security 
and accounting systems at least at some 
sites.65  The U.S.-Chinese dialogue does 
not explicitly include the organizations 
that manage China’s military stockpiles—
by far the largest quantities of HEU and 
plutonium in China—but experts from 
those organizations sometimes take part.66 
China reportedly requires sites to provide 
protection against threats that include 
both outsider and insider adversaries, 
but does not require realistic testing of 
facilities’ ability to defeat intelligent ad-
versaries, and it is not clear how widely 
nuclear security systems have been mod-
ernized.67  Chinese experts have expressed 
65 Yun Zhou, “Security Implications of China’s 
Nuclear Energy Expansion,” Nonproliferation Re-
view, forthcoming.  For earlier accounts of MPC&A 
in China, see, for example, Hui Zhang, “Evaluating 
China’s MPC&A System,” in Proceedings of the 44th 
Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materi-
als Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 13-17 July 2003 
(Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2003), http://belfercenter.
ksg.harvard.edu/publication/3201/ (accessed 16 
February 2010) and the summary of the sparse 
publicly available literature in Nathan Busch, 
“China’s Fissile Material Protection, Control, and 
Accounting: The Case for Renewed Collaboration,” 
Nonproliferation Review 9, no. 3 (Fall-Winter 2002); 
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/93busch.pdf (accessed 
16 February 2010). 
66 U.S.-Chinese nuclear security cooperation was 
cut off years ago over allegations of Chinese spy-
ing, and China has been unwilling, to date, to allow 
the organizations managing its military stocks to 
reengage with U.S. experts.  Interviews with NNSA 
officials, December 2009 and January 2010. 
67 Discussions with Chinese nuclear regulators, 
March 2010.  It appears that the Chinese approach 
may have developed further in recent years.  In the 
past, it does not appear that sites were required to 
perform vulnerability assessments against design 
basis threats specified by the government.  See Tang 
Dan, “Physical Protection System and Vulnerability 
Analysis Program in China: Presentation to the 
Managing the Atom Seminar” (23 March 2004).  In 
concern that improved protections against 
insider theft may be needed, given China’s 
shift toward a more market-oriented (and 
more corrupt) society.68
India has a small but growing nuclear 
stockpile, as its reactors continue to pro-
duce more weapons plutonium.  Very 
little information is publicly available 
about the specifics of India’s nuclear secu-
rity arrangements, though Indian officials 
report that Indian facilities are required 
to protect nuclear weapons, HEU, or plu-
tonium against a spectrum of insider and 
outsider threats; the specifics of the threat 
to India’s nuclear facilities are reviewed 
frequently.69  Despite the recent U.S.-
Indian nuclear agreement, however, India 
has so far refused nuclear security coop-
eration with the United States, though 
it has hosted regional nuclear security 
workshops for the IAEA, and plans to 
participate in the nuclear security sum-
mit.70
Israel, like India, has a small nuclear 
weapon stockpile in a state that has 
remained outside of the nuclear Nonpro-
liferation Treaty (NPT).  Israel, which does 
not even acknowledge the existence of its 
nuclear weapons, has kept essentially all 
information about its nuclear security ar-
an interview in October 2006, a Chinese physical 
protection regulator confirmed that at that time 
most sites had not performed a systematic vulner-
ability assessment.
68 See Tang Dan et al., “Physical Protection System 
and Vulnerability Analysis Program in China,” in 
EU-High Level Scientific International Conference on 
Physical Protection (Salzburg, Austria: Austrian Mili-
tary Periodical, 2002).  It is notable that the authors 
begin with a review of recent changes in Chinese 
society, with the conclusion that these changes in-
crease the criminal threat and decrease the ability to 
rely solely on the loyalty of insider personnel.
69 See presentations to International Atomic Energy 
Agency, “IAEA Regional Training Course on Secu-
rity for Nuclear Installations,” Mumbai, India, 11-20 
May 2003.
70 See, for example, Chidanand Rajghatta, “India-
Pak Sideshow Coming Up at Obama Nuclear 
Meet,” Times of India, 5 March 2010.
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rangements secret.  Given the long Israeli 
experience with terrorism, it seems very 
likely that Israel has extensive security 
measures in place for all its nuclear activi-
ties.  
Most of the sites with weapons-usable 
nuclear material outside the United States 
and Russia are in developed countries.  
Some of these sites have substantial 
stockpiles, ranging from tens of tons of 
separated civilian plutonium at well-
guarded facilities in Britain and France to 
hundreds of kilograms of HEU at some 
less well-protected facilities in several 
countries. Nuclear security in advanced 
developed countries should not be taken 
for granted.  The recent incidents at the 
Belgian air base and with the U.S. Air 
Force inadvertently flying six nuclear 
weapons across the country to an airbase 
that was unaware it had received them—
which, combined with other incidents, 
led to the firing of both the Secretary of 
the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of 
Staff—make that clear.  
The United States does not finance nuclear 
security improvements in developed 
countries, though the United States of-
ten seeks, however, through discussions, 
to convince such states to take steps to 
strengthen nuclear security themselves, 
and under U.S. law, the United States 
conducts occasional visits to confirm 
that U.S.-origin nuclear material in these 
countries is protected in accordance with 
IAEA recommendations.  Extensive U.S.-
Japanese discussions, for example, helped 
encourage Japan to strengthen its physical 
protection rules, though the security mea-
sures required in Japan are still modest.71 
71 Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Japan did not have 
armed guards at nuclear facilities, relying instead 
on armed response units some distance away.  Since 
9/11, lightly armed members of the national police 
force have been stationed at nuclear facilities, but 
they are not required by regulation and may be 
withdrawn at any time.  A senior Japanese regu-
lator estimates that the total cost to all licensees 
Nevertheless, the general assumption that 
all nuclear material in wealthy countries 
is effectively secured is not correct.  Many 
HEU-fueled research reactors in wealthy 
countries have minimal security measures 
in place (particularly in the United States, 
as discussed below). At one research reac-
tor in a developed country, for example, 
the facility had retained a significant 
quantity of separated plutonium on-site 
even though there had not been funds to 
do any experiments with it for years.  The 
cost of meeting that country’s security 
rules for a Category I facility (the highest 
level of security, required for this amount 
of plutonium) was apparently so low that 
it was not worth the trouble to move this 
plutonium into another building on the 
same site which already contained large 
quantities of plutonium.72
France and the United Kingdom have 
small nuclear weapons stockpiles, huge 
stockpiles of civilian plutonium (amount-
ing to 84 tons and 109 tons respectively 
as of their most recent declaration), HEU-
fueled research reactors, and, in France’s 
case, a major HEU fuel fabrication facili-
ty.73  Both countries require their nuclear 
facilities and transports to be protected 
against a range of both outsider and in-
sider threats.  Nevertheless, as in other 
countries, nuclear security concerns some-
combined of meeting the new physical protection 
rules was in the range of $50 million.  Interview 
with Japanese nuclear regulator, November 2006.
72 Visit by the author.
73 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Communi-
cation Received from France Concerning its Policies 
Regarding the Management of Plutonium,” IN-
FCIRC/549/Add.5/13 (Vienna: IAEA, 15 September 
2009), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Docu-
ments/Infcircs/2009/infcirc549a5-13.pdf (accessed 
19 February 2010), and IAEA, “Communication 
Received from the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies 
Regarding the Management of Plutonium,” IN-
FCIRC/549/Add.8/12 (Vienna: IAEA, 15 September 
2009) http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Infcircs/2009/infcirc549a8-12.pdf (accessed 19 Feb-
ruary 2010).
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proGress anD Delays in reDucinG nuclear Material stockpiles
Whether a particular building has more or less effective security and accounting measures in place is far 
more important to the risk of nuclear theft than whether the building has 100 tons or 1 ton of nuclear 
material in it.  Hence, nuclear security programs should not be judged primarily by the sheer quantity 
of nuclear material they address.
Nevertheless, ultimately the huge stocks of weapons-usable material built up over decades of Cold War 
and the large stocks that have built up in the civilian sector should be drastically reduced—by trans-
forming them into forms that can no longer be readily used in weapons.
For HEU, this is technically straightforward, as HEU can be mixed with natural, depleted, or slightly 
enriched uranium to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) that cannot support an explosive nuclear 
chain reaction, and cannot be made weapons-usable without expensive and technologically demand-
ing re-enrichment.  Excess plutonium poses a more difficult problem, as nearly all combinations of 
plutonium isotopes are potentially weapons-usable; plutonium, too, can be mixed with uranium, but 
chemically separating the two to recover weapons-usable plutonium is far less challenging than urani-
um enrichment.  The most plausible approaches to disposition of excess plutonium are using it as fuel 
in nuclear reactors—for example, as plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing light-
water reactors—or immobilizing it with high-level wastes for permanent disposal.1
The United States and Russia have made significant progress in reducing stockpiles of excess HEU.  
Under the U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement, Russia is blending some 30 metric tons of HEU 
every year to LEU for commercial use in the United States and elsewhere.  (It is a remarkable fact that 
nearly 10% of U.S. electricity is fueled by dismantled Russian nuclear bombs.)  By early 2010, 382 
metric tons of HEU had been destroyed; the agreed plan is to destroy 500 tons of HEU in this way by 
the time the deal ends in 2013.2  Similarly, by the end of fiscal year 2009, the United States had blend-
ed 127 tons of its excess HEU to LEU (or shipped it for downblending), and was planning to continue 
doing so at a rate of some 3 tons per year.3  Both countries, however, have very large stocks of HEU 
that is still being reserved for military purposes.
Less progress has been made in disposition of excess plutonium.  After many years of delays and cost 
overruns, a MOX fuel fabrication plant for U.S. excess plutonium is under construction at the Sa-
vannah River Site, but disposition has not yet begun.  DOE has reported that a protocol has been 
completed modifying the 2000 U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, 
which called for disposition of 34 tons of excess weapons plutonium on each side.  The protocol would 
commit the United States, pending the availability of appropriated funds, to provide $400 million to 
support disposition of Russian excess plutonium in fast-neutron reactors, including the existing BN-
600 reactor and the BN-800 reactor that is still under construction.  In Russia, too, disposition at any 
significant scale is still years away.  
Ultimately, the United States and Russia should go much farther, agreeing to reduce their total stock
1 For discussions, see Matthew Bunn and Anatoli Diakov, “Disposition of Excess Highly Enriched Uranium,” and “Disposition 
of Excess Plutonium,” in Global Fissile Materials Report 2007 (Princeton, NJ: International Panel on Fissile Materials, October 
2007), pp. 24-42.  These are briefly updated in “Disposition of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium,” in Global Fissile 
Materials Report 2009 (Princeton, NJ: International Panel on Fissile Materials, October 200), pp. 77-86. 
2 See USEC (formerly the U.S. Enrichment Corporation), “Megatons to Megawatts” (Bethesda, Md.: USEC, 2010), http://
www.usec.com/megatonstomegawatts.htm (accessed 31 March 2010).
3 U.S. Department of Energy, FY2011 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administration, DOE/CF-0047 
(Washington, D.C.: DOE, February 2010) p. 395.  
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proGress anD Delays in reDucinG nuclear Material stockpiles (cont)
piles of nuclear weapons to very low levels, and to destroy all stocks of HEU and plutonium beyond 
the minimum needed to support these agreed levels and a small allotment for naval fuel.
In addition to reducing existing stocks, it is important not to accumulate new stocks of these weapons-
usable materials.  None of the five Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states are currently 
producing plutonium or HEU for weapons.  With help from NNSA, Russia has shut down two of its 
three remaining plutonium production reactors—which continued to operate because they provided 
heat and power to tens of thousands of people in Siberia—and the last of these reactors is expected to 
close in 2010.  This represents a major step forward, ending a substantial accumulation of plutonium 
every year, major bulk-processing plutonium at the reprocessing plants serving these reactors, and a 
major use of HEU fuel as “spike” fuel in these reactors’ cores.4  
Unfortunately, however, negotiation of a fissile cutoff agreement that would permanently end produc-
tion of HEU and plutonium for nuclear weapons has been stymied for years.  Pakistan and India, 
which are still producing plutonium and HEU for weapons, have been resisting such an agreement, 
and Israel is no more enthusiastic.  (North Korea, which says that it will resume plutonium production 
and that its uranium enrichment program is progressing, is not taking part in the discussions.)
Meanwhile, immense stockpiles of separated plutonium continue to build up in the civilian sector, as 
plutonium reprocessing outpaces the use of this material as fuel.  For the first time in the nuclear age, if 
current central estimates of military stockpiles of plutonium are correct, there is as much or more plu-
tonium separated from spent fuel in the world’s civil stockpiles than there is in all the world’s military 
stockpiles combined—enough for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons.5  Currently, there are no ma-
jor international efforts to end the accumulation of these large stocks of civilian plutonium.
It is also important to seek to ensure that new states do not begin producing plutonium or HEU, creat-
ing new potential sources for nuclear theft.  This includes addressing the nuclear programs of North 
Korea and Iran, and limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities—the key technolo-
gies that make it possible to produce weapons-usable nuclear material.  A variety of international 
approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle have been proposed to reduce states’ incentives to make the major 
investments required to build their own nationally controlled enrichment or reprocessing facilities, 
ranging from multinationally controlled facilities that many states could participate in, to “banks” of 
enriched uranium that could increase states’ confidence that fuel would be available even if there was 
an interruption of their normal supplies.  The IAEA Board of Governors has approved an arrangement 
in which the IAEA can draw on a bank of enriched uranium on Russian soil, and a separate IAEA-
controlled bank proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative is expected to be established soon.6 
4 At the same time, however, the closure of these reactors and their associated reprocessing plants will leave thousands of quali-
fied nuclear experts without work, raising other potential issues.
5 The most recent declarations of civilian plutonium stockpiles participating in the Plutonium Management Guidelines (as of 
the end of 2008), combined with unclassified estimates of the civilian stockpiles owned by nonparticipating countries such as 
India, suggest that current world stocks of civilian plutonium separated from spent fuel amount to roughly 257 tons; central 
estimates of current military stockpiles, including the portion of those stockpiles declared excess, are slightly lower, though the 
difference is within the range of uncertainty.  For current declarations, see the series of documents in the Information Circular 
549 (INFCIRC/549) series; for unclassified estimates of military stockpiles, see IPFM, Global Fissile Materials Report 2009, p. 
16.
6 For an overview of such approaches, see, for example, U.S. Committee on Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 
National Academy of Sciences and National Research Council, and Russian Committee on Internationalization of the Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle, Russian Academy of Sciences, Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges (Wash-
ington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2008)
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times arise. U.S. visitors to a major HEU 
processing facility in France in 2006 found 
a wide range of security weaknesses.74  
Security for the frequent transports of ci-
vilian plutonium in France has reportedly 
been substantially improved in recent 
years, after earlier criticisms and incidents 
of anti-nuclear activists seizing control of 
plutonium trucks.75  Similar issues have 
been raised in the Britain over the years.
The United States may have the most 
stringent nuclear security rules in the 
world and almost certainly spends more 
on securing its nuclear stockpiles than any 
other country.  Annual safeguards and 
security spending at DOE alone is now in 
the range of $1.5 billion per year;76 the pri-
vate sector and the Department of Defense 
spend hundreds of millions more each 
year.  All facilities with nuclear weap-
ons or weapons-usable nuclear material 
except a small number of HEU-fueled 
research reactors are required to be able 
to defeat a specified DBT;77 both armed 
guards and modern safeguards and secu-
rity technologies are used to protect these 
sites (and to protect transports).  Regular 
74 Interviews with participants in a visit to the 
CERCA HEU fuel fabrication facility.
75 Interview with DOE official, November 2009. For 
a description of the frequency of civilian plutonium 
transports, including in France see David Albright, 
Shipments of Weapons-Usable Plutonium in the Com-
mercial Nuclear Industry (Washington, D.C.: Institute 
for Science and International Security, 2007), http://
isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/plu-
tonium_shipments.pdf (accessed 9 February 2010).  
For a troubling earlier analysis of security for plu-
tonium transports in France, see Ronald E. Timm, 
Security Assessment Report for Plutonium Transport 
in France (Paris: Greenpeace International, 2005), 
www.greenpeace.fr/stop-plutonium/en/TimmRe-
portV5.pdf (accessed 9 February 2010).
76 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2009 Congressional 
Budget Request: Other Defense Activities, vol. 2, DOE/
CF-025 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2008), http://www.
cfo.doe.gov/budget/09budget/Content/Volumes/
Volume2.pdf (accessed 9 February 2010), p. 414.
77 As discussed below, HEU-fueled research reactors 
regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
are exempted from this requirement.
performance tests probing facilities’ abil-
ity to fend off mock attackers are required, 
and routinely contribute to revealing 
important deficiencies that require cor-
rection.78  While details are classified, the 
DBT now in place for nuclear weapons 
and weapons-usable nuclear material 
at DOE is reported to be comparable in 
magnitude to the 19 attackers in four in-
dependent, well-coordinated groups that 
struck on 9/11.79
78 For discussions of the results of some of these 
tests from a non-government watchdog organiza-
tion, see, for example, {Project on Government 
Oversight, 2005, POGOconsolidation05; Project on 
Government Oversight, 2006, Y12security06; Project 
on Government Oversight, 2001 #1068}  The U.S. 
approach to such testing is by no means perfect, 
and has been criticized both by those receiving 
the tests (who often argue, among other things, 
that they assume an unrealistic level of insider 
knowledge of security vulnerabilities) and for pre-
senting an unrealistically positive impression (in 
part because the tests are done with a substantial 
period of advance notice, and hence are not neces-
sary reflective of day-to-day security performance 
in response to a surprise attack).  Prior to 9/11, for 
example, the NRC allowed reactors to beef up their 
security forces for the day of the test, and then not 
to maintain those heightened defenses after the 
test; nevertheless, in a large fraction of the tests, 
the defenders failed to protect the reactor.  See 
U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Security at Com-
mercial Nuclear Power Plants Needs to Be Strengthened, 
GAO-03-752 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, Sepatem-
ber 2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03752.
pdf (accessed 31 March 2010).  There have also 
been allegations of cheating on such tests over the 
years—for example by giving the defenders ad-
vance knowledge of the tactics the attackers would 
use, or by disabling the test gear so that it was un-
able to detect when a defender received a simulated 
fatal gunshot, making the defenders essentially 
invulnerable.  See, for example, U.S. Department 
of Energy, Inspector General, Protective Force Perfor-
mance Test Improprieties, DOE/IG-0636 (Washington, 
D.C.: DOE, January 2004), http://www.ig.energy.
gov/documents/CalendarYear2004/ig-0636.pdf (ac-
cessed 9 February 2010).
79 For a useful discussion of the several steps in 
the evolution of DOE’s DBT since 9/11, see Project 
on Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons 
Complex: Y-12 and Oak Ridge National Laboratory at 
High Risk (Washington, D.C.: POGO, 2006), http://
www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/nuclear-security-
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Nevertheless, as the Air Force incidents 
described above make clear, significant 
controversies continue to arise about the 
adequacy of nuclear security—and es-
pecially security culture—in the United 
States.  Realistic testing of the perfor-
mance of nuclear security systems against 
well-equipped and well-trained adver-
saries have repeatedly revealed serious 
vulnerabilities in physical protection and 
accounting systems for nuclear material 
in the U.S. nuclear complex.80 Controversy 
continues to swirl, for example, over the 
adequacy and danger of security mea-
sures at Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, where simulated attackers 
easily overcame the defenses in a 2008 red 
team exercise, and at the Los Alamos Na-
tional Laboratory, where repeated lapses 
in securing classified information and a 
failure to correct problems with security 
culture led to the firing of NNSA Admin-
istrator Linton Brooks in early 2007.81  A 
number of the major security initiatives 
safety/Y-12/nss-y12-20061016.html (accessed 9 
February 2010).
80 For a blistering critique of security in the U.S. 
nuclear weapons complex, published shortly after 
the 9/11 attacks, see Project on Government Over-
sight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security at Risk 
(Washington, D.C.: POGO, 2001), http://www.pogo.
org/pogo-files/reports/nuclear-security-safety/secu-
rity-at-risk/ (accessed 9 February 2010).  For a recent 
summary of progress made in improving security 
since then and problems still remaining, including 
both official views and those of critics, see Commit-
tee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, A Review of Security 
Initiatives at DOE Nuclear Facilities, U.S. Congress, 
House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 1st 
Session, 18 March 2005), http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_
hearings&docid=f:99905.pdf (accessed 9 February 
2010). For a brutal earlier official review (including 
a long history of past negative assessments), see 
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 
Science at Its Best, Security at Its Worst: A Report on 
Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy 
(Washington D.C.: PFIAB, 1999), http://www.fas.
org/sgp/library/pfiab (accessed 9 February 2010).  
81 Steven Mufson, “After Breaches, Head of U.S. 
Nuclear Program is Ousted,” Washington Post, 5 
January 2007.
DOE is now undertaking—particularly 
the consolidation of nuclear materials 
into fewer, more secure locations—have 
been slowed by opponents who question 
their cost and value.82  While these events 
indicate that there is more work to do on 
nuclear security even in the U.S. nuclear 
weapons complex, they also are clear 
signs of taking security seriously—requir-
ing facilities to be able to defend against 
very substantial threats, requiring realistic 
tests of security performance, and holding 
both senior officials and lower-level staff 
accountable for security performance.
HEU at NRC-regulated research reactors 
is exempt from most of the security re-
quirements that the same material would 
require if it was located anywhere other 
than a research reactor.  Lightly irradi-
ated HEU is exempt from nearly all of the 
NRC’s security requirements.  Fortunately, 
these reactors generally never have more 
than a couple of kilograms of unirradiated 
HEU on-site at any given time, though 
they may have tens of kilograms of ir-
radiated material on-site, and much of 
this irradiated material is still very highly 
enriched, and may not be radioactive 
enough to prevent theft by determined 
terrorists.83  Tons of HEU metal—the easi-
est material in the world for terrorists to 
use to make a nuclear bomb—exists at 
two NRC-licensed facilities that are re-
quired to defend against a far smaller and 
less capable DBT than would be required 
at DOE sites handling the same material.84  
82 See A Review of Security Initiatives at DOE Nuclear 
Facilities. 
83 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the 
Bomb: An Agenda for Action (Cambridge, Mass., and 
Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, 
Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
2004), http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cn-
wmupdate_052404.pdf (accessed 9 February 2010), 
pp. 36-37.
84 The two sites are Nuclear Fuel Services, in Erwin, 
Tennessee and the Nuclear Productions Division of 
BWXT Technologies, in Lynchburg, Virginia.  See, 
for example, the brief mention of this point in Proj-
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Table 3.5: Global Nuclear Security Today
Category Assessment
Dramatic progress, though major issues remain.  Planned U.S.-sponsored security 
upgrades for both warhead sites and nuclear material buildings almost complete, 
though some warhead sites and material buildings not covered.  Inadequate Russian 
investment to ensure sustainability, though signs of improvement.  Questions on 
security culture.  Poorly paid and trained conscript guards for nuclear material.  
Substantial threats from widespread insider corruption and theft, while material 
accounting and control measures remain weak in some cases.  Substantial outsider 
threats as well, though suppressed by counterinsurgency in Chechnya.  Major need for 
consolidation, as Russia still has the world’s largest numbers of nuclear weapons sites 
and weapons-usable nuclear materials buildings, including the world’s largest eet of 
HEU-fueled research reactors.
Pakistan has a small, heavily guarded nuclear stockpile.  Substantial security improve-
ments have been made in recent years, in part with U.S. help, but the specics of this 
cooperation are classied.  Immense threats in Pakistan from nuclear insiders with 
extremist sympathies, al Qaeda or Taliban outsider attacks, and a weak state.  India also 
has a small nuclear stockpile, and reports that it requires its stocks to be protected 
against a range of outsider and insider threats, but has so far rejected nuclear security 
cooperation with the United States.  China has a somewhat larger nuclear stockpile, 
believed to be protected by substantial guard forces.  A broad U.S.-Chinese nuclear 
security dialogue is underway, and China appears to have modernized security and 
accounting measures at some sites, but little evidence that China has yet required such 
measures in its regulations. In North Korea, a very small nuclear stockpile and a 
garrison state probably limit the risks of nuclear theft.
Important progress in recent years, but some issues remain.  U.S.-funded security 
upgrades completed at nearly all facilities with weapons-usable material in the 
Eurasian states outside of Russia, and in Eastern Europe.  Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
and South Africa have particularly dangerous nuclear material: upgrades completed in 
Ukraine (though sustainability is an issue); upgrades nearing completion after a 
several-year delay in Belarus; South Africa (whose facility suered a penetration of the 
outer perimeter by armed men in November 2007) is discussing cooperation on 
nuclear security. Upgrades completed for nearly all HEU-fueled research reactors that 
previously did not meet IAEA recommendations, but some upgrades would not be 
enough to defend against demonstrated terrorist and criminal capabilities.
Signicant progress in recent years, as several countries have strengthened nuclear 
security rules since 9/11.  The United States has ongoing dialogues with key countries 
on nuclear security, but does not sponsor security upgrades in wealthy countries.  
Nuclear security requirements in some countries remain insucient to protect against 
demonstrated terrorist or criminal threats.  Additional eorts needed to consolidate 
both HEU and separated plutonium in fewer locations.
Substantial progress in recent years, though issues remain.  DOE has drastically 
strengthened its requirements for protecting both nuclear weapons and materials 
(especially from outsider attack) since 9/11.  NRC has also increased its security 
requirements, though they remain less stringent than DOE requirements, and NRC-
regulated research reactors fueled with HEU remain exempted from most NRC security 
requirements. Major progress in converting NRC-regulated reactors to low-enriched 
fuel, and in implementing voluntary security upgrades going beyond regulatory 
requirements at these sites.  Recent incidents suggest an ongoing issue with security 
culture.
Russia
Developing states 
with nuclear weapons
(Pakistan, India, 
China, North Korea)
Developing and 
transition non-nuclear-
weapon states
Developed Countries
United States
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The NRC has ruled that reactors using 
plutonium in MOX fuel can be exempted 
from a substantial fraction of the security 
requirements that are required at other 
sites with weapons-usable nuclear mate-
rial, arguing that there is “no rational 
reason” why a reactor with potential nu-
clear bomb material on-site should have 
any more security than any other reactor.85
the international nuclear security 
policy fraMework
Today, there are many different initia-
tives, agreements, resolutions, and the 
like that seek to improve nuclear security 
and reduce the risk of nuclear terror-
ism.  Unfortunately, however, the overall 
policy framework remains weak—none 
of these policy elements, or even all of 
them in combination, has yet succeeded 
in ensuring effective security is put in 
place and maintained for all stockpiles 
of nuclear weapons and the materials 
needed to make them worldwide.  Table 
3.6 provides a summary of the current in-
ternational policy framework for nuclear 
security.86
Each state with nuclear weapons or weap-
ons-usable nuclear materials bears the 
responsibility for protecting them.  Thus 
ect on Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons 
Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities.
85 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, In the 
Matter of Duke Energy Corporation (Catawba Nuclear 
Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-29 (Washington, 
D.C.: NRC, 2004), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
doc-collections/commission/orders/2004/2004-29cli.
pdf (accessed 9 February 2010); U.S. Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission, NRC Authorizes Use of Mixed 
Oxide Fuel Assemblies at Catawba Nuclear Power Plant 
(Washington, D.C.: NRC, 2005), http://www.nrc.
gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2005/05-043.
html (accessed 9 February 2010).
86 Adapted from Kenneth N. Luongo, “Building a 
Next Generation Nuclear Security Framework,” 
presentation, Managing the Atom seminar, Harvard 
University, 9 February 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.
harvard.edu/files/Building-a-Next-Generation-Nu-
clear-Material-Security-Framework_1.pdf (accessed 
19 February 2010).
national-level rules, regulations, and pro-
cedures are the core of the international 
policy framework for nuclear security.
But while the responsibility is national, 
the implications are international—
thus posing the fundamental paradox 
of nuclear security.  Every state has an 
enormous interest in ensuring that all 
states with nuclear weapons or weapons-
usable nuclear materials implements their 
nuclear responsibilities effectively.  Fac-
ing terrorists with global reach, nuclear 
security is only as good as its weakest 
link.  Hence, effective (and effectively im-
plemented) global standards for nuclear 
security are essential.  The goal must be to 
ensure that all nuclear weapons and stocks 
of weapons-usable nuclear materials 
around the world are effectively protected 
against the kinds of outsider and insider 
threats that thieves and terrorists have 
shown they can pose.  Unfortunately, 
there is not yet any international agree-
ment that can meet this goal.  Informal, 
voluntary approaches may turn out in 
many cases to be more effective than seek-
ing to negotiate binding nuclear security 
agreements.
The IAEA’s recommendations on physi-
cal protection are the closest thing to a 
global nuclear security standard that 
exists today.  While these are purely advi-
sory, most states follow them, and indeed, 
the United States and a number of other 
supplier states require them to do so as 
a condition of bilateral nuclear supply 
agreements.  These recommendations 
have contributed to substantial improve-
ments in nuclear security around the 
world since they were first promulgated 
in 1972.  Nevertheless, these recommenda-
tions, while more specific than many of 
the other documents described below, are 
quite vague.  The discussion process, in 
which essentially any participating state 
can object to a particular recommendation, 
tends to result in least-common-de-
nominator outcomes.  For example, for 
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Table 3.6: Elements of the International Nuclear Security Framework
Category Summary
States are responsible for securing their own nuclear stockpiles; requirements and 
approaches vary widely.
IAEA recommendations and guides are the closest thing that exists to international 
standards for nuclear security, but remain very generally worded.  IAEA-led peer 
reviews and assistance are eective but have occurred at only a small fraction of 
sites with plutonium or HEU.
Original convention covered only physical protection during international trans-
port, and criminalization of nuclear theft; amendment covers domestic physical 
protection and sabotage, but with very general requirements.  Amendment has 
not yet entered into force (as of early 2010).
Criminalizes nuclear terrorism-related crimes, and requires states to make “every 
eort” to provide “appropriate” nuclear security.
Various programs sponsored by the United States and several other countries have 
helped improve nuclear security, consolidate and reduce nuclear stockpiles, 
strengthen interdiction of nuclear smuggling, and more.
National Regulations and 
Procedures
IAEA Recommendations, 
Guides, and Assistance
Physical Protection 
Convention and 
Amendment
Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention
Threat Reduction 
Cooperation
1373 legally obligates all states to take action against terrorist groups. 1540 legally 
requires all states to criminalize any eort to help terrorist groups get nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons and requires all states with such weapons or 
related materials to provide “appropriate eective” security for them, along with 
“appropriate eective” export and border controls. 1887 calls on – but does not 
require – states to take a broad range of nonproliferation actions, including 
securing all nuclear stockpiles within four years.
UNSCR 1373, 1540,
and 1887
Ten-year, $20 billion threat-reduction eort launched by the G8 in 2002, now has 
many contributors beyond the G8, though $20 billion target has never been 
reached; principal early focus on chemical weapons demilitarization and sub 
dismantlement; 2008 summit agreed to broaden eort to global focus; may be 
extended at 2010 summit.
G8 Global Partnership
Ad-hoc cooperative initiative launched by the United States and Russia in 2006, 
now has 76 partners.  Organizes workshops, exercises, provides forum for discus-
sions, requests for assistance.
Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism
Established 2008, voluntary forum for nuclear security operators to exchange best 
practices.  Organizes workshops, discussions, drafts best practice guides.
World Institute for 
Nuclear Security
Ad-hoc cooperation initiative launched in 2003, now some 90 members, focuses on 
interdicting illicit shipments of nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile technologies.
Proliferation Security 
Initiative
Ad-hoc cooperation on particular cases related to nuclear theft, smuggling, and 
terrorism, not yet structured into more formal mechanisms.
Police and intelligence 
cooperation
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“Category I” nuclear material—the type 
and quantity requiring the highest levels 
of nuclear security—the recommenda-
tions specify that there should be a fence 
with intrusion detectors around the area 
where such material is handled, but say 
nothing about how difficult to bypass the 
intrusion detectors should be; they specify 
that when not in use, material should be 
in a vault or locked room, but say noth-
ing about how difficult this room should 
be to penetrate.87  It is not necessary for a 
Category I site to have any armed guards 
to comply with the IAEA recommenda-
tions (and some countries still do not have 
armed guards at nuclear facilities), though 
if a state does not have armed guards, it is 
recommended that it take other measures 
to compensate.  The recommendations do 
not specify any set of insider or outsider 
threats against which all Category I mate-
rial should be protected.  It is, in short, 
quite possible for a site to comply with 
the IAEA recommendations and still have 
87 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, 
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) (Vienna: IAEA, 
1999), http://www.iaea.or.at/Publications/Docu-
ments/Infcircs/1999/infcirc225r4c/rev4_content.
html (accessed 13 March 2010).  INFCIRC/225/Rev. 
4 recommends that Category I nuclear material be 
used and stored in an “inner area” within a “pro-
tected area.”  The document recommends that the 
protected area have a fence around it with intru-
sion detectors, and that unescorted access to the 
protected area and the inner area be limited to the 
minimum necessary number of people, and limited 
to people whose trustworthiness has been deter-
mined (though it says nothing about how rigorous 
this screening process should be).  It recommends 
that people within the inner area where the nuclear 
material is should be under constant surveillance, 
such as by the use of two-person rule. While the 
document recommends that all persons and pack-
ages leaving an inner area should be subject to 
search, it makes no specific recommendation for 
having portal monitors that would detect nuclear 
material at all exits from such a facility.  As a re-
sult, a number of facilities with HEU or plutonium 
around the world do not yet have portal monitors 
that would set off an alarm if someone were carry-
ing out plutonium or HEU, relying on other types 
of search instead.
nuclear security arrangements in place 
that are inadequate to protect against the 
evolving threat.
International discussions of a new revi-
sion of the IAEA recommendations—the 
first since the 9/11 attacks—are now well 
advanced, and officials expect the revi-
sion to be completed during 2010. While 
the draft text of the new revision has not 
been made public, it is expected to be 
significantly more specific than the previ-
ous recommendations.  The new version 
reportedly emphasizes performance test-
ing, including a call for “force-on-force” 
exercises—in which a group pretending to 
be outsider adversaries attempt to break 
into the site—for Category I facilities.  It 
is also said to contain new recommenda-
tions for protection against insider threats, 
stand-off attacks, and cyber attacks.  One 
important change is that it reportedly cau-
tions against downgrading the level of 
protection for lightly irradiated nuclear 
fuel, which can no longer be considered 
“self-protecting” against theft in an age 
of potentially suicidal adversaries.  It 
will still not call on states to post armed 
guards, however, or to provide protec-
tion against any defined set of insider or 
outsider threats, continuing to leave that 
to the discretion of each state.88  The new 
revision, in short, will be a very important 
step, but will still not include all of the 
elements necessary to ensure that a physi-
cal protection system would be effective 
against the insider and outsider threats 
that exist in the state where the facility or 
transport operation is located.
The legally binding instruments that exist 
today are far less specific than the IAEA 
recommendations.  The Convention on 
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Ma-
terials has no requirements for nuclear 
security within individual countries—its 
88 Interviews with IAEA officials, November 2009, 
and with NNSA officials, January 2010, and data 
provided by NNSA, March 2010.
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nuclear security provisions only apply to 
material in international transport.  (Other 
provisions establish international jurisdic-
tion for crimes related to nuclear theft.)  
An amendment to the convention was 
agreed to in 2005, extending the conven-
tion’s terms to cover materials in domestic 
use, storage, and transport, and to cover 
sabotage of nuclear facilities as well as 
nuclear theft.  But, while containing some 
useful principles, the amended conven-
tion includes no particular standards for 
how secure nuclear material should be; 
it says that countries should set national 
rules for nuclear security, but it says noth-
ing about what those rules should say.89  
As of early 2010—almost 12 years after the 
United States proposed that the conven-
tion be amended in 1998—the amendment 
had still not attracted enough parties to 
enter into force.90  (One goal of the nuclear 
security summit will certainly be to con-
vince additional countries—including the 
United States—to ratify the amendment.)  
For a listing of which of the countries 
with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable 
89 International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Se-
curity - Measures to Protect against Nuclear Terrorism: 
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protec-
tion of Nuclear Material, GOV/INF/2005/10-GC(49)/
INF/6 (Vienna: IAEA, 2005), http://www.iaea.org/
About/Policy/GC/GC49/Documents/gc49inf-6.pdf 
(accessed 13 March 2010).
90 See International Atomic Energy Agency, Amend-
ment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material (Vienna, IAEA, updated 8 Feb-
ruary 2010), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Conventions/cppnm_amend_status.
pdf  (accessed 10 February 2010).  As of early 2010, 
there were only 34 parties to the amendment; under 
the treaty’s terms, the amendment will not enter 
into force even for the countries that have ratified 
it until two-thirds of the parties, amounting to over 
90 countries, have ratified it.  It will likely be years 
before that occurs.  The U.S. Senate gave its advice 
and consent to ratification on 25 September 2008, 
but as of early 2010, the United States had not yet 
deposited its instruments of ratification, as the 
U.S. Congress had not yet passed implementing 
legislation conforming U.S. criminal laws relating 
to nuclear smuggling and terrorism to the require-
ments of the amendment.
nuclear material are parties to the con-
vention and its amendment, see Table 
3.1-Table 3.3.
Similarly, the Convention on the Sup-
pression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 
also agreed to in 2005, requires parties to 
“make every effort to adopt appropriate 
measures to ensure the physical protec-
tion of radioactive materials,” but says 
nothing about what measures would be 
appropriate, beyond mentioning that 
states should develop them “taking into 
account” relevant IAEA recommenda-
tions.91  The nuclear terrorism convention 
entered into force in July 2007, but the 
number of parties to the convention re-
mains modest.
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1373, passed unanimously in the after-
math of the 9/11 attacks, legally requires 
all states to take a broad range of actions 
to counter terrorism, but does not include 
specific requirements for nuclear secu-
rity.  UNSCR 1540, passed unanimously 
in 2004, is focused specifically on keeping 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weap-
ons out of the hands of non-state actors.  
It legally requires all states to provide 
“appropriate effective” security and ac-
counting for any stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons or related materials they may 
have—but to date, no one has defined 
what essential elements must be in place 
for nuclear security and accounting sys-
tems to comply with this requirement.92  
91 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts 
of Nuclear Terrorism (New York: United Nations, 
2005), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=A/Res/59/290  (accessed 31 March 
2010).  
92 The text of UNSCR 1540, along with many related 
documents, can be found at United Nations, “1540 
Committee” (New York: UN, no date), http://www.
un.org/sc/1540/ (accessed 27 February 2010).  For 
a proposed definition of essential elements for 
both nuclear security and nuclear accounting, see 
Matthew Bunn, “‘Appropriate Effective’ Nuclear 
Security and Accounting—What is It?” presenta-
tion to the Joint Global Initiative/UNSCR 1540 
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UNSCR 1540 also requires states to put 
in place appropriate effective export con-
trols and border controls, and to put in 
place domestic legislation criminalizing 
any attempt to assist non-state actors with 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.  
The Security Council has established a 
small committee to oversee implementa-
tion of UNSCR 1540, which assesses state’s 
reporting on the steps they have taken to 
implement the resolution, compiles data-
bases of relevant national legislation, and 
seeks to match states requiring assistance 
in implementing the resolution with do-
nor states.  A comprehensive review of the 
implementation of UNSCR 1540 is cur-
rently underway, and its conclusions are 
expected to be published in 2010.
UNSCR 1887, passed unanimously in 
September 2009, is not legally binding, 
but goes further, urging all states to take 
a broad range of measures to strengthen 
global nonproliferation efforts, including 
securing all nuclear material worldwide 
within four years and establishing a fund 
to help states implement UNSCR 1540.93  
To date, it does not appear that fora such 
as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism, the IAEA Office of Nuclear 
Security, the UN committee established to 
oversee implementation of UNSCR 1540, 
or the G8 Nuclear Safety and Security 
Group (which discusses implementation 
of the Global Partnership Against the 
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
Destruction) have been used to try to de-
velop agreed global standards for nuclear 
security.  In short, the world is still a long 
Workshop on “‘Appropriate Effective’ Material 
Accounting and Physical Protection,” Nashville, 
Tenn., 18 July 2008, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.
edu/publication/18452/ (accessed 27 February 2010).
93 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 
1887,” S/Res/1887 (New York: United Nations, 
24 September 2009), http://daccess-ods.un.org/
access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1887%20
(2009)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC (accessed 8 Febru-
ary 2010).
way from having effective global nuclear 
security standards in place.
Threat reduction cooperation represents 
another important element of the inter-
national nuclear security framework.  
U.S.-sponsored threat reduction pro-
grams arose in the 1990s in response to 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, but in 
recent years have expanded to help states 
around the world improve controls over 
nuclear, chemical, biological, radiologi-
cal, and missile weapons, materials, and 
expertise—as the very names of programs 
such as the Global Threat Reduction Ini-
tiative make clear.  As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, these programs have dramat-
ically improved nuclear security at many 
sites around the world, and removed the 
weapons-usable nuclear material entirely 
from many others.  The global risk of 
nuclear theft today is surely far lower than 
it would have been had these programs 
never existed.
In 2002, at the G8 summit in Kananas-
kis, Canada, the other members of the 
G8 pledged $10 billion over 10 years to 
match a projected U.S. threat reduction 
investment of $10 billion over that pe-
riod, in an initiative known as the Global 
Partnership Against the Spread of Weap-
ons and Materials of Mass Destruction.  
Since 2002, many other donor countries 
beyond the G8 have contributed funds as 
well, though the total has never reached 
the originally pledged $20 billion from 
all parties.  The Global Partnership has 
funneled billions of dollars into chemical 
weapons demilitarization and submarine 
dismantlement—the two focus areas Rus-
sia preferred—but the non-U.S. funds 
devoted to nuclear security have been a 
very small fraction of U.S. investments in 
that area.94  At the 2008 G8 summit, the 
partners agreed in principle to extend the 
94  Global Partnership Working Group, Annex A: 
GPWG Annual Report 2009, Consolidated Report Data 
(L’Aquila, Italy: GPWG, July 2009), http://www.
partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/PDFFrameset.
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focus of the Global Partnership beyond 
Russia and the Eurasian states to address 
proliferation risks around the globe, but 
few projects beyond the original focus 
countries of Russia and Ukraine have 
yet been implemented.  The 2010 G8/
G20 summit, again in Canada, may agree 
to extend the partnership for another 10 
years and give it a more explicit global 
focus.
Some states have also chosen to chan-
nel threat reduction funds through the 
IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security and 
its Nuclear Security Fund.  The IAEA 
provides international peer reviews of 
physical protection and other nuclear 
security arrangements when states re-
quest them, and can help states develop 
comprehensive nuclear and radiologi-
cal security plans, covering everything 
from protection of radiological sources to 
improved detection of nuclear and radio-
logical materials covering international 
borders.  When reviews indicate that sig-
nificant nuclear security investments are 
needed, the IAEA can work with donor 
states to arrange help in financing those 
investments, and, on a limited basis, can 
provide equipment and other assistance 
itself as well.95
The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism, launched by the United States 
and Russia in 2006, is a voluntary group 
of states—numbering some 75 coun-
tries as of early 2010—that organizes 
workshops to discuss best practices in 
particular areas relevant to preventing nu-
clear terrorism (such as law enforcement 
measures to stop nuclear smuggling); 
carries out exercises and simulations to 
help states plan national and international 
asp?PDF=g8gp_annex_a.pdf (accessed 19 February 
2010)
95 International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Se-
curity Report 2009, GOV/2009/53-GC(53)/16 (Vienna: 
IAEA, 21 August 2009), http://www.iaea.org/About/
Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Documents/English/gc53-
16_en.pdf (accessed 19 February 2010).
responses to potential emergencies related 
to nuclear or radiological terrorism; and 
also helps, in some cases, to match states 
seeking assistance to donor states willing 
to provide it.96  The Global Initiative (GI) 
brought countries together at the level of 
undersecretaries of state or deputy for-
eign ministers, with teams representing a 
range of relevant agencies, to discuss the 
danger of nuclear terrorism and measures 
to prevent and respond to it, which has 
surely had some effect on international 
perceptions of the threat.  The GI does not 
appear, however, to have included a major 
focus on briefings and exercises designed 
to build states’ sense of urgency about the 
nuclear terrorism threat, efforts to build 
international intelligence cooperation 
focused on nuclear terrorism, or discus-
sions of the levels of security that should 
be provided for all nuclear weapons and 
weapons-usable nuclear materials, even in 
the safest countries.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 
launched in 2003, is another voluntary 
grouping of states, numbering some 90 
participants as of early 2010, which fo-
cuses on interdicting illicit shipments of 
nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile 
weapons, materials, and technologies.  It 
relies on existing international legal au-
thorities, and therefore does not provide 
a legal option for stopping a ship or air-
craft in international waters or airspace 
if the country where the vehicle is regis-
tered does not provide permission. While 
not directly related to securing nuclear 
stockpiles, it potentially has a role to play 
in making nuclear smuggling more dif-
ficult.97  President Obama has proposed 
transforming both the GI and the PSI into 
96 U.S. Department of State, “The Global Initiative 
To Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of State, 2009), http://www.state.
gov/t/isn/c18406.htm (accessed 19 February 2009). 
97 U.S. Department of State, “Proliferation Security 
Initiative,” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
State, no date), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.
htm (accessed 19 February 2010). 
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permanent international institutions with 
staff of their own.98 
The World Institute for Nuclear Security 
(WINS) is a new, voluntary organization 
where nuclear operators can exchange 
ideas and best practices related to improv-
ing nuclear security.  WINS was launched 
in September 2008, headquartered in Vi-
enna.99  WINS was developed through a 
partnership between the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative (NTI) and the Institute for 
Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), 
with support from NNSA, and has been 
gaining endorsements and support from 
institutions ranging from the IAEA to 
nuclear firms and agencies in Britain, 
Norway, France, Japan, the United States, 
and elsewhere.  As of early 2010, WINS 
had organized two major best practice 
workshops, the first on steps to improve 
nuclear security culture and the second 
on measures to protect against the most 
plausible threats to nuclear facilities, and 
expected to prepare over a dozen best 
practice guides for use by nuclear opera-
tors over the next two years.
The international nuclear security frame-
work also includes a range of cooperation 
that is often secret, between police and 
intelligence agencies in different coun-
tries, working to track down terrorist cells 
pursuing nuclear or radiological terror-
ism, or black-market networks smuggling 
nuclear materials and technology.  The 
demise of the network led by Pakistan’s 
A.Q. Khan, for example, involved in-
98 The White House, Office of the Press Secre-
tary, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” 
Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009 http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-
President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/ 
(accessed 19 February 2010).
99 Information on WINS is available at its website, 
http://www.wins.org (accessed 17 February 2010). 
See also Roger Howsley, “The World Institute 
for Nuclear Security: Filling a Gap in the Global 
Nuclear Security Regime,” Innovations: Technology, 
Governance, Globalization, Fall 2009, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 
203–208.
depth cooperation among a number of 
countries, especially U.S. and British intel-
ligence.100  Currently, however, there is far 
less international police and intelligence 
cooperation than is needed to address the 
threat.101
The nuclear security summit and the 
four-year effort to secure nuclear material 
worldwide are also key elements of the 
international nuclear security framework, 
though how much they will accomplish—
and whether they will launch new 
elements of this global framework, such as 
an effective approach to global standards 
for nuclear security—is not yet clear.
In short, the global nuclear security frame-
work includes many different elements, 
each of which is contributing significantly 
to reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism, 
or has the potential to do so in the future.  
Indeed, there are so many different instru-
ments and initiatives that many countries 
(some of whom may have only one or 
two officials dealing with this policy area) 
have trouble keeping track of them all.  To 
date, however, there is no over-arching 
structure into which these initiatives 
could be placed, and the combination of 
all these initiatives has not yet proven 
sufficient to ensure that all global nuclear 
stockpiles are effectively secured.  Many 
of the tiles of the nuclear security mosaic 
are in place, but the picture is only begin-
ning to emerge.  
 
 
 
100 See, for example, Douglas Frantz and Catherine 
Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist (New York: Twelve, 
2007).
101 Interviews with Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, who for-
merly led several such cooperative efforts for the 
U.S. government, and attempted to initiate others, 
throughout 2009.

4 Goals for Nuclear security at the eNd of four years
What should the international community 
hope to have achieved by April of 2013, 
at the end of the four-year effort to secure 
all vulnerable nuclear stockpiles around 
the world?  The plain language of the 
statements from President Obama and 
the UN Security Council, combined with 
the needs of global security, suggests that 
the objective should be that all stocks of 
nuclear weapons, plutonium, and HEU 
worldwide are effectively and lastingly pro-
tected.
All means that any nuclear material that 
could be used to make a nuclear bomb 
should be included, whether it is in a 
military or a civilian stockpile.  It means 
the effort must ensure security not just 
for materials in developing or transition 
countries such as Russia, Pakistan, or 
South Africa, but also in wealthy coun-
tries such as Belgium and Japan—and the 
United States. 
Effectively is a matter of risk—another way 
of stating the goal is that at the end of four 
years, we want all nuclear stocks to have a 
low risk of being stolen.  That means they 
have to be reliably protected against the 
kinds of adversary capabilities (both out-
sider and insider) that they are most likely 
to face.  Hence, how much security is 
enough will vary from country to country, 
depending on the spectrum of plausible 
adversary capabilities in each country: 
a security system that was perfectly ad-
equate in Canada would likely still be 
considered “vulnerable” or “high risk” in 
Pakistan.  (In some cases, adversary capa-
bilities may be higher in different regions 
of individual countries as well, Chechnya 
and neighboring regions of Russia being 
an obvious example.)
But in a world with terrorists with global 
reach, even in the safest countries, nuclear 
weapons, HEU, or plutonium must at least 
be protected against one well-placed in-
sider, a modest group of well-armed and 
well-trained outsiders (capable of operat-
ing in two coordinated teams), or both 
together; in countries such as Pakistan, 
such stocks must be protected against 
more capable threats.  Any nuclear weap-
ons or weapons-usable nuclear material 
not well-protected against such minimum 
threats should be considered a priority to 
be addressed.  The world should not be 
satisfied just because a facility follows the 
IAEA’s current physical protection rec-
ommendations (INFCIRC/225 Rev. 4), as 
these, while valuable, are vague enough 
that it is possible to comply with them 
fully and still not have effective protec-
tion against the kinds of capabilities and 
tactics that terrorists and criminals have 
used in past attacks and thefts.1  Follow-
ing the IAEA recommendations, in short, 
is necessary but not sufficient for a site to 
be considered a low risk for nuclear theft.  
States are now discussing a fifth revision 
of these recommendations, which is ex-
pected to offer significantly more specific 
guidance—but it still will not specify 
any sort of baseline set of threats against 
which the essential ingredients of nuclear 
bombs must be protected.2
Achieving “effective” protection or “low” 
risk could be achieved by improving pro-
tection or by a combination of improving 
protection and reducing the likely adver-
1 See discussion in Chapter 3.
2 Interviews with IAEA officials, November 2009, 
with National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) officials, January 2010, and data provided 
by NNSA, March 2010.
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sary capabilities.  In some countries, such 
as Pakistan, no plausible level of security 
upgrades will be sufficient to achieve a 
low level of risk unless measures are also 
taken to reduce the chance that thieves 
would be able to mount large outsider 
attacks or insider conspiracies without 
detection (see further discussion below).
Of course, “low risk” of being stolen is a 
somewhat elastic concept.  What seems 
sufficiently low to one observer may still 
seem worrisomely high to another.  As-
sessing the theft risks posed by different stocks 
around the world will have to be a continuous 
and ever-evolving part of the effort.  If, at the 
end of four years, the world has reached 
a state where the highest-risk remaining 
stockpiles pose much lower risks than do 
today’s highest-risk stockpiles, the four-
year effort will have “succeeded” in the 
sense of having secured the most vulner-
able stockpiles, and in the sense of having 
substantially reduced the overall risk of 
nuclear theft. 
Lastingly means that the international 
community has some reason to believe 
that these stocks are likely to continue 
to be effectively protected for years to 
come, long after the four-year objective 
has passed.  For example, if a country 
has put in place regulations requiring its 
nuclear materials to be protected against 
a robust spectrum of insider and outsider 
threats, is effectively enforcing those 
regulations, and has arranged for appro-
priate resources to be available to meet 
those regulations, it would be reasonable 
to conclude that nuclear security in that 
country was likely to last.  Of course, there 
are inevitably conflicts between doing 
things quickly and doing them in a way 
that will last, and difficult judgments will 
have to be made as the effort proceeds.  
If, at the end of four years, all or nearly 
all of the world’s stocks have reached a 
state in which they are reliably protected 
against the main plausible threats in the 
countries where those stocks reside, and 
the operators managing these stocks are 
on a plausible pathway toward sustain-
ability—even if they have not reached a 
sustainable state yet—the effort will have 
made enormous progress.
Realistically, not everything that should be 
done to improve nuclear security around 
the world will be done at the end of four 
years; the end of that period must not 
be the end of the road for international 
cooperation on nuclear security.  Nuclear 
material control and accounting practices, 
in particular, are likely to be slower to 
improve than physical protection, and 
there will surely be sites where substan-
tial improvement in material control and 
accounting will still be needed after the 
spring of 2013.  Nuclear security systems 
must always evolve and improve, to keep 
pace with a changing world and an evolv-
ing threat.  Indeed, the goal should be to 
instill a culture of constant improvement 
and emulation of best world practices; it 
is critical to avoid complacency, even once 
significantly improved nuclear security 
measures are in place.  (See “Nuclear Se-
curity Cooperation After the Four-year 
Effort,” p. 63.)
A PAkistAn ExAmPlE
What could be true in Pakistan in four 
years that might lead the international 
community to conclude the four-year ef-
fort had succeeded there?  It is highly 
unlikely that by that time Pakistan will 
have adopted large clear zones, multiple 
layers of fencing, and other security ap-
proaches that might improve physical 
protection but would compromise the 
secrecy of its nuclear weapon sites and 
potentially make them vulnerable to a 
nuclear or conventional strike.  Nor is it 
likely that in four years’ time there will 
be no more terrorists in Pakistan, or that 
there would no longer be any individuals 
in the Pakistani security services or the 
Pakistani nuclear establishment with ex-
treme Islamic sympathies.
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But it is quite plausible that in four years, 
with sufficient effort and creative ap-
proaches, the international community 
could help Pakistan reach a state in which 
there was a very low risk of state failure 
or state takeover by extremists, and: (a) 
Pakistani protections against both out-
sider and insider theft attempts had been 
substantially improved (for both nuclear 
weapons and nuclear material, including 
nuclear material undergoing bulk process-
ing); (b) Pakistan had in place a system of 
rules and regulations requiring facilities 
to sustain these high standards of secu-
rity and to demonstrate in realistic tests 
that they could protect against the ad-
versary threats the Pakistani government 
specified; (c) Pakistan had made plans 
to provide adequate resources to sustain 
these security systems over the long haul; 
and (d) a variety of political, develop-
ment, and counter-terrorism steps had 
been taken that would make it substan-
tially less probable that extreme Islamic 
terrorists could organize an insider theft 
conspiracy or launch a highly capable 
outsider attack without being detected in 
advance.  The combination of strengthen-
ing the defense and weakening the likely 
adversaries the defenses had to protect 
against would substantially reduce the 
risk of nuclear theft, and make it possible 
to say that the four-year effort had “suc-
ceeded” in Pakistan.
nuclEAr sEcurity cooPErAtion AftEr thE four-yEAr Effort
The need for international cooperation to ensure effective nuclear security will not come to an end 
when the four-year effort is completed.  That effort will, if all goes well, have led to major improve-
ments.  But there will continue to be a need to address new problems as they are identified, exchange 
best practices, develop new technologies and approaches, refine and strengthen international standards 
and recommendations, strengthen security cultures, continue consolidating nuclear materials, and 
more.  The goal of all nuclear security systems must be continuing improvement in performance.
Hence, existing cooperative nuclear security programs should not be seen as efforts that will come 
to an end in the spring of 2013, but as efforts that will then enter a new phase, a phase focused on 
sustaining and further improving nuclear security.  In particular, as noted in the chapter, many HEU-
fueled research reactors will not be able to convert to low-enriched fuels by the spring of 2013, as 
new high-density fuels are not expected to be licensed and commercially available until 2014 at best.  
Moreover, accounting and control procedures are likely to be slower to improve than physical protec-
tion, and will probably require continued improvement after the spring of 2013.
One important step that should be taken at the summit meeting of the Group of Eight (G-8) and the 
Group of 20 (G-20) in Canada in June 2010 is to renew the Global Partnership Against the Spread 
of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, extending it for another ten years, expanding it to 
help countries around the world implement effective controls over nuclear, biological, and chemical 
materials and technologies (as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1540), and expanding the 
pledged funding stream.  This would provide key resources for implementing the four-year effort and 
for sustaining effective nuclear security for the long haul after that effort is completed.
Similarly, within the United States, Congress should act to introduce some flexibility in current leg-
islation that requires the administration to focus on achieving a nuclear security system in Russia 
sustained only with Russian resources by the end of 2012.  While Russia should certainly bear the 
lion’s share of the cost of nuclear security after 2012, the U.S. government should continue to budget 
reduced amounts to support continued work in a variety of areas, including on sustainability, regula-
tory effectiveness, and security culture.
64 SECURING THE BOMB 2010
multiPlE mEthods—And not  
doing it All oursElvEs
For some countries, the best approach 
may be similar to the one that has been 
taken in Russia—negotiating agreements, 
then negotiating upgrade contracts, and 
then doing upgrades largely paid for with 
U.S. money.  (Even in countries where up-
grades will be paid for with U.S. money, 
the U.S. government should seek faster 
methods, if the four-year goal is to be 
achieved.)  In countries such as Belgium 
or Japan, however, the focus should be 
on convincing them to upgrade security 
themselves—with as much advice and ex-
change of best practices as they would like 
to have, but without much in the way of 
U.S. funding.  The international commu-
nity needs an approach that integrates a 
variety of such methods, picking the ones 
most likely to be effective in each country.
In all cases, winning the “hearts and 
minds” struggle—convincing key poli-
cymakers and nuclear managers that the 
threats of nuclear theft and terrorism 
pose real dangers to their countries’ se-
curity that will require additional action 
to address—will be central to success, for 
unless they are convinced of that, they 
are unlikely to take or agree to the kinds 
of actions needed to achieve effective and 
lasting nuclear security.  (This issue is dis-
cussed in more detail in the last chapter of 
this report.)
consolidAtion
Improved nuclear security can only re-
duce the risk that nuclear material will be 
stolen from a particular building; it can 
never eliminate it.  The only way to reduce 
that risk to zero is to remove the material 
itself, so that there is no weapons-usable 
material left to steal.  Consolidating 
nuclear stockpiles to a smaller number of 
buildings and sites also makes it possible 
to achieve higher security at lower cost for 
the locations where these stocks remain. 
Hence, consolidation should be a central 
part of the nuclear security agenda, as one 
of several tools to accomplish the overall 
objective of ensuring a low risk of theft 
for all nuclear warheads, plutonium, and 
HEU worldwide.  Consolidation should 
be thought of more broadly than simply 
converting HEU-fueled research reac-
tors.  Wherever there is plutonium, HEU, 
or nuclear warheads, the question should 
be asked: does this building or this site 
need these for some ongoing mission? 
Would removal be as politically achiev-
able and cost-effective as lasting security 
upgrades?  In some cases, the answer 
will be “no, removal is not a practical 
objective”—as in the case of removing 
Pakistan’s nuclear warheads or removing 
all the tens of tons of separated plutonium 
at the French reprocessing plant at La 
Hague.  In other cases, the answer is likely 
to be “yes, removal should be the primary 
goal, though the international commu-
nity should pursue security upgrades to 
prevent theft until removal occurs.”  In 
the United States, a major consolidation 
effort has been underway for some time.  
Non-government experts now estimate 
that U.S. nuclear weapons are stored at 15 
locations in the United States and six in 
Europe, whereas two decades ago, they 
were at as many as 75 sites in Germany 
alone.3  Most U.S. HEU-fueled research 
3 Of the remaining 21 locations, most are military 
bases where nuclear delivery vehicles (missiles, 
submarines, or bombers) are deployed; long-term 
storage of non-deployed nuclear weapons has been 
consolidated to five locations (two of which are at 
major nuclear submarine bases and one of which 
is the dismantlement site, where nuclear weapons 
are stored pending dismantlement).  The remain-
ing two national-level storage sites are Kirtland 
Air Force Base in New Mexico and Nellis Air Force 
Base in Nevada.  See Robert S. Norris and Hans 
M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Worldwide 
Deployments of Nuclear Weapons, 2009,” Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2009, 
pp. 86-98, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/
xm38g50653435657/fulltext.pdf (accessed 8 Febru-
ary 2010).
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reactors that once existed have either 
been shut down or have converted to use 
low-enriched fuel.  DOE has eliminated 
all plutonium and other nuclear mate-
rial from the former Rocky Flats nuclear 
“pit” production facility; has removed 
all significant HEU from Sandia National 
Laboratories; has removed all nuclear 
material from Technical Area 18 (TA-18) 
at Los Alamos, where tests had repeat-
edly revealed security weaknesses; has 
greatly reduced the number of buildings 
with weapons-usable nuclear material at 
other DOE sites; and plans to eliminate 
all weapons-usable nuclear material from 
the Lawrence Livermore National Labora-
tory by 2012.4  This consolidation has been 
driven in large part by post-9/11 security 
rules that have made it very expensive to 
continue to have HEU or plutonium in a 
building, creating a substantial incentive 
to get rid of these materials wherever pos-
sible.
Much the same needs to be done in 
countries around the world.  Today, the 
main consolidation effort is focused on 
HEU-fueled research reactors, which the 
U.S.-funded Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative (GTRI) and its international 
partners are seeking to convert to LEU or 
shut down, coupled with a major effort 
to remove HEU from these facilities and 
any other locations where it is no longer 
needed.  The UN Security Council unani-
mously endorsed this effort in Resolution 
1887, calling on all states to minimize the 
civilian use of HEU “to the greatest extent 
that is technically and economically fea-
sible,” including by converting research 
reactors to use LEU fuels and medical 
isotope production to use LEU targets.5  
4  U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear 
Security Administration, “NNSA Ships Additional 
Surplus Special Nuclear Material From Livermore,” 
9 February 2009, http://nnsa.energy.gov/2280.htm 
(accessed 10 February 2010).
5 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 
1887,” S/Res/1887 (New York: United Nations, 
This consolidation effort should be con-
tinued, with the goal of eliminating the 
use of HEU wherever possible, and given 
adequate resources and political priority 
to succeed.  It should also be expanded to 
include:
Further consolidation of U.S. nuclear • 
weapons and materials (including 
consolidating U.S. nuclear weapons 
in Europe to one or two secure U.S.-
operated bases, or removing them 
entirely);6
A major consolidation program in • 
Russia, which, as described in the last 
chapter, still has some 110-130 nuclear 
weapon sites and roughly 250 build-
ings with weapons-usable nuclear 
material at dozens of sites.  This should 
include a major effort to convert or 
shut down Russia’s HEU-fueled re-
search reactors, the largest fleet of such 
reactors in the world.
An effort to limit, as much as prac-• 
ticable, the number of sites where 
plutonium separated from spent fuel is 
stored and used.
Not all the consolidation of nuclear weap-
ons and materials that is desirable is likely 
to be accomplished within four years.  In 
particular, even if all goes well, new high-
density fuels needed to convert some 
high-performance research reactors are 
not expected to be available until 2014 (a 
year after the end of the four-year effort), 
and that date could still slip.  Once those 
fuels are available, it will take a few years 
to get those reactors converted, which is 
24 September 2009), http://daccess-ods.un.org/
access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1887%20
(2009)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC (accessed 8 Febru-
ary 2010).
6 In both the United States and Russia, the idea is 
to reduce the number of sites where nuclear weap-
ons not deployed on strategic ballistic missiles are 
stored and handled, not to reduce the number of 
missile silos, submarines, or bombers more than is 
required by arms control agreements.
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why GTRI plans to be spending more on 
reactor conversion and HEU removals in 
2015 than it will during the years of the 
four-year effort.7  Hence, eliminating the 
civil use of HEU cannot realistically be 
accomplished by the end of the four-year 
effort: instead, what can be done is to 
remove weapons-usable nuclear mate-
rial from a large number of facilities and 
provide highly effective security wherever 
such material remains.
What consolidation steps might the world 
hope to accomplish during the four-year 
effort? With sufficient leadership, part-
nership, and resources, it might well be 
possible by April of 2013 to:
Reduce the number of countries where • 
HEU or plutonium exist by 50-60%.
Reduce the number of buildings and • 
bunkers where nuclear weapons, HEU, 
or plutonium exist by 30-50% (includ-
ing converting or closing an additional 
20-40 HEU-fueled research reactors).8
Such actions would make it possible to 
achieve higher security at lower cost at the 
sites where nuclear weapons, plutonium, 
or HEU will continue to exist.
7 See U.S. Department of Energy, FY2011 Budget Re-
quest: National Nuclear Security Administration, Vol. 1 
(Washington, DC: DOE, February 2010), p. 436.
8 The GTRI program currently hopes to convert or 
shut down an additional 29 HEU-fueled research 
reactors by the end of fiscal year 2013.  See DOE, FY 
2011 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear 
Security Administration, p. 439. If Russia launched 
a major program to convert its research reactors 
or shut those that are now little used, and other 
governments and operators decided to shut down 
some of the other underutilized reactors, the total 
number of converted or shut-down reactors at the 
end of four years could be higher than GTRI now 
expects.  In any case, because Russia has such a 
large number of nuclear weapon and weapons-
usable nuclear material locations, the larger goal of 
reducing the total number of such locations by 30-
50% could only be achieved if Russia undertook a 
major consolidation initiative.
nuclEAr sEcurity imProvEmEnts
In parallel with consolidating nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear ma-
terial at the smallest practicable number of 
locations, it is critical to provide effective 
protection from theft at the sites that will 
remain (and for those transports that will 
continue).  What can be done in four years 
in improving nuclear security?
Technically, it is possible to implement 
substantial security at upgrades at many 
locations during that time.  In Russia, ma-
jor security and accounting upgrades at a 
number of highly complex facilities were 
completed within about two years after 
work had been started at those sites.
But when the time required for political 
discussions, negotiating contracts, and 
the like is included, it is clear that only a 
modest number of facilities in a modest 
number of countries could be upgraded 
using the methods that have been used 
in U.S.-Russian cooperation—even if all 
the relevant countries were willing to 
cooperate.  Relying on those approaches 
everywhere where nuclear weapons or 
weapons-usable materials exist would 
certainly not lead to effective security for 
all of these stocks within four years.
But different methods can be used in 
different cases.  Many countries will pro-
vide effective security for their nuclear 
stockpiles with their own money and 
experts, and will take those actions with-
out extensive discussion or negotiation 
with the United States or other countries.  
Those actions could readily be taken 
within the four-year target—if countries 
became convinced that they needed to 
take nuclear security steps beyond those 
they had taken in the past.  Hence, con-
vincing countries that improvements 
are needed—including convincing them 
that there is a real threat of nuclear theft 
and terrorism against which they must 
protect—is fundamental to success in 
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achieving the four-year objective.  The 
United States and other countries seek-
ing to achieve the four-year goal should 
push for countries to take immediate steps 
to put in place at least a baseline level of 
security that would protect these stocks 
against modest outsider and insider 
threats, while plans for sustainability are 
developed and longer term solutions are 
implemented.
How much nuclear security is enough?  
A balance must be drawn: one does not 
want to waste money protecting against 
imagined armies of ten-foot-tall terror-
ists, but at the same time, nuclear facilities 
must be protected against the most plau-
sible adversary capabilities.  Clearly, the 
capabilities of terrorists and thieves vary 
from one country to another.  A nuclear 
security system sufficient to reduce the 
risk of nuclear theft or sabotage to a low 
level in Canada may not be sufficient 
in Pakistan.  Each country with nuclear 
weapons, plutonium separated from spent 
fuel, or HEU must ensure that these stocks 
are effectively protected against the spec-
trum of outsider and insider capabilities 
that are most plausible in their country.  
These stocks should be protected against 
two sets of capabilities: first, capabilities 
that terrorists and criminals have shown 
they can bring together in that country 
(with whatever additional capabilities that 
country’s intelligence agencies believe are 
most likely), and second, a set of capabili-
ties that international terrorists might be 
able to bring to bear in any country.  To 
accomplish this, countries controlling 
these stocks should establish and enforce 
rules that require that these stocks be pro-
tected against particular sets of adversary 
capabilities, known as the “design basis 
threat,” (DBT).9  Ideally, the threat as-
9 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, 
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) (Vienna: IAEA, 
1999) http://www.iaea.or.at/Publications/Docu-
ments/Infcircs/1999/infcirc225r4c/rev4_content.
sessment process should include experts 
who have access to all relevant threat in-
formation available to the state, and who 
are independent of those operating the 
nuclear facilities.  The DBT should be re-
viewed regularly to ensure that it reflects 
an up-to-date assessment of the evolving 
threat. 
As just noted, facing terrorists with global 
reach, there are adversary capabilities that 
all stocks of nuclear weapons, plutonium, 
or HEU must be protected against, no 
matter what country they are in.  All such 
stocks should at least be protected against:
A modest group of well-trained out-• 
side attackers, capable of operating as 
more than one team, with armaments 
that might include automatic weapons, 
rocket-propelled grenades,10 and explo-
sives;
A well-placed insider, with knowledge • 
of the security system, who might carry 
out a theft himself or herself, or might 
provide passive or active assistance to 
outsiders;
Deception attacks, where thieves • 
might, for example, have military uni-
forms and forged identification papers, 
or even forged documents authorizing 
material to be removed from a site for 
shipment;
html (accessed 30 October 2009), and International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Development, Use, and 
Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat: Implement-
ing Guide, Nuclear Security Series No. 10 (Vienna: 
IAEA, 2009), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/
publications/PDF/Pub1386_web.pdf (accessed 30 
October 2009). 
10 Unfortunately, rocket-propelled grenades are 
widely available to terrorist groups, and have been 
used extensively in Lebanon, in Iraq, in Afghani-
stan, and elsewhere.  Fortunately, in the case of 
defending fixed sites such as nuclear facilities, sim-
ple and cheap defenses—such as strong wire mesh 
in front of a wall to be protected—can cause the 
grenade to detonate harmlessly away from the wall. 
See “Systems Under Fire,”  (video), U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy, Office of Independent Oversight 
and Performance Assurance, 2003.
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How mucH migHt it cost to secure nuclear materials worldwide?
No one knows for sure how much it would cost to provide high levels of security for all nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide.  The number of buildings and bunkers 
worldwide where these materials exist is not known precisely, and as discussed in the chapter, how 
many of these require upgrades and how extensive the needed upgrades might be depends on the level 
of security that is set as the goal.  (No matter how many security measures have already been taken, 
additional steps can always be put in place.)
In Russia, which has the world’s largest and most dispersed nuclear stockpiles, NNSA spent roughly 
$1.3 billion on MPC&A improvements through the end of fiscal year (FY) 2006, by which time up-
grades had been completed for 139 buildings containing weapons-usable nuclear material, an average 
of nearly $10 million per building (though nearly $500 million of this total financed a wide range of 
training, regulatory development, and other efforts separate from upgrading security and account
The Department of State 
FY 2011 budget request is $53.809 billion.
The Cooperative Threat 
Reduction FY 2011 request is 
$197 million, representing 
0.37% of the total request.
The Department of Energy
FY 2011 budget request is $28.4 billion.
The Cooperative Threat 
Reduction FY 2011 request is 
$1.332 billion, representing 
4.69% of the total request.
The Department of Defense 
FY 2011 budget request is $718.795 billion.
The Cooperative Threat 
Reduction FY 2011 request is 
$523 million, representing 
0.07% of the total request.
Figure 4.1:  Components of Departments of Energy, State, and Defense
FY 2011 Budget Requests Devoted to Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs
(each full box represents $1 billion)
Source:   U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Budget Estimate: Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010), p.803.  U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2011 Budget Request: 
National Nuclear Security Administration, vol. 1, DOE/CF-0047 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, February 2010).  U.S. 
Department of State, FY 2011 International Affairs (Function 150) Executive Budget Summary (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
State, February 2010).
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How mucH migHt it cost to secure nuclear materials worldwide? (cont)
ing equipment at particular buildings).1  In addition, DOE and the Department of Defense together 
spent just under $800 million on upgrading security for nuclear warhead storage sites in Russia 
through the end of FY2006, and had completed upgrades at 62 warhead sites by that time, an average 
cost in the range of just under $13 million per site.2  Russia, of course, is paying the costs of providing 
guard forces, security personnel, and the like, as well as its own investments in security and account-
ing equipment. The costs of consolidation are also significant: GTRI expects to spend hundreds of 
millions of dollars a year for years to come on converting HEU-fueled research reactors and removing 
HEU (and plutonium, in a few cases) from sites around the world.3
While prices have increased somewhat since then, and there are arguments in some cases as to whether 
the upgrades are sufficient to meet the threat (especially in the case of insider theft), these figures 
provide a reasonable order-of-magnitude understanding of the cost of upgrading nuclear security.  It 
appears very likely that similar levels of security could be provided for all the nuclear weapon and 
weapons-usable nuclear material sites and transport operations in the world for an initial capital cost 
in the range of $4-$8 billion (much of which, of course, should be paid by the countries where these 
stockpiles exist, or by other donor states, rather than putting the entire burden on the United States).  
Even with an expanded consolidation effort included as well, it appears very likely that the total cost 
over the four-year effort would be $10 billion or less.  
That figure does not include the costs of guard forces, security personnel, regulators, and all the other 
elements of an effective nuclear security system; these ongoing costs will have to be paid by the op-
erators of the facilities and transports handling nuclear weapons and weapon-usable materials or the 
governments of their countries. For many facilities, effective security could be provided for 2-3% of 
annual operating costs.  There are some cases, however, such as small research reactors with little rev-
enue, where the annual cost of a more substantial security system might be a substantial fraction of the 
facility’s total current operating budget; in those cases, governments will have to subsidize security or 
encourage less-needed facilities to shut down.
Beyond these costs for nuclear security, the U.S. government or other donor states may wish to help 
countries take other steps (as they have in the former Soviet Union), from re-employing nuclear scien-
tists to paying to destroy stocks of HEU or plutonium, to strengthening countries’ ability to interdict 
nuclear smuggling.  These efforts would add additional costs.
But the bottom line is that nuclear security is affordable: a level of nuclear security that could greatly 
reduce the risk of nuclear theft could be achieved for less than two percent of annual U.S. defense 
spending, spread over several years.  (Figure 4.1 shows what a tiny fraction of the budgets of the De-
fense, Energy, and State Departments is devoted to all threat reduction activities combined, going well 
beyond nuclear security.)  Lack of money should not be allowed to constrain the effort to keep nuclear 
stockpiles out of terrorist hands.
1 For the funding figure, see U.S. Congress, Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in 
Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-Term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain, 
GAO-07-404 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07404.pdf (accessed 31 March 2010), pp. 
12, 16.  For the number of buildings, see Figure Figure 3.1.
2 U.S. Congress, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security, p. 18.  For the number of warhead sites com-
pleted by the end of FY2006, see Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008 (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, 
Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2008), p.95, http://www.nti.org/securingthebomb (accessed 13 
February 2010). 
3 DOE, FY 2011 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administration, pp. 435-445.
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Bombs that could be carried on a per-• 
son’s body, or in a car or van; and
Unusual vehicles or routes.  • 
It is particularly important that the DBT 
include the possibility of an insider.  All 
of the real cases of theft of HEU or pluto-
nium whose origins are documented were 
perpetrated by insiders or with the as-
sistance of insiders.  Hence, it is essential 
to maintain a strong personnel reliabil-
ity program that conducts background 
checks before giving employees access to 
nuclear weapons, materials, or nuclear se-
curity information, and that also includes 
ongoing monitoring so that suspicious 
changes in behavior may set off warn-
ings.  But even where effective personnel 
reliability programs are in place, it is still 
essential to protect against insider theft.  
Some managers may believe that their 
employees are trustworthy and they could 
never have an insider problem at their 
facility.  But it should be remembered 
that even trustworthy insiders could be 
coerced.  In one case in Northern Ireland, 
for example, a bank had a security system 
that required two senior officers of the 
bank to work together to open the vault—
but a gang kidnapped the families of two 
of the senior officers of the bank, and sure 
enough, they opened the vault.11  Where 
practical, it may even be desirable to re-
quire operators to at least explore options 
that would make theft attempts involving 
more than one insider more difficult and 
risky.
Each of these types of adversary capabil-
ity has been repeatedly demonstrated in 
terrorist attacks and thefts from guarded 
non-nuclear facilities around the world.  
11 For a good introduction to the Northern Bank 
case, see Chris Moore, “Anatomy of a ₤26.5 Million 
Heist,” Sunday Life, 21 May 2006.  The thieves also 
used deception in this case, appearing at the bank 
managers’ homes dressed as policemen.  One of 
these managers, however, was later charged with 
participating voluntarily in the crime; he denied the 
charge.
Indeed, the Pelindaba incident described 
above—two teams attacking from op-
posite sides, apparently with insider 
knowledge of how to defeat the intrusion 
detectors—makes clear that this is a realis-
tic level of threat against which stockpiles 
of nuclear weapons, plutonium, or HEU 
worldwide must be protected.12
Countries and operators should not use 
a DBT that represents a single point es-
timate of the threat, but rather should 
protect against a spectrum of possibilities.  
A theft attempt involving a small number 
of people with convincing official uni-
forms and paperwork is not a lesser attack 
than a dozen attackers arriving with guns 
blazing, it is a different attack, requiring 
different types of defensive procedures.
 Of course, establishing a requirement 
that operators be able to protect against 
such a DBT is only the first step.  Opera-
tors must then develop and implement 
security designs, plans, and procedures 
capable of protecting against the full 
spectrum of possibilities included in the 
DBT.  Regulators must review these ar-
rangements to confirm that they really 
will provide effective protection against 
the DBT.  Assessments of operators’ 
security arrangements should include 
a range of testing, including not only 
component tests—such as tests to ensure 
that detectors detect intrusions, or that 
response forces arrive in response to a 
call—but also exercises designed to test 
the full system’s ability to defeat intel-
ligent adversaries.  In the United States, 
for example, “force on force” exercises 
testing sites’ protection against outsider 
attacks—sometimes using laser-tag weap-
ons to avoid anyone actually being shot in 
the exercise—have often revealed impor-
12 For a description, see Bunn, Securing the Bomb 
2008, pp. 3-4, and “60 Minutes: Assault on 
Pelindaba,” CBS News, 23 November 2008, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/20/60minutes/
main4621623.shtml (accessed 30 October 2009).
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tant weaknesses in security systems that 
looked good on paper.  
Facilities will inevitably vary in their abili-
ties to maintain effective security against a 
spectrum of threats of this kind.  Military 
organizations have long focused on secu-
rity for their operations and are generally 
already protected against these kinds of 
threats—though the focus at both military 
and civilian facilities must always be on 
constant vigilance and continual improve-
ment.  For large commercial facilities, 
effective security can be achieved and 
maintained for a cost that represents a 
small fraction of total operating budgets, 
perhaps in the range of 1-3%.  For small 
research reactors with little operating 
revenue, however, the costs of protecting 
against the kinds of threats outlined above 
may seem prohibitive.  Governments, 
which generally already subsidize the 
operation of such reactors, should pay for 
their security, to the extent that govern-
ments believe their continued operation 
provides a benefit to society worth the 
cost.  The costs of security will also pro-
vide an additional incentive to convert 
from the use of HEU to other fuels that do 
not require such stringent protection.
If efforts to convince countries of the 
urgency of action succeed, it is quite 
plausible that by the end of the four-
year effort, all countries that still have 
stockpiles on their soil will have effec-
tively enforced national rules requiring 
these stockpiles to be protected against 
a DBT that includes the characteristics 
just described—at least a modest group 
of well-armed and well-trained attack-
ers (capable of operating as more than 
one team), a well-placed insider, or both 
together, using a range of possible tactics.  
With considerable effort, it may also be 
possible to ensure that countries facing 
terrorist adversaries with more substantial 
capabilities have protection against even 
more capable DBTs in place.  It is also 
plausible that by the end of four years, all 
states with these stockpiles exist would 
have effective nuclear material control and 
accounting measures in place; that they 
would have made arrangements to ensure 
that sites and transporters would have 
the resources needed to maintain strong 
nuclear security and accounting mea-
sures even after international assistance 
phases out; that they would have strong 
programs in place to strengthen security 
culture among all personnel relevant to 
nuclear security; and that they would be 
implementing regular performance tests 
to ensure that their nuclear security sys-
tems really were effective in countering 
intelligent adversaries doing their best to 
figure out how to overcome them.
Should the four-year effort lead to such 
results, it should be considered a re-
sounding success, for it will have greatly 
strengthened global nuclear security and 
greatly reduced the risk of nuclear theft 
and terrorism worldwide.

5 Methods for Judging Progress
Means for assessing progress are essential 
for managing any large and important 
government program.  Progress measures 
help to identify where good progress is 
being made and where obstacles have 
been encountered that must be addressed. 
They can be used to structure perfor-
mance incentives, allocate budgets, and 
more.
Metrics that do not fully reflect the actual 
goals being pursued can be dangerous, 
however, misdirecting efforts from meet-
ing the real goals to meeting the metrics, 
in a process known as “goal displace-
ment.”  If a manager is being judged on 
how many sites are equipped with radia-
tion detection equipment, for example, 
that manager will have an incentive to 
focus on getting many sites equipped 
quickly, rather than on the quality of the 
installations, the degree to which the peo-
ple at the sites are trained and motivated 
to use the equipment, or other approaches 
to interdicting nuclear smuggling.1
Unfortunately, reducing the risk of nu-
clear theft and terrorism is a problem that 
combines all of the features that make 
realistic measurement and assessment 
of progress extraordinarily difficult: it 
involves countering intelligent adversar-
ies who will adapt to efforts to stop them 
(and therefore “success” in blocking one 
route or tactic may not have a large ef-
fect on reducing risk if other routes or 
1 For a classic paper outlining how common and 
damaging such misdirected metrics and incentives 
are in almost every walk of life, see Steven Kerr, 
“On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for 
B,” Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 9, No. 
1 (1995), pp. 7-14 http://www.sba.oakland.edu/
Faculty/york/Readings434/Readings/On%20the%20
folly.pdf (accessed 10 February 2010).  This version 
is an update from the original 1975 article.
tactics are available); it involves stopping 
activities that by their nature take place 
in secret (so it is difficult to know if an 
increase or decrease in, say, reported in-
cidents of nuclear smuggling comes from 
a real change in the amount of nuclear 
smuggling, or from a change in how 
well smuggling is being detected and 
reported); and it involves addressing ac-
tivities that are rare, where even one case 
may be catastrophic, making it difficult 
to rely on statistical analysis of incidents 
over time to assess progress in reducing 
the risk.2
As a result, efforts to assess progress in 
reducing the risk of nuclear theft and ter-
rorism are based on (a) assessing the most 
likely pathways for terrorist acquisition 
of a nuclear bomb; (b) assessing what 
policies would be most likely to reduce 
the probability that terrorists pursuing 
those pathways would succeed; and then 
(c) assessing progress in implementing 
those policies.  In particular, the U.S. 
government approach and the focus of 
this report both reflect the judgment that 
getting a stolen nuclear weapon or sto-
len nuclear material is the most likely 
pathway for terrorists to get a nuclear 
bomb, and that improving security for 
2 For an excellent discussion of how these character-
istics of risks complicate efforts to control them, and 
approaches that different types of agencies have 
taken to try to address such risks and measure their 
progress in doing so, see Malcolm K. Sparrow, The 
Character of Harms: Operational Challenges in Control 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 
2008).  The three categories of harm Sparrow iden-
tifies as most difficult to control—each of which 
gets its one chapter in the book—are ones where 
there is “a brain behind the harm” (an intelligent 
adversary); “invisible harms” (ones that take place 
in secret); and “catastrophic harms.”  Nuclear theft 
and terrorism combine all three characteristics.  
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nuclear weapons and materials is the most 
promising policy tool for blocking that 
pathway.  Hence, the measures discussed 
below relate primarily to progress in im-
proving security for nuclear weapons and 
materials.  Even there, it is difficult to de-
velop metrics or indicators that provide a 
real reflection of progress.
Ideally, one would like to measure how 
much the risk of nuclear theft has been 
reduced—overall, and at particular loca-
tions.  But by its nature, the probability 
that terrorists or thieves will success-
fully steal nuclear material or a nuclear 
weapon from a particular location is ex-
traordinarily difficult to assess. Both the 
defenders and the adversaries maintain 
considerable secrecy about their capa-
bilities, and are continuously adapting 
and evolving, which makes assessing the 
likelihood that the adversaries could over-
come the defenders a major challenge.
As a result, there is no single, definitive 
answer to questions such as: How many 
sites would have to have their security up-
graded to achieve the four-year objective?  
How extensive would the needed up-
grades be?  How much would upgrading 
these sites cost?  It is always possible to 
invest more in security or to invest less—
there is no well-defined endpoint that 
can be considered “enough”—and in any 
case, security is an ever-evolving process, 
in which improvements made one year 
may erode by the next, or new policies 
and approaches may be instituted. Hence 
the answers to such questions depend 
on how secure the relevant facilities and 
transports already are, how secure the 
effort should seek to make them be, how 
capable adversaries are in different coun-
tries, and how those adversary capabilities 
will evolve over time.
Moreover, many of the most important 
elements of nuclear security—whether the 
staff take security seriously and are con-
stantly on the watch for anything unusual 
that might indicate a problem, whether 
there are problems of insider corruption 
and theft, how well-trained and well-mo-
tivated the guard force is—cannot readily 
be encapsulated in a single measure.  
As Albert Einstein is reported to have 
said, “not everything that counts can be 
counted, and not everything that can be 
counted, counts.”  Though there is good 
reason to believe that installing major 
improvements in security and accounting 
equipment will reduce the risk of nuclear 
theft, it is difficult to assess how much that 
risk has been reduced by any particular 
improvement.
In addition, nuclear security cooperation 
programs may have important intangible 
benefits—such as promoting dialogue and 
exchange of ideas between U.S. and for-
eign nuclear security experts, improving 
transparency and building confidence that 
nuclear security is being managed appro-
priately, exchanging best practices, and 
the like—which should also be considered 
in assessing the value of these programs.  
As one expert put it: “Gary Powers 
was shot down trying to spy on Chely-
abinsk-70.  Today we can walk in the front 
door of Chelyabinsk-70.”3  Congress has 
recognized the need for metrics that go 
beyond simply counting how many mis-
siles have been dismantled, and asked the 
National Academy of Sciences to help the 
Department of Defense develop improved 
measures of progress for these efforts.4
Nevertheless, despite these many diffi-
culties, it is essential to develop the best 
measures one can to assess the progress of 
the four-year nuclear security effort.  The 
U.S. government and the governments of 
other major countries, drawing on a range 
3 Ken Luongo, presentation, Managing the Atom 
seminar, 9 February 2010.  Chelyabinsk-70 is a 
closed Russian nuclear city, now known as Sne-
zhinsk, that housed one of Russia’s two principal 
nuclear weapons design laboratories.
4 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010, Public Law 111-84, Section 1304.
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of classified and unclassified information, 
can in principle track measures that are 
more reflective of the complex reality than 
is possible with the limited unclassified 
information available with the resources 
of a single researcher.  This chapter 
describes both measures the U.S. govern-
ment should use to track the progress of 
these efforts, and measures used in this 
report.
 Three general classes of measures are 
typically used to assess programs:
Input measures•	  assess the level of effort 
being devoted to a problem, including 
such items as budgets devoted to re-
solving it, people assigned to the task, 
level of leadership applied, and so on.  
In themselves, they do not offer infor-
mation on how much progress is being 
made.
Output measures •	 assess the level of 
activity generated by the inputs—for 
example, the number of patrols a police 
force provides in a given area, or the 
number of arrests they make.
Outcome measures •	 seek to assess the 
actual reduction in the problem being 
targeted, seeking to measure, for ex-
ample, reductions in crime rates rather 
than numbers of arrests.
The kinds of performance measures that 
U.S.-sponsored programs such as the In-
ternational Nuclear Materials Protection 
and Cooperation (INMPC) program and 
the Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
(GTRI) rely on today—so many reac-
tors converted, so many kilograms of 
HEU removed, so many buildings with 
upgraded nuclear security equipment 
installed—are primarily output measures.  
But they are intended to offer at least a 
general idea about changes in the actual 
outcome (that is, reductions in the risk of 
theft)—if the number of buildings where 
modern nuclear security equipment has 
been installed grows, then presumably the 
likelihood of nuclear theft shrinks, and in 
cases where the weapons-usable nuclear 
material has been entirely removed, we 
have a real and lasting outcome measure, 
for then the risk of nuclear theft from that 
location has been reduced to zero, in a 
permanent way.
Input Measures
The key input measures used in this re-
port include:
Budget. •	 Are the funds allocated suffi-
cient to carry out the needed tasks?
Personnel.•	  Has the U.S. government 
assigned enough of the right people, 
particularly in key leadership posts, to 
get the needed jobs done?
Leadership and planning.•	   Have top-level 
leaders been willing to invest their 
time and political capital to move this 
agenda forward, and laid out cohesive 
plans for doing so?
In general, these input measures should 
be compared less to whatever went be-
fore than to what is likely to be needed 
to reach the designated goals.  A budget 
cut for a nuclear security program might 
mean the program was not getting enough 
money, or it might mean that program 
had largely accomplished its mission and 
was winding down.
Other potentially important indicators 
might include the number of countries 
that contribute to cooperative nuclear 
security efforts, such as the International 
Atomic Energy Agency’s Office of Nuclear 
Security or nuclear security improvement 
programs sponsored as part of the Global 
Partnership Against the Spread of Weap-
ons and Materials of Mass Destruction, 
or the scale of these contributions.  These 
contributions are both inputs to the effort 
to improve nuclear security, and indica-
tions of national commitments to the 
effort—one potential outcome of efforts to 
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convince policymakers around the world 
that urgent action to improve nuclear se-
curity is required.5 
Output Measures
Output measures are useful for informing 
broader assessments of real reductions in 
risk, but they provide limited informa-
tion in and of themselves, and should not 
be relied on too heavily.  This report uses 
information from the U.S. government on 
measures such as:
The fraction of the buildings with •	
weapons-usable material, or sites with 
nuclear weapons, in Russia and the 
other Eurasian states where U.S. pro-
grams have funded a completed set 
of security and accounting equipment 
upgrades and associated training.
The fraction of the world’s HEU-fueled •	
research reactors that have shut down 
or converted to low-enriched uranium 
(LEU) fuel that cannot be used in a 
nuclear bomb.
The quantity of HEU and plutonium •	
(in kilograms) removed from research 
reactors and related sites around the 
world and shipped back to the coun-
try of origin for secure storage and 
disposition.
OutcOMe Measures
The best single measure of progress 
would be the fraction of buildings or trans-
port routes judged to be high or medium risk 
at the outset that are low or zero risk at the 
time of assessment.6  This would be an 
5 In some cases, however, small contributions to 
these efforts may be an easy way for countries to 
appear to be contributing to nuclear security, while 
avoiding more difficult and important steps such as 
expensive improvements to their own nuclear secu-
rity arrangements.
6 This indicator and the others in this report are fo-
cused on fixed sites such as buildings; they should 
indicator, in essence, of the fraction of the 
total job of getting all facilities and trans-
ports to a low-risk state that had been 
accomplished.  While the U.S. government 
may be able to track this metric—with 
some considerable uncertainties in the 
risk judgments—there is simply not suf-
ficient publicly available data for public 
reports like this one to offer accurate as-
sessments of this metric.  As noted above 
in the previous chapter, “low” risk might 
be achieved through security upgrades or 
a combination of security upgrades and 
steps to reduce likely adversary capabili-
ties.
Some potential related indicators, each of 
which may be easier to measure, include:
The fraction of sites where all weapons-us-•	
able nuclear material has been eliminated.  
Eliminating all the HEU from a re-
search reactor site, for example, is the 
only way to reduce the risk of nuclear 
theft at that site to zero.  Converting the 
reactor to LEU would be only one step 
toward that HEU-removal objective.
The fraction of sites and transport routes •	
with nuclear security and accounting sys-
tems	that	are	performing	effectively. This 
would attempt to assess the fraction 
of the buildings containing warheads 
or nuclear material that had demon-
strated, in realistic performance tests, 
the ability to defend against a speci-
fied threat.  Unfortunately, for nuclear 
warheads and materials in the former 
Soviet Union, such data do not yet ex-
ist (and even less information of this 
kind is available for nuclear stockpiles 
in much of the rest of the world).  One 
element of the four-year effort may be 
focused on attempting to get states to 
exchange more data on nuclear security 
that would help in making these kinds 
of judgments (see discussion below).
be adapted to include transport routes as well.
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The fraction of buildings with nuclear •	
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear 
materials that exist in countries whose 
governments give high priority to nuclear 
security and accounting.  This could be 
assessed on the basis of senior leader-
ship attention and resources assigned 
to the effort, along with statements of 
priority, decisions to step up nuclear 
security requirements, and the like.  
(This would be one measure of how 
much progress was being made in the 
“hearts and minds” campaign to con-
vince countries that nuclear theft and 
terrorism are real threats requiring ur-
gent action.)
The fraction of buildings with nuclear •	
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear mate-
rials that exist in countries with stringent 
and	effectively	enforced	nuclear	security	
and accounting regulations.  Since most 
nuclear managers will only invest in 
expensive security measures if the 
government tells them they have to, 
effective regulation is essential to effec-
tive and lasting nuclear security.  The 
effectiveness of regulation of nuclear 
security and accounting could be 
judged by whether rules have been set 
which, if they were followed, would 
result in effective nuclear security and 
accounting programs, and whether 
approaches have been developed and 
implemented that successfully con-
vince facilities to abide by the rules 
to a degree sufficient to achieve that 
objective.  Such an assessment would 
have to rely on expert judgment, rather 
than simply counting a specific number 
of regulations written, enforcement 
actions taken, and the like, as such 
measures of the quantity of regulatory 
action are usually almost unrelated to 
the actual effectiveness of regulation.
The fraction of buildings with nuclear •	
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear ma-
terials that exist at sites with long-term 
plans in place for sustaining their nuclear 
security and accounting systems, and re-
sources	budgeted	to	fulfill	those	plans.  The 
National Nuclear Security Administra-
tion (NNSA) has been contracting with 
facilities to develop cost estimates and 
plans for maintaining and operating 
their nuclear security and accounting 
systems. This metric would assess the 
fraction of sites that have completed 
such an estimate, and which appear 
to have a realistic plan for funding 
those costs once international assis-
tance comes to an end.  A simple metric 
along the same lines would be the total 
amount of money a particular country 
(or facility) is investing in nuclear se-
curity and accounting, compared with 
an assessment of overall needs.  Similar 
estimates could be made for personnel 
resources as well as financial resources. 
For both money and personnel, how-
ever, such data is often unavailable.
The fraction of buildings with nuclear •	
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear 
materials that exist at sites with strong 
“security cultures.”  Effective orga-
nizational cultures are notoriously 
difficult to assess, but critically impor-
tant.  Ideally, nuclear security culture 
should be measured by actual day-in, 
day-out behavior—but developing 
effective indicators of day-to-day secu-
rity performance has proven difficult.  
Potential measures of attitudes that pre-
sumably influence behavior include the 
fraction of security-critical personnel 
who believe there is a genuine threat of 
nuclear theft (both by outsiders and by 
insiders), the fraction who understand 
well what they have to do to achieve 
high levels of security, the fraction 
who believe that it is important that 
they and everyone else at their site act 
to achieve high levels of security, the 
fraction who understand the security 
rules well, and the fraction who believe 
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nuclear securIty: HOw wOuld we KnOw?
A key question for any effort to assess progress in improving nuclear security is: how would the world 
know how effective security for any particular site or transport route is, when the specific security 
measures in place are secret? If states make nuclear security commitments, at the nuclear security 
summit or other bilateral or multilateral fora, how can other participants confirm that those commit-
ments are being fulfilled?  How can states balance building the necessary international confidence in 
their nuclear security arrangements with maintaining the needed secrecy surrounding those arrange-
ments?
There are several means to address these problems that should be considered.  Most important, inter-
national nuclear security peer reviews can provide an in-depth look at nuclear security arrangements, 
and many states already routinely accept such international reviews.  Under U.S. law, the U.S. gov-
ernment is required to carry out expert visits to countries that have received U.S. nuclear materials 
and key U.S. nuclear technologies to ensure that these recipients are providing adequate security for 
these U.S.-origin materials.  These visits have been taking place since the mid-1970s, and give the 
U.S. government a reasonable overview of the nuclear security arrangements in dozens of countries.  
Similarly, by early 2010, some 46 countries had voluntarily hosted IAEA-led International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) reviews of their physical protection arrangements, including 
some 16 states that possess HEU or plutonium separated from fission products.  Finally, when the 
United States or another donor state finances nuclear security improvements somewhere, they usually 
end up with a good understanding of nuclear security practices in that country, though this varies 
with the specifics of the cooperation.  For example, in Russia, U.S. experts typically visit a particular 
building or bunker multiple times during the course of the upgrades process, and get a sense for what
security equipment is in place, what access procedures are followed, and the like.  But even in that 
case, there are many aspects of an effective security system that the United States knows little about—
from internal monitoring of personnel for signs of unusual behavior to the real performance of guard 
forces in the event of an attack to day-to-day implementation of security procedures when no visitors 
are around.  As upgrades are completed and U.S. personnel visit less frequently (or not at all, in some 
cases), U.S. knowledge of the continuing security situation declines. Pakistani officials, by contrast, 
have publicly said that U.S.-Pakistani nuclear security cooperation has not involved any U.S. access 
to nuclear weapon or sites or the most important nuclear material facilities, leaving U.S. experts with 
much more limited knowledge of the real state of nuclear security.
it is important to follow the security 
rules.  Such attitudes could be assessed 
through surveys, as is often done to 
assess safety culture—though enor-
mous care has to be taken in designing 
the specifics of the approach, to avoid 
employees simply saying what they 
think they are supposed to say.7  NNSA 
7 For a brief discussion of such safety culture sur-
veys, see International Atomic Energy Agency, 
and Rosatom have jointly developed a 
methodology for assessing security cul-
ture that has been applied at two U.S. 
and two Russian facilities on a pilot 
basis, but little information is publicly 
Safety Culture in Nuclear Installations: Guidance for 
Use in the Enhancement of Safety Culture, IAEA-TEC-
DOC-1329 (Vienna: IAEA, 2002), http://www-pub.
iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1329_web.pdf 
(accessed 9 February 2010).
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nuclear securIty: HOw wOuld we KnOw? (cOnt)
A variety of other, less intrusive measures could also contribute to international confidence in nuclear 
security.  Public statements outlining a country’s nuclear security requirements, improvements being 
made, and the like can be very useful.  States may also choose to exchange information privately that 
they would not wish to see provided to other states or the general public.  (Russia, for example, has 
confidentiality agreements with the United States and other countries it is cooperating with.) These 
private exchanges concerning the state of nuclear security can be helpful in building international 
confidence.  States may also choose to share information about how they assess the performance of 
their nuclear security systems—so that other states will know that rigorous assessments are being per-
formed, and to share best practices in conducting such assessments with others—and even to reveal 
certain information about the results of those assessments.
The kind of information about national physical protection and accounting rules and procedures 
that is already routinely discussed at international conferences could be systematized into a common 
format asking common questions, to make comparison easier.  Nations could publish much of their 
physical protection and MC&A regulations and procedures (excluding only a small number of ele-
ments they considered might be helpful to potential adversaries seeking to overcome them).  Nations 
could exchange information on what kind of performance tests and other measures they take to assess 
security at their own nuclear sites, and then exchange data on what fraction of their sites have scored 
well on such national assessments.  (In the United States, for example, NNSA sets targets every year 
for the fraction of its facilities that it hopes will receive high marks in nuclear security inspections, 
and then publishes the actual percentages, without compromising any information on weaknesses 
that may have been found at particular sites.)1  Diplomatic efforts at the nuclear security summit and 
afterward should include gaining as wide agreement as possible on such mechanisms for building 
confidence that nuclear security commitments are being fulfilled.
In the end, nuclear security judgments will have to be made on the basis of analysis of all the sources 
of information available, including results of international reviews and cooperative programs, pub-
lished statements and regulations, satellite photography, and more.
1 See, for example, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, “Detailed Information on the National Nuclear Security Ad-
ministration: Safeguards and Security Assessment” (Washington, D.C.: OMB, 9 January 2009), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10000126.2004.html (accessed 10 February 2009).
available about this tool, or the results 
of these initial assessments.8
The fraction of buildings with nuclear •	
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear ma-
terials	that	exist	at	sites	with	an	effective	
infrastructure of personnel, equipment, 
organizations, and incentives to sustain 
MPC&A.  Each of these areas would 
8 Interview with DOE laboratory expert, February 
2008.
likely have to be addressed by expert 
reviews, given the difficulty of quanti-
fication. 
NNSA’s MPC&A program is now putting 
a substantial focus on progress toward 
strong security cultures and long-term 
sustainability.  But there is still more to be 
done to develop performance measures 
that adequately reflect the real state of 
progress, but are simple enough to be use-
ful to policymakers.

6 Progress so Far in the  Four-Year nuclear securitY eFFort
As described in earlier chapters, nuclear 
security efforts since 1992 have made 
major progress in improving security 
for many nuclear stockpiles around the 
world.  The new four-year effort to ensure 
effective security for nuclear weapons 
and the materials needed to make them 
around the world announced by President 
Barack Obama in April 2009 is now under 
way.  But after less than one year, it is too 
soon to judge the outcomes of that effort.  
The best way to assess the effort so far is 
to examine the inputs, the level of effort 
devoted to the problem, in three key cat-
egories: leadership and planning; funding; 
and personnel.
Leadership and pLanning
The Obama administration deserves 
high marks for leadership on security for 
global nuclear stockpiles.  In his Prague 
speech in April 2009, President Obama 
for the first time set a specific objective 
of securing all vulnerable nuclear mate-
rial worldwide within four years, making 
preventing nuclear terrorism a key plank 
of his nuclear policy.  He also announced 
that he would host a summit meeting 
of world leaders focused specifically on 
nuclear security.  While in the past, this 
subject had often been handled by deputy 
office directors in foreign ministries or 
nuclear ministries, now presidents, prime 
ministers, and their staffs would be forced 
to engage, potentially making many deci-
sions possible that had not been possible 
before.
In September of 2009, President Obama 
personally chaired a meeting of the UN 
Security Council with all the leaders of 
the other Security Council states, and fo-
cused it entirely on preventing the spread 
of nuclear weapons.  This resulted in UN 
Security Council Resolution 1887, which 
transformed the four-year objective from 
an American hope to a unanimously en-
dorsed objective of the Security Council.
Meanwhile, the individual programs 
focused on improving nuclear security 
prepared analyses of what they hoped 
they could accomplish over four years, 
and what resources accomplishing those 
goals might require.1  Rather than simply 
adding those individual program plans 
together, the National Security Council 
staff led an intensive review process, do-
ing country-by-country “deep dives” to 
explore what specific steps needed to be 
taken and how they might best be ac-
complished.2  As befits an effort to ensure 
effective security for all nuclear mate-
rial worldwide, this planning went well 
beyond the traditional threat-reduction 
focus on Russia and the former Soviet 
Union, considering a variety of other 
countries around the world as well.  By 
September of 2009, the administration had 
settled on an overall strategic plan for the 
four-year nuclear security effort, grouping 
different nuclear stockpiles by the level of 
priority the United States would assign to 
eliminating them or improving their secu-
rity.3
Some gaps in this effort appear to have 
remained, however.  As has been the case 
in previous administrations, nearly all of 
the attention ended up focused on devel-
oping and transition countries, reflecting 
1 Interviews with National Nuclear Security Admin-
istration officials, May, July, and September 2009.  
2 Interviews with National Security Council offi-
cials, July and September 2009.
3 Interview with National Security Council official, 
January 2010.
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an implicit assumption that wealthy coun-
tries pose lower risks.  Most of the effort 
to convince wealthy countries to upgrade 
security for their stocks remained in the 
hands of a single deputy undersecretary 
with limited staff at the Department of 
Energy (DOE).  As described in earlier 
chapters, while it is probably true that 
wealthy countries pose lower overall risks 
of theft than some other countries, ac-
tion will be needed in wealthy countries 
as well – including in the United States 
– if the goal of effective security for all 
stocks of weapons-usable nuclear material 
worldwide is to be achieved.
Funding
With respect to funding for this four-year 
effort, the Obama administration got off 
to an unimpressive start in 2009, but has 
then requested a substantial funding in-
crease in the budget submitted in early 
2010.  While much of the effort to secure 
nuclear stockpiles around the world will 
be based on convincing countries to do 
more for security of their own materi-
als, rather than on new efforts paid for 
entirely by the United States, it is never-
theless clear that achieving the four-year 
objective will require U.S.-funded pro-
grams to do more, faster, and that this will 
require additional funding.
Inaction in FY 2010  
In late 2008 and again in 2009, past reports 
in this series recommended that Congress 
appropriate an additional $500 million 
for nuclear security efforts, to allow the 
Obama administration to hit the ground 
running with an expanded and acceler-
ated set of nuclear security programs.4  
4 See, Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008 (Cam-
bridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on 
Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2008), pp. 
178-179, and Andrew Newman and Matthew Bunn, 
“Funding for U.S. Efforts to Improve Controls for 
Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise Over-
But the Obama administration made no 
effort to secure additional nuclear security 
funding for fiscal year (FY) 2010.
   Although then-Senator Obama had ar-
ticulated the four-year nuclear security 
objective during the campaign, the Prague 
speech did not come until well after the 
administration’s first budget request was 
submitted to Congress; hence, that re-
quest included no additional funding for 
nuclear security in FY2010.  The adminis-
tration could have made a supplemental 
appropriation request after the formal 
announcement of the four-year objective, 
but they had taken a high-level political 
decision not to distort the normal bud-
get process with repeated supplemental 
requests, and that decision was not over-
ridden in this case.  The administration 
made no supplemental request.
The House Armed Services Committee 
(HASC) observed that expanding and ac-
celerating nuclear security efforts would 
require more money, and added $403 
million for threat reduction programs 
focused on nuclear security in its pro-
posed defense authorization bill.5  The 
administration did nothing to support this 
congressional initiative; it was not even 
mentioned in the statement of adminis-
tration policy on the HASC bill, and the 
administration did not reach out to any 
of the other congressional committees to 
ask them to support the HASC approach.6  
seas: A 2009 Update” (Cambridge, Mass.: Project 
on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 2009).
5 See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 
Committee on Armed Services, “H.R. 2647: FY 2010 
National Defense Authorization Act: Summary” 
(Washington, D.C.: Committee on Armed Services, 
June 2009), http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/
HASCFY10NDAA061709.pdf (accessed 31 March 
2010), p. 12.
6 See Executive Office of the President, Office 
of Management and Budget, “Statement of Ad-
ministration Policy: H.R. 2647, National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010” (Wash-
ington, D.C.: OMB, 24 June 2009), http://www.
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As a result, neither the Senate authorizing 
committee nor the appropriations com-
mittees took similar action, and virtually 
none of the money the HASC proposed 
made it into the final appropriation.
In the end, Congress added $20 million to 
the request for the International Materials 
Protection and Cooperation program, all 
of which Congress directed be applied to 
the Civilian Nuclear Sites element of the 
program (which supports both security 
upgrades at civilian sites in the former 
Soviet Union and nuclear security coop-
eration with China and South Asia), and 
cut $20 million from the Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative (GTRI) program, 
while also requiring GTRI to find an ad-
ditional $20 million from its available 
resources to finance the establishment of 
U.S. medical isotope production not us-
ing HEU.7  Ironically, with a Democratic 
President committed to an expanded and 
accelerated nuclear security effort backed 
by a Democratic Congress, GTRI found 
itself suffering its first-ever budget cut, a 
reduction of over $60 million from the FY 
2009 appropriation.8  Though GTRI can 
whitehouse.gov/omb/asset.aspx?AssetId=1436 (ac-
cessed 15 January 2009).
7 U.S. Congress, Committee on Appropriations, 
Energy and Water Development and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act, 2010: Conference Report 
to Accompany H.R. 3183, House Report 111-278 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2009), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/
R?cp111:FLD010:@1%28hr278%29 (accessed 19 
February 2010), p. 131.
8 Congress appropriated $333.5 million for GTRI, 
compared to a request of $353.5 million and an FY 
2009 appropriation of $395 million. See Committee 
on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development 
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010, p. 131, 
and U.S. Department of Energy, FY2011 Budget Re-
quest: National Nuclear Security Administration, Vol. 
1 (Washington, DC: DOE, February 2010), p. 443.  
While a significant part of the reduction in the re-
quest arose from the fact that GTRI’s efforts to move 
the BN-350 fuel in Kazakhstan were coming to an 
end and no longer required funding, the request 
also reduced funding for HEU reactor conversions, 
for Russian research reactor fuel return, and for 
shift some resources from its efforts to 
secure radiological materials, the reduced 
budget will inevitably limit what GTRI 
can do to accelerate reactor conversions 
and HEU removals.  Since FY 2011 does 
not begin until 1 October 2010, a year and 
a half of the four-year effort announced by 
President Obama in April 2009 will have 
gone by before additional funds to accel-
erate and expand nuclear security efforts 
become available.
Requested Budget Increases  
for FY2011
For FY2011, the Obama administration 
has requested a substantial increase in 
funding for nuclear security, including a 
$225 million (67%) increase for the Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and 
a new $74.5 million line in the Coopera-
tive Threat Reduction (CTR) program at 
the Department of Defense (DoD) known 
as “Global Nuclear Lockdown.”9  With 
a modest increase for nuclear security 
efforts in the International Nuclear Mate-
rials Protection and Cooperation (INMPC) 
program, better known as materials pro-
tection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) 
and a small decrease in funding for DoD 
nuclear warhead security efforts (which 
are nearing completion), the overall in-
crease for international nuclear security 
efforts is $311 million.  See Table 6.1.  
Coming in a time of substantial budget 
stringency, these increases represent an 
important commitment.
The request for GTRI will finance ex-
panded efforts to remove HEU from sites 
around the world, along with an increase 
in funding for upgrading security for 
HEU-fueled research reactors and radio-
logical materials that could be used in a 
“dirty bomb.”  The “Global Nuclear Lock-
U.S. research reactor fuel return, all of which would 
need additional funds to meet an accelerated sched-
ule. 
9 See sources in Table 6.1.
84 SECURING THE BOMB 2010
down” line will finance efforts to secure 
and eliminate irradiated HEU naval fuel 
in Russia; additional training and sustain-
ability work in Russia; and a new effort to 
establish several regional nuclear security 
“centers of excellence” around the world, 
which would provide training, host work-
shops and exchanges of best practices, 
and demonstrate modern security and 
accounting equipment.10
There is bad news in this budget also.  
It is clear that the MPC&A effort is not 
currently planning on expanding to ad-
ditional countries, despite the goal of 
securing all nuclear material worldwide in 
four years.  Programs at the State Depart-
ment are largely maintained at a steady 
level (though there is an increase for 
the Nonproliferation and Disarmament 
Fund, a contingency fund that can be 
used for a wide range of nonproliferation 
purposes).11  The funding GTRI envisions 
for securing nuclear and radiological 
materials around the world is far higher 
after the four-year plan than it is during 
the four-year plan; some of those funds 
should be made available sooner than 
currently planned, to achieve as much 
progress on nuclear security as possible 
during the four-year effort President 
Obama envisioned.  Moreover, NNSA re-
portedly originally sought an even larger 
increase for its nonproliferation programs, 
to $3.04 billion, but the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) trimmed this 
10 U.S. Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year 2011 
Budget Estimate: Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program” (Washington, D.C.: DOD, February 2010), 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/
budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_
Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/CTR_FY11.pdf 
(accessed 31 March 2010).
11 U.S. Department of State, “Executive Budget 
Summary: Function 150 and Other International 
Programs: Fiscal Year 2011” (Washington, D.C.: 
DOS, February 2010), http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/135888.pdf (accessed 31 March 
2010).
figure by some $350 million, reducing the 
proposed increase by nearly 40%.12
The Obama administration’s FY2011 
request would also boost funding for bio-
logical threat reduction programs, and 
would restart funding for supporting 
disposition of excess plutonium in Russia.  
Under the newly negotiated protocol to 
the 2000 Plutonium Management and Dis-
position Agreement (PMDA), the United 
States would provide up to $400 million 
over 30-35 years, subject to the availability 
of appropriated funds, to support Russian 
use of its excess weapons plutonium as 
fuel for its fast-neutron reactors, and the 
FY 2011 budget includes the first $113 mil-
lion of this total.13
As Figure 6.1 makes clear, the combina-
tion of nuclear security investments and 
all other threat reduction spending remain 
a tiny fraction of the budgets of the de-
partments that carry out these programs.  
Even in times of budget stringency, the 
U.S. government could easily afford sub-
stantial increases in these programs if 
needed.  The message is simple: nuclear 
security is affordable.   The Obama ad-
ministration and the Congress should 
act to ensure that lack of funds is never a 
constraint on how rapidly action to reduce 
the risk of nuclear terrorism moves for-
ward.  
 
 
 
12 Todd Jacobson, “NNSA Set for Big Increase in 
FY2011 Budget Request,” Nuclear Weapons and Ma-
terials Monitor, 18 January 2010.  According to this 
report, NNSA’s weapons programs fared better, 
with OMB only reducing an original $7.09 billion 
proposal – more than twice the nonproliferation 
budget – to $7.01 billion in the final budget, a cut in 
the range of $80 million.  In other words, weapons 
programs suffered a cut from NNSA’s proposal 
roughly one-quarter as large, from a budget 
roughly twice as big.
13 DOE, FY2011 Budget Request: National Nuclear 
Security Administration, p. 435.
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Goal/Program  
Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials
Material Protection, Control, & Accounting (excl. SLD)
Nuclear Weapons Storage Security - Russia
Global Threat Reduction Initiative
Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security - Russia
International Nuclear Security
Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling
Second Line of Defense (part of MPC&A budget line)
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
WMD Proliferation Prevention
International Counterproliferation
Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear Personnel
Global Threat Reduction Program 
Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
Civilian Research and Development Foundation 
Monitoring Stockpiles and Reductions
HEU Transparency Implementation
Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency
Ending Further Production
Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production
Reducing Excess Stockpiles
Russian Plutonium Disposition 
Energy
Defense
Energy
Defense
Energy
Energy
State
Defense
Defense
State
Energy
State
Energy
Energy
Energy
Energy
1,315
756
280
16
395
59
6
300
175
46
69
10
81
62
15
4
33
17
16
141
141
1
1
FY09 
Approp.
 
Total, Improving Controls on Nuclear 
Weapons, Material, and Expertise
2
3
1,290
707
300
22
334
46
6
425
272
54
84
14
94
70
20
4
36
18
18
25
25
1
1
FY10 
Approp.
394*
+311
+25
-12
+225
-1
0
-4
-7
+8
-4
0
0
+2
-1
0
-1
0
-1
-25
-25
+112
+112
31%
+44%
+8%
-56%
+68%
-2%
  -7%
-1%
-3%
+14%
-5%
0%
0%
+3%
-7%
0%
-4%
0%
-7%
-100%
-100%
Change from 
FY10 Approp.
 
1,684
1,018
325
10
559
45
5
421
265
62
80
14
94
72
18
4
34
18
17
0
0
113
113
FY11 
Request
11,200%
11,200%
Notes
Source: "Interactive Budget Database," in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing 
the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2010; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/funding.asp as of 4 February 2010), 
updated by Andrew Newman, February 2010.
Except where noted, gures are taken from the following budget documents: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fiscal Year 2011 Budget 
Estimate, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Washington, D.C.: DOD, February 2010); U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2011 Congressional Budget Request: National 
Nuclear Security Administration, vol. 1, DOE/CF-0047 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, February 2010); U.S. Department of State, Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 & Other 
International Programs – Fiscal Year 2011 (Washington, D.C.: DOS, February 2010).
Values may not add due to rounding.
*   All gures in this column represent the dierence between the FY2010 Appropriation and the FY2011 request, in current dollars, in millions.
** New program proposed for FY2011
1.  The scal year 2009 total includes a $55 million supplemental appropriation requested by the President in April and passed by the House and Senate in May 2009.
2.  U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense), p.501.  
3.  FY2009 and FY2010 funding is estimated based on Michelle Marchesano and J. Raphael Della Ratta with contributions from Kenneth N. Luongo, Funding Analysis of 
the Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request for International WMD Security Programs, Partnership for Global Security Policy Update, May 2009 and interview with CRDF ocial, 
May 2008.  The FY2011 gure is an estimate based on FY2009 and FY2010 appropriations.  The gures here include only funds provided to CRDF for its own programs, 
not funds from other programs listed here which use CRDF as a facility for spending money on their programs.
Figure 6.1.  U.S. Appropriations to Improve Controls on Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise
(Current Dollars, in Millions)
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The nucLear securiTy summiT
On April 12-13, 2010, President Obama will host a global summit meeting intended, in his words, 
“to discuss steps we can take to secure loose nuclear materials; combat smuggling; and deter, detect, 
and disrupt attempts at nuclear terrorism.”1
Leaders from over 40 countries are expected to attend the nuclear security summit, including all of the 
countries that possess significant stocks of HEU or separated plutonium (except those with whom the 
United States currently has poor relations, including North Korea, Iran, and Belarus). 
The Obama administration expects three main products from the nuclear security summit.  First, they 
hope for a joint communiqué “pledging efforts to attain the highest levels of nuclear security.”2  The 
leaders’ communiqué is likely to be phrased in quite general terms, so experts are also working on a 
more detailed “work plan” that would be issued along with the communiqué.  Finally, officials are dis-
cussing individual nuclear security pledges and commitments that countries may make, either publicly 
or privately, on the occasion of the nuclear security summit or in its aftermath.  A series of meetings 
among the “sherpas” helping countries prepare for the summit took place during late 2009 and early 
2010, along with other diplomatic discussions to prepare for the summit.
Beyond the specific commitments made at the summit itself, the summit may have other important 
outcomes.  First, the series of briefings on and discussions about the threat of nuclear theft and terror-
ism in the lead-up to the summit and at the summit itself may help to convince foreign leaders that 
nuclear terrorism is a real threat to their countries’ security, requiring additional action to prevent it 
beyond what their countries’ have done in the past.  As described in the next chapter, making that 
case is essential to overcoming the political and bureaucratic obstacles to securing all nuclear material 
within four years.  Second, the process of preparing for the summit, focusing unprecedented high-level 
political attention on nuclear security, may lead a number of countries to establish new approaches to 
organizing their response to the nuclear terrorism threat (such as appointing a single coordinator able 
to reach across agency lines, or a new interagency group to coordinate these efforts), and to reassess the 
adequacy of their existing nuclear security efforts.  Third, the summit process may also establish new 
channels for diplomatic communication on nuclear security, at higher political levels than the matter 
has typically been handled before.  All of these effects could substantially contribute to accelerating 
and expanding progress in securing nuclear materials worldwide.
1 President Barack Obama, press conference, 10 July 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press-Conference-
by-the-President-in-LAquila-Italy-7-10-09 (accessed 31 March 2010).  See also The White House, “Addressing the Nuclear 
Threat: Fulfilling the Promise of Prague at the L’Aquila Summit,” 8 July 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Addressing-the-Nuclear-Threat-Fulfilling-the-Promise-of-Prague-at-the-LAquila-Summit/ (accessed 31 March 2010).
2 The White House, “Addressing the Nuclear Threat: Fulfilling the Promise of Prague at the L’Aquila Summit.”
personneL
Getting the right people with the right 
expertise and authority working the 
problem is another critical input to 
nuclear security efforts or any other major 
government program.  Here, the Obama 
administration’s record is mixed.
On the positive side, the Obama 
administration filled the Congressionally-
mandated position of White House 
Coordinator for Arms Control and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Proliferation, and Terrorism, which 
the Bush administration had not done.  
President Obama also appointed, for 
the first time, a Senior Director on the 
National Security Council staff with full-
time responsibility for preventing nuclear 
and biological terrorism. 
At the State Department, the Obama 
administration created another new posi-
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The nucLear securiTy summiT (conT)
The nuclear security summit represents a crucial opportunity to move the nuclear security agenda for-
ward.  No similar event is likely to occur for at least another two years – by which time three years of 
the four-year nuclear security effort will already have passed.  To be judged a success, the nuclear secu-
rity summit should result in:
Commitments to improve nuclear security and consolidate nuclear stockpiles that, if fulfilled, •	
would go much of the way toward fulfilling the objective of ensuring effective security for all 
nuclear material within four years, and are specific enough to make it possible to judge whether 
countries are fulfilling their commitments;
A new sense of urgency to take action to reduce the danger of nuclear theft and terrorism among •	
some or all of the key participants;
New channels of communication within and between governments to discuss specific steps to ad-•	
vance nuclear security; and
A process to follow-up on the commitments made and develop new ones as necessary.•	
This last element is particularly crucial, to ensure that the commitments made are fulfilled; there is, 
unfortunately, a long history of commitments at G8 and other summits that are unfulfilled and largely 
forgotten.  The nuclear security initiative launched at the Bratislava summit between U.S. President 
George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin provides a model of what might be done: the 
two Presidents each designated a senior official to be responsible to them for accomplishing the ob-
jectives of the initiative and reporting to them on progress every six months.  Following the summit, 
the two sides worked out a detailed implementation plan for the initiative, and then met regularly 
to assess progress and work through obstacles as they arose.  Of course, that effort involved only 
two countries, and establishing a comparable follow-up mechanism among many countries would 
inevitably be more complex.  But some mechanism for reporting and assessing progress, identifying 
remaining gaps, and developing new commitments as needed is likely to be essential if the nuclear 
security summit is to lead to rapid and lasting progress in nuclear security around the world.3  
3 For a useful summary of what might be required, see Kenneth N. Luongo, “Making the Nuclear Security Summit Matter: 
An Agenda for Action,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_01-02/Luongo 
(accessed 31 March 2010).
tion, an ambassador-level Coordinator 
for Threat Reduction Programs.  At the 
Defense Department, President Obama 
appointed committed advocates of co-
operative threat reduction to head the 
relevant programs.  These are surely posi-
tive steps as well.
But there are also important gaps in the 
Obama administration’s assignments of 
people to handle the problem of nuclear 
security.  Most importantly, a year into 
the new administration, no one has been 
appointed to the post that oversees all 
of the most important nuclear security 
programs, the Deputy Administrator 
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at 
DOE’s National Nuclear Security Admin-
istration (NNSA), leaving that position 
without a political leader identified with 
and able to shape the Adminsitration’s 
nonproliferation goals.  Similarly, at the 
State Department, no one has been ap-
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pointed to be Assistant Secretary for 
Nonproliferation.  The new NSC Senior 
Director was not brought into place until 
some six months into the administration, 
long after most of the rest of the NSC staff 
was in place.  
ouTpuTs and ouTcomes
While it is too soon to judge what the 
outcomes of these efforts will be – and in 
particular, the nuclear security summit 
may lead to new progress in a variety of 
areas – it is worth reviewing a few of the 
nuclear security achievements and disap-
pointments of the Obama administration’s 
first year. 
The Obama administration has made a 
major effort to “reset” relations with Rus-
sia in particular.  While there have been 
some notable improvements, U.S.-Russian 
relations are still difficult.  And although 
threat reduction cooperation continues 
apace, no significant breakthroughs with 
Russia have been achieved.  While the 
agencies charged with actually managing 
nuclear weapons and materials remain 
eager to cooperate, the political elements 
of the Russian government have often 
not been eager to move forward.  These 
political officials have taken the view that 
Russia is no longer on its knees and new 
agreements should not be framed in terms 
of U.S. assistance, but at the same time 
have resisted providing Russian financing 
for cooperative efforts, making it difficult 
to reach agreement on expanded coopera-
tion.  Obama administration officials had 
hoped that at the Obama-Medvedev sum-
mit in July, they would launch a successor 
to the highly successful nuclear security 
initiative begun by U.S. President George 
W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir 
Putin at their Bratislava summit in 2005, 
but no such agreement was reached.  Nor 
was an expected accord on cooperation on 
consolidating and blending down HEU, 
or a protocol that would have allowed the 
2000 Plutonium Management and Dis-
position Agreement to come into force. 
As of early 2010, these accords had not 
yet been signed, though the government 
was reporting that negotiations on the 
plutonium disposition protocol had been 
completed.14  But Russia has continued to 
support the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism and the nuclear secu-
rity summit; indeed, it appears that Russia 
will host a follow-up summit perhaps two 
years after the 2010 nuclear security sum-
mit.15
The Obama administration has held 
extensive discussions with Pakistan 
concerning Pakistan’s nuclear security 
arrangements and possibilities for ad-
ditional cooperation to strengthen them.  
The results of these discussions, whether 
positive or negative, remain classified.
Progress has continued in the U.S. nuclear 
security dialogue with China, but in late 
2009 China again rejected extending that 
dialogue to explicitly include the military 
agencies that manage most of China’s 
fissile materials.16  As of early 2010, India 
had not agreed to cooperate on nuclear 
security and accounting, though both 
India and China will be taking part in 
the nuclear security summit.  There is no 
evidence that nuclear security was a major 
focus of President Obama’s 2009 trip to 
China or Indian Prime Minister Manmo-
han Singh’s state visit to the United States.
South Africa, by contrast, having already 
converted its Safari-I research reactor to 
use low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel 
14 See U.S. Department of Energy, Department of En-
ergy FY2011 Budget Request: National Nuclear Security 
Administration,  Vol. 1., DOE/CF-0047, p. 394
15 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
“Press Conference by President Obama and Presi-
dent Medvedev of Russia,” The Kremlin, Moscow, 
Russia, 6 July 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/press-conference-president-obama-
and-president-medvedev-russia (accessed 31 March 
2010).
16 Interview with NNSA officials, January 2010.
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rather than HEU, announced in mid-2009 
that it would also phase out the use of 
HEU targets for producing medical iso-
topes.17  South Africa also privately agreed 
to cooperate on security upgrades for the 
Pelindaba site, to prevent a recurrence of 
the 2007 break-in. Both of these are poten-
tially major breakthroughs.
Progress in nuclear security upgrades and 
consolidation efforts has also continued 
during the Obama administration.  Most 
strikingly, perhaps, by early 2010, four 
countries had eliminated all weapons-
usable nuclear material on their soil since 
President Obama’s April 2009 speech, 
including Romania, Taiwan, Libya, and 
17 Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa 
(NECSA), “Nuclear Reactor Uses Only Low-
Enriched Uranium (LEU) for the First Time” 
(Pelindaba: NECSA, 29 June 2009), http://www.
necsa.co.za/Portals/1/Documents/322e00a9-02e8-
4522-8e29-947ef896d6e5.doc (accessed 31 March 
2010).
Turkey.18  Post-Bratislava upgrades and 
work on sustainability, regulation, se-
curity culture, and the exchange of best 
practices continue in Russia.  Cooperation 
continued in Pakistan and China as well, 
though specifics with respect to Pakistan 
are classified.
Achieving the objective of effective 
security for all HEU and plutonium 
worldwide within four years will require 
a substantial acceleration of current prog-
ress – but such an acceleration, of course, 
is precisely what the nuclear security 
summit and other ongoing discussions are 
intended to achieve.
18 Data provided by NNSA, January 2009.  NNSA 
completed the removal of the HEU from Turkey in 
January 2010.  See National Nuclear Security Ad-
ministration, “NNSA Announces Highly Enriched 
Uranium Removed from Turkey,” 12 January 2010 
http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/news/2785.htm (ac-
cessed 31 March 2010).

7 Next StepS to Secure Nuclear StockpileS
Programs to improve nuclear security 
have made enormous progress since 
the early-to-mid 1990s, making a major 
contribution to the security of the world.  
But real risks—and difficult obstacles to 
progress—remain.  The pace of improve-
ment in nuclear security today is simply 
not sufficient to secure all nuclear material 
worldwide in four years—the world is not 
yet on the track to succeed in meeting the 
four-year nuclear security objective.  The 
Obama administration is well aware of 
that mismatch: the purpose of the nuclear 
security summit and the follow-up to it 
is to shift these efforts onto the faster and 
broader trajectory that would be needed to 
achieve the four-year goal.  This situation 
is illustrated conceptually in Figure 7.1.
At the nuclear security summit and be-
yond, President Obama, working with 
other world leaders, must forge a global 
campaign to lock down every nuclear 
weapon and every significant stock of po-
tential nuclear bomb material worldwide, 
as rapidly as that can possibly be done—
and to take other key steps to reduce the 
risk of nuclear terrorism.  If, as President 
Obama has emphasized, nuclear terror-
ism is the most urgent threat to global 
security, then this effort must be at the 
center of U.S. national security policy and 
diplomacy—an issue to be raised with 
every country with stockpiles to secure or 
resources to help, at every level, at every 
opportunity, until the job is done.
2010: A CritiCAl YeAr
The year 2010 is absolutely critical if the 
four-year nuclear security effort is to suc-
ceed.  Only if a substantial acceleration of 
nuclear security improvements around the 
world can be achieved by the end of the 
year—by which time the four-year effort 
will be nearly half over—can the world 
avoid having the four-year target slip out 
of reach.
Fortunately, this year will see several op-
portunities for high-level international 
leadership to accelerate and expand the 
nuclear security effort.  First, and most 
important, is the nuclear security sum-
mit in April.  If that summit succeeds, the 
leaders who participate will come away 
with a new understanding of the threat 
of nuclear theft and terrorism and a new 
sense of urgency to take action to address 
it, along with new sets of commitments 
and new mechanisms for cooperating to 
implement them.  The ultimate success of 
the summit will be measured by nuclear 
security improvements on the ground; it 
may take 6-12 months to judge how much 
difference the summit has made.
Second, the nuclear security summit 
will be followed quickly by the five-year 
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
review conference in May.  While that 
conference is not likely to see major new 
commitments on nuclear security, it can 
and should reemphasize the importance 
of additional action to prevent nuclear ter-
rorism as an essential foundation for the 
three pillars of the NPT—nonproliferation, 
disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear 
energy.  Moreover, a successful NPT re-
view could help address political disputes 
between nuclear weapon states and non-
nuclear-weapon states and between North 
and South that could otherwise interfere 
with cooperation to improve nuclear secu-
rity.
Third, the next plenary meeting of the 
Global Initiative (GI) to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism will occur in June.  This creates 
an opportunity to use the GI as a mecha-
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nism for implementing the agenda coming 
out of the nuclear security summit, and to 
lay out a program of efforts designed to 
build the sense of urgency about the threat 
of nuclear theft and terrorism and com-
mitment to action to reduce the threat (see 
discussion below).
Finally, in late June, the G8 and G20 sum-
mits will be held in Canada.  This G8 
meeting, the first in Canada since the 2002 
G8 decision to establish the $20 billion, 
10-year threat reduction effort known as 
the Global Partnership Against the Spread 
of Weapons and Materials of Mass De-
struction, is slated to consider the future of 
that initiative after its currently-scheduled 
completion date of 2012.  The G8 leaders 
should agree to make the Global Partner-
ship a central instrument for providing 
the funding needed to meet the four-year 
nuclear security goal, and for implement-
ing all the other improved controls over 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
and materials around the world mandated 
by UN Security Council Resolution 1540.  
They should firmly put the “global” back 
in the Global Partnership, re-focusing it 
from an effort primarily focused on the 
former Soviet Union to a global effort.  
And they should extend it to last another 
10 years, with a similar level of funding to 
the first ten.1  
President Obama and the other lead-
ers seeking to prevent nuclear terrorism 
1 When the Global Partnership was established in 
2002, the idea was that the United States would 
provide $1 billion per year for 10 years for threat 
reduction, and the other G8 participants would 
match that figure—hence the initiative was some-
times known as “10 plus 10 over 10.”  Since then, 
the United States has increased average annual 
threat reduction spending to much more than $1 
billion, while the non-U.S. participants in total have 
provided significantly less than the $1 billion a year 
originally pledged.  For a follow-on 10 years, the 
non-U.S. participants should provide $500 million 
to $1 billion per year for the full range of coopera-
tive threat reduction efforts in countries around the 
world.
should seek to come out of these events 
with:
Greatly strengthened international • 
understanding of the threat of nuclear 
theft and terrorism, and commitment to 
take action to address it;
Broad international understanding of • 
the baseline of nuclear security today 
and the work that needs to be done to 
accomplish the four-year nuclear secu-
rity objective;
National and multilateral commitments • 
that, once fulfilled, would go a long 
way toward meeting the four-year goal;
Agreement on a substantial funding • 
stream to help states meet those com-
mitments;
Clear decisions by key states as to who • 
in their countries will be in charge of 
overseeing implementation of these 
commitments; and
An established mechanism for fol-• 
lowing up on these commitments, 
reviewing progress, continuing 
dialogue, and expanding cooperation 
where needed.
As described in Chapter 5, the goal must 
be to ensure that all nuclear weapons and 
weapons-usable nuclear material world-
wide are effectively and lastingly secured.  
Terrorists will get the material to make a 
nuclear bomb wherever the combination 
of their strength and the security systems’ 
weakness makes it easiest to steal.  The 
world therefore cannot afford to let gaps 
between different programs leave some 
vulnerable stocks without security up-
grades.
The four-year objective is a very ambitious 
target.2 The many obstacles to success—
2 I originally proposed the four-year objective years 
ago, and always intended it as an ambitious one, 
designed to drive the system to improve nuclear 
security as quickly as possible.  In the more than 
four years since I first proposed a four-year tar-
get, many nuclear security improvements have 
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posed by complacency about the threat, 
political disputes, sovereignty concerns, 
pervasive secrecy, and bureaucratic 
obstacles—will take tremendous effort to 
overcome. (See “Why is This Hard?” p. 
96.)
As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
Obama administration has already taken 
many important steps to strengthen the 
nuclear security effort.  But success in the 
four-year effort is likely to require tak-
been accomplished, making the objective easier to 
achieve; but a variety of political disputes that af-
fect nuclear security cooperation have continued 
to fester, and with increasing time since the 9/11 
attacks, complacency about the threat has returned 
in many quarters, making the objective more dif-
ficult to achieve.  The four-year target first appeared 
in 2002 as an objective to complete upgrades in 
Russia within four years and remove or secure 
the most vulnerable nuclear material elsewhere 
within a “few years.”  See Matthew Bunn, John P. 
Holdren and Anthony Wier, Securing Nuclear Weap-
ons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action 
(Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing the Atom, 
Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
May 2002).
ing the additional steps outlined below.  
(These should be seen as supplements to 
strengthen existing efforts, not substitutes 
for them or reasons to abandon them.)
Build the SenSe of urgenCY And 
Commitment WorldWide
The fundamental key to success in pre-
venting nuclear terrorism is to convince 
political leaders and nuclear managers 
around the world that nuclear terrorism is 
a real and urgent threat to their countries’ 
security, worthy of a substantial invest-
ment of their time and money—something 
many of them do not believe today.  If they 
come to feel that sense of urgency, they 
will be likely to take the needed actions 
to prevent nuclear terrorism; if they re-
main complacent, they will not.  Some of 
the critical work of building this sense of 
urgency is already being done, especially 
in lead-up to the nuclear security summit 
and in the context of the Global Initia-
tive to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.  But 
much more needs to be done, if President 
Figure 7.1: Nuclear Security Improvement Over Time
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Obama’s objective of ensuring effective se-
curity for all vulnerable nuclear weapons 
and weapons-usable materials worldwide 
is to be achieved. There are three layers 
of complacency that must be overcome: 
(1) the belief that terrorists could not 
plausibly make a bomb; (2) the belief that 
nuclear security measures are already 
adequate, so that terrorists could not plau-
sibly get the materials needed for a bomb; 
and (3) the belief that even if terrorists 
could get nuclear material and could make 
a crude bomb, it is the United States’ prob-
lem, not a problem other countries need to 
worry about very much.
President Obama should work with other 
countries to take several steps to overcome 
this complacency and build the needed 
sense of urgency and commitment, includ-
ing: 
Joint threat briefings. • Upcoming sum-
mits and other high-level meetings with 
key countries should include detailed 
briefings for both leaders on the nuclear 
terrorism threat, given jointly by U.S. 
experts and experts from the country 
concerned.  These would outline both 
the very real possibility that terrorists 
could get nuclear material and make a 
nuclear bomb, the global economic and 
political effects of a terrorist nuclear 
attack, and steps that could be taken to 
reduce the risk.  U.S. briefings for U.S. 
and Russian officials highlighting intel-
ligence on continuing nuclear security 
vulnerabilities were a critical part of 
putting together the Bush-Putin Bratis-
lava nuclear security initiative. 
Intelligence-agency discussions. •  In 
many countries, the political leader-
ship gets much of its information 
about national security threats from 
its intelligence agencies.  It is therefore 
extremely important to convince the 
intelligence agencies in key countries 
that nuclear terrorism is a serious and 
urgent threat—and that plausible ac-
tions, taken now, could reduce the risk 
substantially.  During the second Bush 
term, DOE intelligence was actively 
working with foreign intelligence ser-
vices to make this case, and to build 
cooperation against the threat.  This 
effort should be renewed and expanded 
to include focused efforts by the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and other U.S. in-
telligence agencies as well.3
The “Armageddon Test.”  • President 
Obama should direct U.S. intelligence—
possibly working in cooperation 
with agencies in other countries—to 
establish a small operational team 
that would seek to understand and 
penetrate the world of nuclear theft 
and smuggling.  The team would be 
instructed to seek to acquire enough 
nuclear material for a bomb.  If they 
succeeded, this would dramatically 
highlight the continuing threat, and po-
tentially identify particular weak points 
and smuggling organizations requiring 
urgent action.  If they failed, that would 
strongly suggest that terrorist opera-
tives would likely fail as well, building 
confidence that measures to prevent 
nuclear terrorism were working.4 
Nuclear terrorism exercises.  • Building 
on the exercise program that has be-
gun in the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism, the United States 
and other leading countries should or-
ganize a series of exercises with senior 
policymakers from key states.  These 
exercises should have scenarios fo-
cused on theft of nuclear material, the 
realistic possibility that terrorists could 
3 I am grateful to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen for discus-
sions of this approach.
4 This concept was originally developed by Rolf 
Mowatt-Larssen.  Care would have to be taken to 
structure the effort in a way that avoided creating 
perceptions of a market for nuclear material that 
might contribute to additional nuclear thefts.
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construct a crude nuclear bomb if they 
got enough HEU or plutonium, just 
how difficult it would be to stop them 
once they had the material, and how 
much all countries would be affected 
if a terrorist nuclear bomb went off.5  
Participating in such a war game can 
reach officials emotionally in a way that 
briefings and policy memos cannot.  A 
program of such exercises should be-
come a central element of the Global 
Initiative.
Fast-paced nuclear security reviews.  • 
The United States and other leading 
countries should encourage leaders of 
key states to pick teams of security ex-
perts they trust to conduct fast-paced 
reviews of nuclear security in their 
countries, assessing whether facilities 
are adequately protected against a set 
of clearly-defined threats—such as a 
well-placed insider, or two teams of 
well-armed, well-trained attackers.  (In 
the United States, such fast-paced re-
views after major incidents such as 9/11 
have often revealed a wide range of 
vulnerabilities that needed to be fixed.)
Realistic testing of nuclear security • 
performance.  The United States and 
other leading countries should work 
with key states around the world to im-
plement programs to conduct realistic 
tests of nuclear security systems’ ability 
to defeat either insiders or outsiders.  
(Failures in such tests can be powerful 
evidence to senior policymakers that 
nuclear security needs improvement.)
Shared databases of threats and in-• 
cidents. The United States and other 
5 The model would be the “Black Dawn” exercise 
organized by the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies (and sponsored by the Nuclear 
Threat Initiative) for key NATO officials.  For a 
description, see Black Dawn: Scenario-Based Exercise 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, 2004), available at http://www.csis.
org/media/csis/pubs/040503_blackdawn.pdf (ac-
cessed 26 May 2009).
key countries should collaborate to 
create shared databases of unclassi-
fied information on actual security 
incidents (both at nuclear sites and at 
non-nuclear guarded facilities) that of-
fer lessons for policymakers and facility 
managers to consider in deciding on 
nuclear security levels and particular 
threats to defend against. The World 
Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) 
could be a forum for creating one 
version of such a threat-incident data-
base.  In the case of safety, rather than 
security, reactor operators report each 
safety-related incident to groups such 
as the Institute of Nuclear Power Op-
erations (the U.S. branch of the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators), and 
these groups analyze the incidents and 
distribute lessons learned about how 
to prevent similar incidents in the fu-
ture to each member facility—and then 
carry out peer reviews to assess how 
well each facility has implemented the 
lessons learned.6
BroAden ConSolidAtion And 
SeCuritY upgrAde effortS
Today, U.S.-funded cooperative nuclear 
security upgrade efforts are focusing pri-
marily on the former Soviet Union, South 
Asia, and a few HEU-fueled research 
reactors elsewhere.  (Nuclear security 
cooperation with China has so far fo-
cused on dialogue and exchanges of best 
practices, not on U.S.-funded upgrades.)  
U.S.-funded consolidation programs focus 
primarily on converting HEU-fueled reac-
tors and removing Soviet-supplied HEU 
and a fraction of U.S.-supplied HEU.  
To secure all nuclear stockpiles in four 
years, both security upgrades and con-
solidation efforts must be broadened.  The 
6 See Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The 
Transformation of Nuclear Safety since Three Mile Is-
land (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
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United States and other donor countries 
should seek to help countries carry out 
security upgrades that:
Cover more facilities in more coun-• 
tries.  Many countries can and should 
upgrade their nuclear security sys-
tems with their own resources, though 
they can benefit from exchanging best 
practices and engaging in other forms 
of international cooperation.  But the 
United States and other donor states 
should expand the number of countries 
WhY iS thiS hArd?
To succeed, the effort to achieve effective security for all nuclear stockpiles worldwide within four 
years will have to overcome a maze of obstacles posed by complacency, political disputes, secrecy, sov-
ereignty concerns, cost issues, and bureaucratic obstacles.
Complacency.  Many policymakers around the world believe, as Anatoliy Kotelnikov, then in charge 
of security for Russia’s nuclear complex, put it in 2002, that it would be “absolutely impossible” for 
terrorists to make a nuclear bomb even if they got the needed nuclear material.1  Even more believe 
that existing nuclear security measures are adequate, so that there is little chance of terrorists getting 
enough nuclear material for a bomb. At most nuclear facilities, for example, there have been no thefts 
or attacks in decades of operation, so how can the security measures in place be insufficient?  Poli-
cymakers and nuclear managers simply will not put in the level of effort required to achieve major 
improvements in nuclear security unless they believe those improvements are necessary—making the 
effort to overcome complacency a fundamental element of a global nuclear security campaign.
Political disputes.  Some of the countries that ought to be cooperating to improve nuclear security 
have political disagreements that get in the way.  India, for example, has refused to cooperate with 
the United States on nuclear security for many years, in part because of the U.S. sanctions on India’s 
nuclear establishment that were in place ever since India’s 1974 nuclear test; even the recent U.S.-India 
civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was not enough to overcome those decades of distrust in the 
area of nuclear security.  As another example, neither Iran nor Belarus were invited to the nuclear secu-
rity summit, though Belarus has a substantial stock of HEU and Iran has a few kilograms of irradiated 
research reactor fuel left over from the Shah’s days.  Remarkably, threat reduction cooperation between 
the United States and Russia has managed to continue despite the many ups and downs of U.S.-Rus-
sian relations—but that cannot be taken for granted indefinitely.  Intensive efforts are needed to find 
ways to overcome these disputes and to cooperate even where political disputes continue.
Secrecy.  As discussed in the text, most countries keep the specifics of what they do to protect their 
nuclear stockpiles as closely guarded secrets.  This often makes in-depth nuclear security cooperation 
far more difficult.  As just one example, Pakistani officials have made clear that they have not allowed 
U.S. experts to actually visit Pakistan’s nuclear weapons facilities to assess what improved security 
measures might be needed, or even to know where these facilities are.  Disputes over access to sensi-
tive sites in Russia have delayed progress at some sites for years, and blocked progress at a few sites 
entirely. In Russia, a variety of creative approaches have been developed and tested to address secrecy 
constraints, including the use of photographs and videotapes of equipment installed and in use, and in 
some case the use of “trusted agents” (Russians with Russian security clearances who the United States 
has reason to trust, such as screened employees of U.S. firms) who are able to certify that certain work 
has been done. Creative leadership is needed to find such approaches for each case, as the most work-
able methods are likely to vary from one country and secrecy system to the next.
1 Aleksandr Khinshteyn, “Secret Materials,” trans. BBC Monitoring Service, “Russian Central TV,” 29 No-
vember 2002.
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in which they are willing to help fi-
nance nuclear security improvements.
More extensive security upgrades.  • 
The goal of cooperative nuclear security 
improvements should be not just to 
ensure that facilities’ security measures 
are generally consistent with those the 
IAEA recommends, but to ensure that 
all HEU and plutonium are protected 
against a robust set of outsider and in-
sider threats, as described below.  This 
means that more facilities will require 
WhY iS thiS hArd? (Cont)
Sovereignty concerns.  States seek to preserve their prerogative to make their own nuclear security 
decisions, without other countries or international agencies telling them what to do.  In some cases, 
concerns over sovereign rights cause countries to resist signing up to any sort of global standards for 
nuclear security, or any accountability mechanisms that might provide a forum for other countries to 
question whether they were doing enough.  Finding the balance between national sovereignty and the 
strong common interest of the international community will be a difficult challenge.
Cost issues.  Nuclear security measures cost money, and every dollar spent on nuclear security is a 
dollar not spent on activities that will bring in revenue.  Managers who believe their existing security 
arrangements are fully adequate will inevitably resist any suggestion that they should adopt additional 
expensive measures.  The impact of this factor varies from one type of facility to another, however.  
Military facilities in most cases already have extensive nuclear security measures and substantial bud-
gets set aside for security.  For large commercial nuclear facilities, an expenditure of 1-3% of revenue 
is likely to be sufficient, in most cases, to provide highly effective security—and can be seen as an 
excellent investment in corporate risk management, in much the same way that measures to achieve 
excellence in nuclear safety are viewed.  But for a small research reactor, the cost of providing any sig-
nificant force of round-the-clock guards might be a major fraction of the reactor’s total annual budget, 
at a time when most research reactors are struggling to get by.  This is another reason to focus on elim-
inating weapons-usable nuclear material entirely from as many research reactors as possible.  In the 
meantime, governments—which subsidize the operation of most research reactors in any case—should 
step in to provide the money needed to finance effective security at these facilities.
Bureaucratic obstacles.  A wide range of bureaucratic difficulties can slow steps to improve nuclear 
security, from disputes between agencies over who has what authority, to disputes between countries 
over tax and liability provisions related to cooperation, to lengthy and uncertain processes for approv-
ing agreements, contracts, and visits.  These kinds of disputes can sometimes delay cooperation for 
years at a time.  
Synergistic barriers.  These barriers frequently reinforce each other.  Secrecy, for example, by mak-
ing real outside scrutiny of performance very difficult, contributes to complacency about how good 
that performance is today.  Complacency encourages officials not to address cost issues or bureaucratic 
obstacles.  Sustained high-level leadership, not only from Washington but from other capitals around 
the world, will be needed to overcome these obstacles and achieve the objective of securing all nuclear 
weapons and materials worldwide.
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improvements, and those improve-
ments must be more extensive.  It also 
requires not just installing equipment, 
but increasing countries’ capacity and 
commitment to implement effective 
nuclear security on their own—through 
training, exchanges of best practices, 
improvements in regulation, sustain-
ability support programs, work on 
security culture, and more.  This effort 
should also include the regional nuclear 
security “centers of excellence” that 
President Obama and some European 
countries have proposed, which could 
provide central locations for training, 
demonstrating modern equipment, ex-
change of best practices, and the like.7  
Consolidation efforts should also be ex-
panded, and should be a central element 
of the four-year nuclear security effort, as 
protecting fewer locations makes it pos-
sible to achieve higher security at lower 
cost.  The Global Threat Reduction Initia-
tive (GTRI) has greatly accelerated the 
pace at which research reactors are being 
converted from HEU to low-enriched 
uranium (LEU) that cannot be used in a 
nuclear bomb, and the pace of removing 
HEU from these sites to secure locations.
The consolidation effort should be ex-
panded to include:
reducing the number of sites where • 
nuclear weapons exist (particularly in 
Russia); 
limiting the accumulation of stock-• 
piles of separated plutonium, and the 
number of places where plutonium is 
processed, stored, and used; and
7 These regional centers of excellence would receive 
$30 million in the Department of Defense budget 
request.  See , “Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimate: 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program” (Washing-
ton, D.C.: DOD, February 2010), http://comptroller.
defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/budget_justification/
pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_
VOL_1_PARTS/CTR_FY11.pdf (accessed 31 March 
2010), p. CTR-803.
removing HEU from a far broader set • 
of the sites where it now exists, with the 
goal of eliminating the HEU from the 
most vulnerable sites during the four-
year effort, and eliminating all civil 
HEU within roughly a decade.
The United States and Russia should work 
together to reduce the number of build-
ings and bunkers with nuclear weapons, 
HEU, or plutonium as much as practically 
possible.  They should carefully assess 
whether each location where these items 
exist is still needed, or whether there are 
other alternatives to these locations whose 
balance of costs, benefits, and risks would 
be better.
The United States and other countries 
should offer new incentives to convince 
operators to shift away from the use of 
HEU.  These should include (a) offer-
ing to help reactor operators so that they 
would be better off (e.g., higher perfor-
mance, or more funding for research) 
after ending their use of HEU than they 
were before; and (b) adopting policies that 
would end exports of HEU for medical 
isotope production and imports of medi-
cal isotopes made using HEU as soon as 
sufficient supplies made without HEU are 
available.  (The latter step would create 
a strong incentive for isotope producers 
to convert their production so that it no 
longer uses HEU, to avoid being frozen 
out of the U.S. market, the world’s largest.) 
New incentives should also be offered so 
that a much larger fraction of the world’s 
HEU will be sent back to its country of 
origin or otherwise eliminated (including 
many of the tons of U.S.-origin HEU not 
covered in current GTRI removal plans).  
This might include, for example, offer-
ing something in the range of $10,000 per 
kilogram of HEU to any operator willing 
to send the United States its HEU.8  A new 
8 This would include, of course, arrangements to ensure 
that they were not  producing or importing more HEU.  
The program would be intended to clear out small stocks 
of HEU from facilities around the world, not to address 
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program should be established to give un-
needed reactors incentives to shut down 
(an approach which may be cheaper and 
quicker than converting them to use LEU, 
especially for difficult-to-convert reac-
tors).  Over time, the United States should 
seek an end to all civil use of HEU, and to 
eliminate HEU from civil sites.
The United States should undertake new 
efforts to limit the production, use, and 
stockpiling of weapons-usable separated 
civilian plutonium—including renewing 
the nearly-completed late-1990s effort to 
negotiate a 20-year U.S.-Russian mora-
torium on plutonium separation.  And 
as nuclear energy expands and spreads, 
the huge excess stockpiles that will remain in Russia af-
ter the current 500-ton HEU purchase is complete; those 
stocks should be addressed in separate agreements de-
signed for that purpose. The program might offer smaller 
amounts for HEU in forms that would be more difficult 
for terrorists to make a bomb from, such as material that 
was only 20-50% enriched or irradiated material. The 
proposal here would be in addition to existing incentives. 
In developing and transition countries, GTRI already 
encourages reactors to convert to low-enriched uranium 
(LEU) fuel and send back their fresh and spent HEU fuel 
by providing new LEU fuel (valued at some $15,000 per 
kilogram) free of charge, and paying the costs of packag-
ing, transport, and disposition.  Many research reactors, 
however, already have enough HEU fuel for their pro-
jected reactor lifetimes, or for many years to come; for 
them, supply of LEU fuel offers little incentive to switch 
to LEU and ship away their HEU.  Where needed, GTRI 
sometimes offers additional incentives in the form of 
technical assistance to improve reactor efficiency or to 
replace shut-down reactors as well as providing technical 
training.  Most civil HEU, however, is located in high-
income countries such as France, Germany, and Japan, to 
which GTRI does not currently offer incentives to give 
up their HEU, arguing that these countries should pay 
for managing their HEU themselves.  But the costs of 
offering incentives to eliminate civil HEU stocks in all 
countries would be small by comparison to the security 
stakes.  If the proposal was extraordinarily successful, 
and countries agreed to eliminate 10 tons of HEU in this 
way, the cost of this incentive would be $100 million 
over several years (plus the costs of transport and man-
agement, if the United States also agreed to pay for those 
costs); in reality, it would be substantially less, since 
(a) much of the relevant HEU is in less-enriched or ir-
radiated forms, for which lower per-kilogram incentives 
might be offered, and (b) it is unlikely that a quantity 
as large as 10 tons of HEU would be addressed through 
such an effort.
the United States should not encourage 
that spread to be based on approaches 
that involve reprocessing and recycling 
plutonium, as some of the approaches en-
visioned in the Bush-era Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership (GNEP) would have 
done.  Even the proposed GNEP processes 
that would not separate “pure pluto-
nium” would tend to increase, rather than 
decrease, the risk of nuclear theft and pro-
liferation compared to not reprocessing 
this fuel.
get the ruleS And inCentiveS right
Effectively enforced national rules for nu-
clear security and effective global nuclear 
security rules are both key elements of the 
effort to secure nuclear stockpiles around 
the world.
As most nuclear managers only invest in 
expensive security measures when the 
government tells them they have to, effec-
tive regulation is essential to effective and 
lasting security.  Hence, President Obama 
and other leaders seeking to improve 
nuclear security should greatly increase 
the focus on ensuring that countries 
around the world put in place and enforce 
effective nuclear security and account-
ing regulations, giving all facilities strong 
incentives to ensure those stockpiles are 
effectively secured—including the pos-
sibility of being fined or shut down if 
facilities do not meet nuclear security reg-
ulations.  Regulators in each country must 
have the authority, independence, exper-
tise, and resources needed to do their jobs 
effectively—and countries must ensure 
that operators have the resources needed 
to follow the rules.  These rules should 
include requirements for realistic testing 
of the performance of nuclear security 
systems against intelligent and creative 
insider and outsider adversaries.
Some of this effort can best be pursued 
through bilateral cooperation with par-
ticular countries.  In other cases, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
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(IAEA) and its Office of Nuclear Security 
may be best suited to work with countries 
on strengthening their nuclear regulatory 
systems, drawing on what works in other 
countries around the world.  
Nuclear security is only as strong as its 
weakest link.  Hence, it is also important 
to seek effective global nuclear security 
rules that will help ensure that each coun-
try where stockpiles of nuclear weapons 
and weapons-usable materials exist puts 
effective national rules and procedures in 
place.  Today, there are no binding agree-
ments that specify what level of security 
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable 
nuclear materials should have—that is 
left primarily to the sovereign decisions 
of each state possessing such stockpiles.  
Unfortunately, because of complacency 
about the threat, concerns over national 
sovereignty, worries over the cost of more 
stringent measures, and differing national 
approaches, past efforts to negotiate global 
treaties specifying how secure nuclear 
weapons or weapons-usable materials 
should be have not succeeded, and such a 
treaty-negotiation approach is not likely 
to succeed in the future.  (As discussed in 
Chapter 3, there is a Convention on Physi-
cal Protection and a 2005 amendment to it 
that provide useful guidelines, but these 
accords set no specific requirements for 
how secure weapons-usable nuclear mate-
rial should be.)
The process by which IAEA nuclear se-
curity recommendations are developed 
has been somewhat more successful, with 
a series of revisions over the years to the 
basic recommendations on physical pro-
tection, known as Information Circular 
225 (INFCIRC/225).9  The current version 
is the fourth revision, agreed in 1999 (be-
9 The IAEA now has a substantial and growing 
body of additional recommendations and guides 
in the Nuclear Security Series, covering everything 
from detection of radiation at borders to strength-
ening nuclear security culture.  But INFCIRC/225 
remains the internationally recognized document 
fore the 9/11 attacks).  While these are only 
recommendations, many countries follow 
them, and some are required to do so by 
agreements with nuclear suppliers such as 
the United States.  As described in Chapter 
3, INFCIRC/225 is more specific than the 
physical protection convention, but is still 
quite general.  It does not specify what 
kinds of threats all weapons-usable nu-
clear material should be protected against, 
or how effective measures such as fences, 
locks, barriers, and intrusion detectors 
should be.  A fifth revision, expected to be 
significantly more detailed (though still 
without answers on many of these critical 
issues of how well the system should per-
form) is slated for completion in 2010, if all 
goes well. 
The United States should certainly con-
tinue to work to get states to ratify the 
physical protection convention and its 
2005 amendment and to strengthen IN-
FCIRC/225 and other IAEA guides and 
recommendations.  But there is little pros-
pect for success in getting agreement on 
effective global nuclear security standards 
by attempting to negotiate another amend-
ment to the convention, a new treaty, or 
yet another revision of INFCIRC/225.  UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1540 may offer a more promising path.  
UNSCR 1540 legally requires all countries 
to provide “appropriate effective” secu-
rity and accounting for all their nuclear 
stockpiles—but no one has yet defined 
what that means.  The United States 
should develop a concept of what essential 
elements are needed for nuclear security 
systems to be considered to meet the “ap-
propriate effective” standard, and should 
begin working with other countries to try 
to build a political-level consensus around 
a set of elements that every state with dan-
gerous nuclear stockpiles should have in 
place to protect them, if its security and 
accounting systems are to be considered 
incorporating the principal recommendations on 
security for nuclear materials and facilities.
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appropriate and effective.10  It should then 
work with other donor states to help (and 
pressure) countries around the world to 
put those essential elements in place.  If 
broad agreement could be reached on 
the essential elements of an “appropriate 
effective” nuclear security system, that 
would, in effect become a legally bind-
ing global standard for nuclear security.  
Indeed, the entire global effort to put in 
place stringent nuclear security measures 
for all the world’s stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear 
materials can be considered simply as the 
implementation of the unanimously ap-
proved obligations of UNSCR 1540.  
Every country with nuclear stockpiles has 
its own approach to nuclear security.  For 
countries where labor is cheap and tech-
nology is expensive, the best approach 
will inevitably be different from the best 
approach where the reverse is true.  Thus, 
any effort to forge a global approach 
should be focused on how well the system 
performs, not on what specific security 
measures it includes.  To be successful, an 
international standard must be general 
and flexible enough to allow countries to 
pursue their own specific approaches as 
long as they are effective enough to meet 
the threats, yet at the same time be specific 
enough to provide guidance for effective 
security and the basis for questioning, as-
sessment, and review.11
10 For an initial cut at defining the essential ele-
ments that must be included for nuclear security 
and accounting systems to meet the obligation 
to be “appropriate effective,” see Matthew Bunn, 
“‘Appropriate Effective’ Nuclear Security and 
Accounting — What is It?”, presentation to “‘Ap-
propriate Effective’ Material Accounting and 
Physical Protection,” Joint Global Initiative/UNSCR 
1540 Workshop, Nashville, Tennessee, 18 July 2008, 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunn-1540-
appropriate-effective50.pdf  (accessed 2 March 
2010).
11 Questions designed to clarify a country’s compli-
ance with this standard could include such items 
as: is there a rule in place specifying that all facili-
ties with nuclear weapons or significant quantities 
If the words “appropriate effective” mean 
anything, they should mean that nuclear 
security systems could effectively defeat 
threats that terrorists and criminals have 
shown they can pose.  Thus one pos-
sible definition would be that to meet its 
UNSCR 1540 physical protection obliga-
tion, every state with nuclear weapons or 
weapons-usable nuclear materials should 
have a well-enforced national rule requir-
ing that every facility with a nuclear bomb 
or a significant quantity of nuclear mate-
rial must have security in place capable of 
defeating a specified design basis threat 
(DBT) including outsider and insider ca-
pabilities comparable to those terrorists 
and criminals have demonstrated in that 
country (or nearby). As discussed in Chap-
ter 4, in an age of terrorists with global 
reach, all countries where nuclear weap-
ons and weapons-usable nuclear materials 
exist should protect them against a range 
of potential outsider and insider threats.  
At a bare minimum, such stocks should be 
protected against a well-placed insider or 
against two small teams of well-trained, 
well-armed attackers, possibly with in-
side help, as occurred at Pelindaba.  (In 
countries facing threats from more capable 
adversaries, even greater levels of protec-
tion are needed.)12
of weapons-usable nuclear material must have 
security in place capable of defending against 
specified insider and outsider threats?  Are those 
specified threats big enough to realistically reflect 
demonstrated terrorist and criminal capabilities in 
that country or region?  How is this requirement 
enforced?  Is there a program of regular, realistic 
tests, to demonstrate whether facilities’ security 
approaches are in fact able to defeat the specified 
threats?  Are armed guards used on-site at nuclear 
facilities, and if not, how is the system able to hold 
off outside attack or insider thieves long enough for 
armed response forces to arrive from elsewhere?  
For a brief discussion of other standards that have 
been proposed, see Securing the Bomb 2008, pp. 149-
150.
12 See discussion in Chapter 4, and in Matthew 
Bunn and Col.-Gen. Evgeniy Maslin (ret.), “All 
Stocks of Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material World-
wide Must be Protected Against Global Terrorist 
Threats,” paper prepared for the workshop on 
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The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism offers one potentially effective 
venue for discussing the essential ele-
ments of appropriate and effective nuclear 
security and accounting systems.  Its ac-
tivities should be sustained and expanded, 
with achieving high standards of security 
for nuclear stockpiles worldwide an in-
creased priority of the initiative.
Incentives are as important as rules. Given 
the strong incentives to save money and 
time by cutting corners on nuclear secu-
rity, states, agencies, facilities, managers, 
and staff must be given strong incentives 
to focus on achieving high nuclear secu-
rity performance.13 If the effort to build 
a sense of urgency around the world 
about the threat of nuclear terrorism suc-
ceeds, the desire to address real threats 
will provide the most important incen-
tive.  President Obama should also make 
clear to countries around the world that 
cooperating to ensure effective security for 
nuclear stockpiles and taking other steps 
to prevent nuclear terrorism is as essential 
to good relations with the United States, 
as compliance with arms control and 
nonproliferation agreements has been for 
many years. At the same time, the United 
States should seek to ensure that each 
country with dangerous nuclear stockpiles 
establishes financial and other rewards 
for strong nuclear security performance 
(comparable, for example, to the bonus 
payments contractors managing DOE 
facilities can earn for high performance), 
and for those who identify nuclear se-
curity problems and propose practical 
“Protecting Nuclear Programmes From Terrorism,” 
World Institute for Nuclear Security and American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vienna, 19-20 No-
vember 2009.
13 For a more detailed discussion, see Matthew 
Bunn, “Incentives for Nuclear Security,” in Proceed-
ings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Institute for 
Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 10-14 
July 2005 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2005), http://belf-
ercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/inmmincentives205.
pdf (accessed 3 March 2010).
solutions. The U.S. government should 
take the position that only facilities that 
can demonstrate that they maintain highly 
effective security will be eligible for U.S. 
government-funded contracts for coopera-
tive R&D and related efforts, and should 
seek to convince other governments to do 
likewise. Ultimately, effective security and 
accounting for weapons-usable nuclear 
material should become part of the “price 
of admission” for doing business in the 
international nuclear market.
tAke A pArtnerShip-BASed ApproACh
To succeed, a global nuclear security im-
provement effort must be based not just on 
donor-recipient relationships but on real 
partnerships, which integrate ideas and 
resources from countries where upgrades 
are taking place in ways that also serve 
their national interests.  For countries like 
India and Pakistan, for example, it is po-
litically untenable to accept U.S. assistance 
that is portrayed as necessary because 
they are unable to adequately control their 
nuclear stockpiles on their own.  But join-
ing with the major nuclear states in jointly 
addressing a global problem may be po-
litically appealing.  U.S.-Russian relations 
are still rocky despite President Obama’s 
efforts to “reset” them, making a real 
nuclear security partnership with Russia 
difficult to achieve, but no less essential; 
shared U.S.-Russian interests in keeping 
nuclear material out of terrorist hands 
remain.  Such partnerships will have to 
be based on creative approaches that 
make it possible to cooperate in upgrad-
ing nuclear security without demanding 
that countries compromise their legiti-
mate nuclear secrets.  Specific approaches 
should be crafted to accommodate each 
national culture, secrecy system, and set 
of circumstances.  As a central element 
of this partnership-based approach, the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Ter-
rorism should be reinvigorated, with a 
focus on building the international sense 
of urgency and commitment to action to 
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reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, and 
on meeting the four-year nuclear security 
objective.
BroAden BeSt prACtiCeS exChAngeS 
And SeCuritY Culture effortS
Opportunities for nuclear security opera-
tors to share ideas—problems they have 
encountered, ways they have found to re-
solve them, cost-effective means to protect 
against particular adversary tactics, and 
more—are another critical element of im-
proving nuclear security for the long haul. 
As people see what other countries are do-
ing, this kind of sharing of best practices 
can be a powerful motivator for change, 
building both the sense of urgency and 
the sense of possibility.  While the specif-
ics of nuclear security arrangements have 
long been shrouded in secrecy, operators 
can discuss many of the common issues 
they face without revealing sensitive in-
formation.  The United States and Russia 
have greatly expanded their sharing of 
best practices in recent years, and these 
exchanges have expanded to include Brit-
ish experts as well.  The United States and 
China are also engaged in a substantial set 
of dialogues on best practices in nuclear 
material security and accounting.
Most important, perhaps, a new organi-
zation, the World Institute for Nuclear 
Security (WINS) was established in 2008 
precisely to promote sharing of best prac-
tices in nuclear security.  WINS organizes 
workshops where experts can exchange 
ideas on a particular aspect of nuclear 
security, and then publishes best practice 
guides to help operators implement the 
best available ideas on improving nuclear 
security.  
Targeted efforts to improve nuclear secu-
rity culture, so that guards are no longer 
falling asleep on the job or turning off 
intrusion detectors, are also critical.  Build-
ing strong security cultures is a difficult 
policy challenge, requiring intense com-
mitment from the top management of 
nuclear facilities.  The most important 
single element is convincing nuclear man-
agers and all their security-relevant staff 
of the urgency of the threat.  The United 
States and Russia have established a secu-
rity culture program that is operating at a 
few sites, the IAEA has just produced its 
first guidance on the subject, and security 
culture was the subject of WINS’ first best 
practice guide.14
But much more needs to be done both on 
exchanging nuclear security best practices 
and on strengthening security culture.  
President Obama and other leaders seek-
ing to improve nuclear security should 
work with all countries where nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear 
materials exist—as well as countries 
with major nuclear facilities that might 
be subject to sabotage—to exchange best 
practices and strengthen nuclear security 
culture.  The ultimate goal should be to 
ensure that every facility and transporter 
handling nuclear weapons and weapons-
usable nuclear material participates in 
programs to exchange best practices, and 
has a targeted program in place to con-
tinually assess and strengthen its nuclear 
security culture.
CreAte meChAniSmS to folloW up 
And Build ConfidenCe in progreSS
Mechanisms to follow up on commitments 
made and to build confidence that they 
are being implemented—and that states 
are maintaining effective nuclear security 
systems—will be essential if the commit-
ments of the nuclear security summit are 
to have a real and lasting impact.
14 See International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear 
Security Culture: Implementing Guide, Security Series 
No. 7 (Vienna: IAEA, 2008) http://www-pub.iaea.
org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1347_web.pdf 
(accessed 31 March 2010), and World Institute for 
Nuclear Security, Nuclear Security Culture: A WINS 
Best Practice Guide for Your Organization, Rev. 1.4 
(Vienna: WINS, September 2009).
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First, each participating state should 
designate one or a small number of key 
officials to be responsible for implement-
ing their states’ efforts, and groups of 
these officials should meet regularly in 
the months and years after the summit 
to review progress and assess next steps.  
If initial approaches are not working, or 
particular cooperating countries identify 
gaps that need to be filled or unexpected 
problems that need to be solved, these of-
ficials should have the authority to modify 
the cooperative nuclear security efforts.  
Simply getting each state to designate an 
official or a small group to be in charge of 
their nuclear security efforts would itself 
be a major step forward—particularly if 
these designated individuals were given 
the power needed to follow up effectively.
The nuclear security initiative launched 
by Presidents Bush and Putin at their 
Bratislava summit provides a compel-
ling example.  Each president designated 
a single senior official to be responsible 
for implementing the initiative, and those 
individuals were to report on progress 
every six months.  The two sides drew up 
a list of facilities where security upgrades 
would take place, and a list of HEU-fueled 
reactors in third countries from which 
HEU would be removed, with particu-
lar schedules agreed.  They then worked 
furiously to meet the agreed timetables; 
whenever a problem or delay arose, U.S. 
and Russian officials would talk (some-
times in person, sometimes by phone) to 
try to find a way to overcome the problem 
and get back on schedule.  In the end, 
essentially all security improvements 
originally agreed to were completed by 
the end of December 2008, the deadline 
the two Presidents had originally set.  Of 
course, that was a bilateral effort, and 
follow-up on multilateral commitments 
would be much more complex—but an 
effective mechanism to track progress 
and discuss ways to overcome obstacles is 
likely to be essential if the four-year effort 
is to succeed.
Second, it is important to build an inter-
national understanding of the work to 
be done.  Through intelligence programs 
such as the Nuclear Materials Informa-
tion Program (NMIP), the United States is 
developing its own classified understand-
ing of the state of nuclear security around 
world.  NMIP includes assessments of 
what is known and what is not known 
about sites with nuclear weapons or 
weapons-usable nuclear materials around 
the world, the security in place for those 
stocks, and at least limited information re-
lating to the most plausible capabilities of 
adversaries who might seek to steal from 
those stocks in different parts of the world. 
The U.S. government should direct its in-
telligence agencies to place a high priority 
on collecting and analyzing information 
on crucial matters such as how security 
measures in different countries are as-
sessed and tested, how much workers at 
remote research reactors are paid, where 
corruption is a serious problem, which 
facilities are in areas where terrorists or 
criminal groups have been particularly so-
phisticated about how to defeat defenses, 
and more.
But a common understanding of the state 
of nuclear security around the world is 
needed, to provide a baseline against 
which to judge progress of the four-year 
nuclear security effort.  While many of 
the specifics of nuclear security arrange-
ments in different countries will inevitably 
remain shrouded in secrecy, the United 
States and other countries working to 
achieve the four-year nuclear security ob-
jective should seek to convince countries 
of the importance of sharing as much 
information as they can.  Each country 
should disclose the number of sites with 
nuclear stockpiles, what security measures 
are in place (at least in general descriptive 
terms), and the like.  A more focused effort 
to simply compile and assess information 
that is already publicly available—in pub-
lished laws, conference papers, facilities’ 
NExT STEpS TO SECURE NUClEaR STOCkpIlES 105
websites, and the like—would be a good 
place to begin.
Third, countries should work together 
to develop means, within the confines of 
necessary secrecy, to build international 
confidence that states are taking the steps 
they have committed to and putting effec-
tive nuclear security measures in place.  
This will not be easy.  Unfortunately, in 
international discussions to date, many 
countries have expressed intense opposi-
tion to proposals to broaden transparency 
around the topic of nuclear security, see-
ing complete secrecy about every aspect 
of the topic as the best approach.  In the 
negotiations of the 2005 amendment to 
the physical protection convention, for 
example, a U.S. proposal that each coun-
try report on the steps it had taken to 
improve physical protection—including 
only as much detail as each country chose 
to include—was soundly rejected.  It may 
be that more informal approaches, worked 
out in a spirit of partnership as part of the 
international cooperative effort to secure 
nuclear stockpiles, will be more successful.
International visits such as those that 
take place under U.S. nuclear supply 
agreements, IAEA-led peer reviews, and 
international cooperation on nuclear 
security upgrades are all effective mecha-
nisms for expanding transparency to build 
confidence that effective nuclear security 
measures are in place, or are being put 
in place.  As a high-level group com-
missioned by the IAEA recommended: 
“Ultimately, international reviews of both 
safety and security should become a regu-
lar part of business at nuclear facilities 
with HEU or separated weapons-usable 
plutonium.”15
15 Commission of Eminent Persons, Reinforcing the 
Global Nuclear Order, p. 22. Norway was the first 
major developed state to request such an interna-
tional peer review and encouraged all other states 
to do likewise, arguing that all states can benefit 
from international advice.  Government of Norway, 
But additional approaches will be needed 
for sites that are unlikely to welcome inter-
national visitors in the near future—from 
U.S. and Russian nuclear warhead assem-
bly plants to nuclear sites in Pakistan and 
Israel.  Graham Allison has proposed that 
nuclear weapon states invite experts from 
another nuclear weapon state with which 
they have good relations to review their 
nuclear security arrangements and certify 
that they are effective.  China, for example, 
which has long had close nuclear relations 
with Pakistan, might review and certify 
Pakistan’s nuclear security system. 16
Another approach might focus on provid-
ing, at least in general terms, the results 
of tests of security system effectiveness.  
The United States, for example, already 
openly publishes data on what percent-
age of DOE facilities have received high 
ratings in DOE security inspections—and 
uses that percentage as a measure of the 
effectiveness of ongoing steps to improve 
security.17  In the case of U.S.-Russian co-
operation, to build understanding of what 
was being tested and how, U.S. and Rus-
sian adversary teams might train together, 
and perhaps conduct tests of nuclear secu-
rity systems together at non-sensitive sites 
in each country.  Then the remaining sites 
could be tested by purely national teams, 
using similar approaches and standards, 
and broad descriptions of the results could 
be provided to the other country.18
“Statement by Norway,” to the 48th IAEA General 
Conference, Vienna, Austria, 20-21 September 2004.
16 Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable 
Catastrophe, pp. 150-153.
17 See, for example, U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget, “National Nuclear Security Administration: 
Safeguards and Security Assessment” (Washing-
ton, D.C.: OMB, original assessment 2004, updated 
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expect-
more/detail/10000126.2004.html (accessed 31 March 
2010).
18 In the case of tests that revealed vulnerabilities 
requiring immediate corrective action, U.S. and 
Russian officials would probably not want to reveal 
the specifics of those vulnerabilities to the other 
side until they had been corrected; the existence of 
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Approaches such as these are sensible 
goals to aim for, though they will be 
extremely difficult to achieve.  In the im-
mediate term, states should do more 
to provide general descriptions of their 
nuclear security approaches, photographs 
of installed equipment, and related data 
that could be made public and help build 
confidence that effective nuclear security 
measures are being taken without provid-
ing data that could help terrorists and 
criminals plan their attacks.
Build A multi-lAYered defenSe
Nuclear security systems will never be 
perfect—and some nuclear material may 
already have been stolen and never re-
covered.  Hence, a multilayered effort to 
block the terrorist pathway to the bomb is 
needed, with nuclear security as the first 
and most important layer.
Disrupt: counter-terrorism efforts fo-
cused on nuclear risks.  President Obama 
should work with other countries to build 
an intense international focus on stopping 
the other elements of a nuclear plot—the 
recruiting, fundraising, equipment pur-
chases, and more that would inevitably be 
required.  Because of the complexity of a 
nuclear effort, these would offer a bigger 
and more detectable profile than many 
other terrorist conspiracies—although, as 
U.S. intelligence officials have pointed out, 
the observable “footprint” of a nuclear 
such vulnerabilities is considered a secret in each 
country.  In cases where deficiencies were found, 
they could simply be silent about the results of 
the test, leaving the other side to draw its own 
conclusions, until after corrective action had been 
completed.  Such an approach could provide sub-
stantially increased confidence to each side that the 
other’s nuclear stockpiles were secure and were 
being tested effectively.  In particular, an approach 
like this one might be used to confirm that Russia 
had taken action to provide security at sites that 
had been judged too sensitive to allow U.S. access 
that was comparable to the security measures at 
sites where U.S.-Russian cooperation had taken 
place, particularly the two remaining nuclear war-
head assembly and disassembly facilities.
plot might be no bigger than that of the 
9/11 plot.  The best chances to stop such a 
plot lie not in exotic new detection tech-
nologies but in a broad counter-terrorist 
effort, ranging from intelligence and other 
operations to target high-capability terror-
ist groups to addressing the anti-American 
hatred that makes recruiting and fund-
raising easier, and makes it more difficult 
for other governments to cooperate with 
the United States.  In particular, the United 
States should work with governments and 
non-government institutions in the Islamic 
world to build a consensus that slaughter 
on a nuclear scale is profoundly wrong 
under Islamic laws and traditions (and 
those of other faiths)—potentially making 
it more difficult for those terrorists want-
ing to pursue nuclear violence to convince 
the people they need to join their cause.
Interdict: countering the nuclear black 
market.  Most of the past successes in 
seizing stolen nuclear material have come 
from conspirators informing on each 
other and from good police and intelli-
gence work, not from radiation detectors.  
President Obama should work with other 
countries around the world to intensify 
police and intelligence cooperation fo-
cused on stopping nuclear smuggling, 
including additional sting operations, 
tiplines, and well-publicized rewards for 
informers to report on such plots, to make 
it even more difficult for potential nu-
clear thieves and buyers to connect.  The 
United States should also work with states 
around the world to ensure that they have 
(a) units of their national police forces 
trained and equipped to deal with cases of 
smuggling of nuclear materials and weap-
ons-related equipment, and other law 
enforcement personnel should be trained 
to call in those units as needed;  (b) laws 
on the books making any participation in 
real or attempted theft or smuggling of 
nuclear weapons or weapons-usable ma-
terials, or nuclear terrorism, crimes with 
penalties comparable to those for murder 
or treason; (c) a commitment to catching 
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and prosecuting those involved in such 
transfers; and (d) standard operating 
procedures, routinely exercised, to deal 
with materials that may be detected or 
intercepted.  The U.S. government should 
develop an approach that offers a greater 
chance of stopping nuclear smugglers at 
lower cost than the current mandate for 
100 percent scanning of all cargo contain-
ers, focusing on an integrated system that 
places as many barriers in the path of 
intelligent adversaries attempting to get 
nuclear material into the United States by 
any pathway as can be accomplished at 
reasonable cost, and work with Congress 
to get the modified approach approved.  
(In particular, it is important to under-
stand that neither the detectors now being 
deployed nor the Advanced Spectroscopic 
Portals in development will offer a high 
probability of detecting HEU metal if it 
has significant shielding.)
Prevent and deter: reducing the risk of 
nuclear transfers to terrorists by states.  
While the risk that a hostile state would 
consciously decide to transfer nuclear 
weapons or materials to terrorists is 
small—and represents only a small part of 
the overall risk of nuclear terrorism—this 
risk is not zero, and steps should be taken 
to reduce it further.  The international 
community should continue to seek to put 
together packages of carrots and sticks 
large enough and credible enough to con-
vince the governments of North Korea and 
Iran that it is in their interest to verifiably 
end their nuclear weapons efforts (and, in 
North Korea’s case, to give up the weap-
ons and materials already produced).  The 
international community should also work 
to strengthen efforts to detect and interdict 
any shipment of nuclear material from 
these or other countries—though given the 
difficulties, undue reliance should not be 
placed on that tool.  At the same time, the 
global effort to stem the spread of nuclear 
weapons should be strengthened wher-
ever possible, reducing the chances that 
other states might someday gain nuclear 
weapons that might fall into terrorist 
hands.  The United States should also put 
in place the best practicable means for 
identifying the source of any nuclear at-
tack—including not just nuclear forensics 
but also traditional intelligence and law 
enforcement means—and announce that 
the United States will treat any terrorist 
nuclear attack using material consciously 
provided by a state as an attack by that 
state, and will respond accordingly.  This 
should include both increased funding for 
R&D and expanded efforts to put together 
an international database of material 
characteristics.  Policymakers should un-
derstand, however, that nuclear material 
has no DNA that can provide an absolute 
match: nuclear forensics will complement 
other sources of information, but will 
rarely make clear where material came 
from by itself.
Respond: global nuclear emergency re-
sponse.  President Obama should work 
with other countries to ensure that an 
international rapid-response capability 
is put in place—including making all the 
necessary legal arrangements for visas 
and the import of technologies such as 
the nuclear detectors used by the nuclear 
emergency search teams (some of which 
include radioactive materials)—so that 
within hours of receiving information re-
lated to stolen nuclear material or a stolen 
nuclear weapon anywhere in the world, a 
response team (either from the state where 
the crisis was unfolding, or an interna-
tional team if the state required assistance) 
could be on the ground, or an aircraft with 
sophisticated search capabilities could be 
flying over the area.
Impede: impeding terrorist recruit-
ment of nuclear personnel.  President 
Obama should maintain existing scientist-
redirection programs, but should reform 
them to use a broader array of tools and 
to focus on a broader array of threats, in-
cluding not only top weapons scientists 
but workers with access to nuclear mate-
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rial, guards who could help steal nuclear 
material, and people who have retired 
from nuclear facilities but still have criti-
cal knowledge.  The United States is not 
likely to have either the access or the 
resources to carry out this broader mis-
sion by itself, but must work closely with 
partner countries to convince them to take 
most of the needed actions themselves.  
President Obama should also work with 
key countries such as Russia and Pakistan 
to strengthen control of classified nuclear 
information and ensure that they monitor 
contacts and behavior of all individuals 
with key nuclear secrets—and should 
work with a broader set of countries to 
monitor and stop recruitment attempts 
at key sites, such as physics and nuclear 
engineering departments in countries with 
substantial extremist communities.
Reduce: reducing stockpiles and ending 
production.  The United States, Russia, 
and other nuclear weapon states should 
join in an effort to radically reduce the 
size, roles, and readiness of their nuclear 
weapon stockpiles, verifiably dismantling 
many thousands of nuclear weapons and 
placing the fissile material they contain in 
secure, monitored storage until it can be 
safely and securely destroyed.  Very deep 
reductions in nuclear stockpiles, if prop-
erly managed, would reduce the risks of 
nuclear theft—and could greatly improve 
the chances of gaining international sup-
port for other nonproliferation steps that 
could also reduce the long-term dangers 
of nuclear theft. President Obama should 
launch a joint program with Russia to 
reduce total U.S. and Russian stockpiles 
of nuclear weapons to something in the 
range of 1,000 weapons, and to place all 
plutonium and HEU beyond the stocks 
needed to support these low, agreed war-
head stockpiles (and modest stocks for 
other military missions, such as naval 
fuel) in secure, monitored storage pend-
ing disposition.  In particular, the United 
States and Russia should launch another 
round of reciprocal initiatives, comparable 
to the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 
1991-1992, in which they would each agree 
to: (a) take several thousand warheads—
including, but not limited to, all tactical 
warheads not equipped with modern, 
difficult-to-bypass electronic locks—and 
place them in secure, centralized storage; 
(b) allow visits to those storage sites by 
the other side to confirm the presence and 
the security of these warheads; (c) com-
mit that these warheads will be verifiably 
dismantled as soon as procedures have 
been agreed by both sides to do so without 
compromising sensitive information; and 
(d) commit that the nuclear materials from 
these warheads will similarly be placed in 
secure, monitored storage after dismantle-
ment.  President Obama should also seek 
new ways to overcome the obstacles to 
negotiating a verified fissile material cutoff 
treaty—while also seeking to end all pro-
duction of HEU for any purpose, and to 
phase out civilian separation of weapons-
usable plutonium.
Monitor: monitoring nuclear stockpiles 
and reductions.  President Obama should 
work with Russia to revive efforts to 
put in place a system of data exchanges, 
reciprocal visits, and monitoring that 
would build confidence in the size and 
security of each side’s nuclear stockpile, 
lay the groundwork for deep reductions 
in nuclear arms, and confirm agreed re-
ductions in nuclear warhead and fissile 
material stockpiles.  Such a system should 
ultimately be expanded to cover other 
nuclear weapon states as well.  In particu-
lar, President Obama should seek Russian 
agreement, before the 2010 NPT review, 
that each country will place large quanti-
ties of excess fissile material under IAEA 
monitoring.
Prepare: organize to respond to a nuclear 
attack.  Finally, no matter what is done to 
prevent nuclear terrorism, it is essential 
that the United States get better prepared 
should such a catastrophe nevertheless 
occur.  While some steps have been taken 
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to prepare for the ghastly aftermath of a 
terrorist nuclear attack, a comprehensive 
plan and approach is needed.  The United 
States needs a rapid ability to assess which 
people are in the greatest danger and 
to tell them what they can do to protect 
themselves.  Better capabilities to commu-
nicate to everyone, when TV, radio, and 
cell phones in the affected area may not 
be functioning properly are also needed, 
as are much better public communication 
plans for the critical minutes and hours 
after such an attack.  The U.S. government 
needs to do a much better job encouraging 
and helping people to take simple steps to 
get ready for an emergency.  The United 
States also needs to put in place a bet-
ter ability—including making use of the 
military’s capabilities—to treat many thou-
sands of injured people, along with more 
effective plans to keep the government 
and economy functioning while taking all 
the steps that will be needed to prevent 
another attack.  (In particular, Congress 
has not yet acted to put a plan in place for 
reconstituting itself should most members 
of Congress be killed in a nuclear attack.)  
Many of these steps would help respond 
to any catastrophe, natural or man-made, 
and would pay off even if efforts to pre-
vent a terrorist nuclear attack succeeded.
provide the needed leAderShip, 
plAnning, And reSourCeS
Achieving effective security for all the 
world’s stockpiles of nuclear weapons and 
weapons-usable nuclear materials poses 
an extraordinarily difficult challenge. 
Sustained high-level leadership will be 
needed to overcome a maze of obstacles 
posed by complacency about the threat, 
secrecy, political disputes, sovereignty 
concerns, and bureaucratic obstacles.  Sus-
tained engagement from presidents and 
prime ministers in the months and years 
following the nuclear security summit will 
be needed, not just occasional statements 
of support.  Leaders will have to be willing 
to change outdated rules, overrule officials 
standing in the way of nuclear security 
cooperation, invest additional funds in 
nuclear security, and more.  For President 
Obama, several steps will be particularly 
critical.
Structure for leadership.  First, President 
Obama, building on the structure he has 
put in place, should give the National 
Security Council clear direction and au-
thority to take the needed actions to move 
this agenda forward, and to keep this 
effort on the front burner at the White 
House every day.  The staff focused on 
this topic need to wake up every morning 
thinking “what can we do today to pre-
vent a nuclear terrorist attack?”  President 
Obama should also encourage Russia and 
other key countries to put similar top-level 
structures in place, so that it is clear which 
officials other countries should talk to 
about nuclear security and nuclear terror-
ism.
A comprehensive, prioritized plan.  Sec-
ond, President Obama should direct the 
NSC staff to further develop a compre-
hensive, prioritized plan for preventing 
nuclear terrorism, integrating steps from 
implementing nuclear security upgrades 
to expanding intelligence cooperation 
focused on the nuclear terrorist threat to 
building the sense or urgency around the 
world.  This plan will have to be continu-
ously modified as circumstances change.
The resources to do the job.  Third, Presi-
dent Obama and the Congress should 
work together to provide sufficient re-
sources to ensure that steps that could 
significantly reduce nuclear terrorism risks 
are not slowed by lack of money.  Achiev-
ing the four-year nuclear security objective 
will require doing more, faster, than in 
the past, which will inevitably require an 
increase in budgets.  Yet nuclear security 
is eminently affordable: the entire sums 
spent on cooperative threat reduction each 
year are a tiny fraction of the budgets of 
the Departments of Defense, Energy, and 
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State.  With increased budgets will in-
evitably also come a need for increasing 
available federal officials to oversee the 
work, and Congress should allow the rel-
evant agencies to hire additional people as 
needed. 
As part of providing sufficient resources, 
the leaders at the 2010 G8 summit should 
agree to extend the Global Partnership 
Against the Spread of Weapons and Ma-
terials of Mass Destruction for another ten 
years; continue providing $500 million to 
$1 billion per year above and beyond the 
funds allocated by the United States; and 
target the effort on helping states around 
the world provide effective nuclear secu-
rity and meet their other obligations under 
UNSCR 1540.
Strengthening the IAEA’s role in nuclear 
security is also an important element of 
providing sufficient resources for the 
nuclear security effort.  While some donor 
countries have played down the IAEA’s 
role, preferring to work directly with re-
cipient countries, the IAEA, despite its 
sometimes bureaucratic nature, brings a 
powerful international legitimacy to the 
effort, and has a key role to play.  The 
IAEA’s recommendations and help are 
seen as having a value and legitimacy that 
no single country can muster.  The United 
States and other countries participating in 
the nuclear security effort should: (a) work 
to increase the budget of the IAEA Office 
of Nuclear Security and shift it primar-
ily to the IAEA’s regular budget, rather 
than continuing to rely on unpredictable 
voluntary contributions; seek to empower 
the IAEA to undertake a broader set of 
nuclear security peer reviews and assis-
tance efforts, encouraging all countries 
participating in the four-year nuclear se-
curity effort to request IAEA peer reviews 
of their nuclear security arrangements 
and ensuring that the IAEA has the re-
sources and expertise to respond quickly 
when such reviews identify weaknesses 
that need to be fixed; (c) give the IAEA 
Office of Nuclear Security the people and 
mandate needed to expand its ability to 
analyze and assess nuclear security and 
nuclear terrorism threats, working with 
intelligence and police agencies around 
the world to improve global understand-
ing of what nuclear avenues terrorists 
have actually pursued and what is going 
on in the shadowy world of nuclear smug-
gling, including in-depth investigations of 
important nuclear smuggling cases.
Information and analysis.  Fourth, Presi-
dent Obama should take action to ensure 
that his administration has the informa-
tion and analysis it needs to support 
effective policymaking.  Information is 
crucial to identifying where the greatest 
risks, opportunities, and obstacles to prog-
ress lie.  President Obama should direct 
U.S. intelligence agencies to place high pri-
ority on all aspects of the nuclear terrorism 
problem, from assessing and penetrat-
ing terrorist conspiracies and nuclear 
smuggling networks to assessing nuclear 
security measures around the world.  
President Obama and the Congress should 
also work together to fund non-govern-
ment institutions to provide independent 
analysis and suggestions that can help 
strengthen these programs. The highest-
leverage area for information collection 
and analysis is likely to be supporting 
policy efforts to improve security for 
nuclear stockpiles—answering questions 
ranging from which sites have particularly 
large and vulnerable stockpiles, to which 
nuclear facilities have poorly paid staff or 
corrupt guards, to which research reac-
tors are underutilized, underfunded, and 
might be convinced to shut down with a 
modest incentive package.
Fifth, President Obama should work to 
put the United States’ own house in order.  
Convincing foreign countries to reduce 
and consolidate nuclear stockpiles, to put 
stringent nuclear security measures in 
place, or to convert their research reactors 
from HEU to LEU fuel will be far more 
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difficult if the United States is not doing 
the same at home.  As part of that effort:
DOE and DOD should establish intensive 
programs to strengthen nuclear security 
culture wherever nuclear weapons and 
weapons-usable nuclear materials are 
stored and handled, in an effort to avoid 
future incidents of guards sleeping on 
duty or nuclear weapons being acciden-
tally flown across the country without 
authorization.
DOE and DOD should continue to seek • 
to consolidate their nuclear stockpiles 
to the minimum possible number of 
locations.
DOE should continue providing fund-• 
ing to convert U.S. research reactors to 
LEU.
Congress should provide funding for • 
DOE to help HEU-fueled research re-
actors, or research reactors that pose 
serious sabotage risks, to upgrade secu-
rity voluntarily.
At the same time, Congress should • 
direct the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (NRC) to phase out the exemption 
from most security rules for HEU that 
research reactors now enjoy, and pro-
vide funding for DOE to help these 
reactors pay the costs of effective secu-
rity.
Congress should also insist that NRC • 
revise its rule exempting modestly ra-
dioactive HEU from almost all security 
requirements, as recent studies make 
clear that the level of radiation specified 
in NRC rules would pose little deter-
rent to theft by determined terrorists.
Congress should direct the NRC to • 
strengthen its requirements for pro-
tection of potential nuclear bomb 
material to bring them roughly in line 
with DOE’s rules for identical material 
(particularly since the NRC-regulated 
facilities handling this material are do-
ing so mainly on contract to DOE in 
any case, so DOE will end up paying 
most of the costs of security as it does at 
its own sites).
Congress should pass legislation • 
requiring that as soon as sufficient sup-
plies of medical isotopes produced 
without HEU are available, the United 
States will stop exporting HEU for 
medical isotope production and stop 
importing any isotopes made from 
HEU.
A dAunting But eSSentiAl roAd
The obstacles to accelerated and expanded 
progress are real and difficult.  But with 
sustained high-level leadership, a sensible 
strategy, partnership-based approaches, 
adequate resources, and good informa-
tion, they can be overcome.  The actions 
President Obama has already taken in 
laying out the four-year objective, gaining 
Security Council endorsement of it, and 
calling the nuclear security summit, open 
new opportunities.  Now is the time to 
seize them.  President Obama still has an 
enormous opportunity, and obligation—to 
reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism to a 
fraction of its current level during his first 
term in office.
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